FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-079
Tuesday
23 April 1996

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-079 *23 April 1996*

CONTENTS

NOTICE: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

ALBANIA

Albania: PS's Islami on 'Strategic Importance' of U.S. Ties *[DREJT 21 Apr]* 1

BULGARIA

Bulgaria: SDS Daily Criticizes Program for Solana Visit *[DEMOKRATSIYA 19 Apr]* 3
Bulgaria: Lilov Rules Out Presidential Candidacy *[KONTINENT 22 Apr]* 3
Bulgaria: Zhelev on Elections, President's Prerogatives *[STANDART NEWS 20 Apr]* 4
Bulgaria: SDS Candidate on Presidential Powers *[Sofia Radio]* 4
Bulgaria: SDS Leader Kostov Comments on Primaries *[DEMOKRATSIYA 22 Apr]* 5
Bulgaria: SDS Leader Describes 'Third Political Center' *[STANDART NEWS 22 Apr]* 6
Bulgaria: Belene Reactor To Be Commissioned by 2004 *[TRUD 18 Apr]* 7
Bulgaria: Cabinet Said To Have Approved Belene Plant *[DEMOKRATSIYA 23 Apr]* 7
Bulgaria: Politicians Accused of Selling Country's Assets *[24 CHASA 22 Apr]* 7

CZECH REPUBLIC

Czech Republic: Havel, China's Qian Discuss Human Rights *[Prague Radio]* 9
Czech Republic: Comment: Yeltsin 'Lesser Evil' for West *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 22 Apr]* 9
Czech Republic: Talk of Cutting Military Service Premature *[LIDOVE NOVINY 20 Apr]* 10

SLOVAKIA

Slovakia: Clinton Seen 'Defensive' on NATO Expansion *[PRAVDA 23 Apr]* 11
Slovakia: Concessions at Clinton-Yeltsin Summit Analyzed *[NARODNA OBRODA 23 Apr]* 11
Slovakia: Schenk Expects Veto of NATO Expansion Act *[SME 23 Apr]* 12
Slovakia: Chance of NATO Membership Seen Deteriorating *[SME 22 Apr]* 12
Slovakia: Opposition Conspiracy Alleged in EU Demarche *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA, etc.]* 12
Slovakia: Construction Firm at Iranian Power Plant *[PRAVDA 22 Apr]* 13
Slovakia: Prosecutor Examining Breach of Language Law *[SME 19 Apr, etc.]* 14
Slovakia: Councils' Decrees on Use of Hungarian Viewed *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 20 Apr]* 15
Slovakia: Kovac Jr Accuses Investigator of Disinformation *[NARODNA OBRODA 20 Apr]* 15
Slovakia: Former Investigators on Accusations *[NARODNA OBRODA 19 Apr, etc.]* 16
Slovakia: Kovac Suspicious of New Territorial Division *[PRACA 20 Apr]* 17
Slovakia: 'Political Criteria' Said Used in STV Layoffs *[SME 20 Apr]* 17
Slovakia: Minister Fires Academia Istropolitana Director *[SLOVAK SPECTATOR 28 Feb-12 Mar]* 17
Slovakia: Public Works Projects To Lower Unemployment *[SLOVAK SPECTATOR 28 Feb-12 Mar]* 19

HUNGARY

Hungary: Defense Minister Views NATO Compatibility *[MAGYAR NEMZET 20 Apr]* 20
Hungary: Major General Vegh Assesses U.S. Visit *[NEPSZABADSAG 22 Apr]* 22
Hungary: Prospective MDF Leader Gyorgy Gemesi Interviewed *[168 ORA 30 Jan]* 23

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

B-H: Izetbegovic Tells Buzim Crowd: Country Not Yet Free *[Sarajevo Radio]* 26

B-H: Izetbegovic Visits Bosanska Krupa, Champions Integrity *[Sarajevo Radio]* 26
B-H: Izetbegovic Pledges Aid to Western Bosnia at Bihac Rally *[Sarajevo Radio]* 27
B-H: Muratovic Comments on Ties to Serb Republic, Croatia *[VECERNJE NOVINE 18 Apr]* 27
B-H: Izetbegovic Stresses Importance of Elections *[Sarajevo Radio]* 29
B-H: Prlic, Casado View 'Need' To Meet Election Deadlines *[Sarajevo Radio]* 29
B-H: Ukraine To Allot $50,000 for Organization of Elections *[Hanau NOVA BOSNA 19 Apr]* 30
B-H: NATO Head Solana Gives 'Top Priority' to Elections *[Madrid Radio]* 30
B-H: EU Sets Out New Rules for Return of Refugees to Mostar *[Sarajevo Radio]* 30
B-H: EU Officials in Mostar Deny Embezzlement Charges *[AFP]* 31
B-H: Diplomatic Relations Established With Latvia *[Sarajevo Radio]* 31
B-H: Refugees Plan More 'Mass Returns' to Former Homes *[AFP]* 32
B-H: 50 Muslims Reportedly Missing in Serb Town of Doboj *[Sarajevo TV]* 32
B-H: 'Most' of Velika Kladusa Under Croatian Army Control *[SRNA]* 33
B-H: Croatia To Establish Air Links to Sarajevo, Mostar *[Sarajevo Radio]* 33
B-H: Commission Demands Belgrade Release of 4 Bosniak POW's *[Sarajevo Radio]* 33
B-H: Serb, Croat Councils Propose District for Sarajevo *[Sarajevo TV]* 33
B-H: Croat Council Prepared To Defend War Crimes Accused *[Mostar Radio]* 34
B-H: Government Wants Case Against Djukic To Continue *[AFP]* 34
B-H: Goldstone Sees Trial as Way To Prevent Conflicts *[London THE EUROPEAN 18-24 Apr]* 35
B-H: Goldstone: Chances Improved To Arrest Bosnian Serbs *[AFP]* 36
B-H: Karadzic Calls Hague Tribunal 'Political Farce' *[Pale TV]* 36
B-H: Karadzic Orders Investigation on Banja Luka IFOR Base *[SRNA]* 37
B-H: Serb General Wants IFOR To Be Tougher on Muslims *[SRNA]* 37
B-H: Bosnian Serb General Protests Helicopter Incident *[SRNA]* 38
B-H: Pale Serbs Accuse IFOR of Encouraging 'Aggression' *[Belgrade Radio]* 38
B-H: Serbs Allege 'Biased' Treatment by NATO, Police *[SRNA]* 38
B-H: Serbs, IMF Officials Discuss Payments, Currency *[Bad Vilbel VESTI 21 Apr]* 39
B-H: Serbs' Kasagic, World Bank Officials Discuss Issues *[SRNA]* 39
B-H: Serb PM on Elections, Economic Issues *[TANJUG]* 39
B-H: Kasagic Asks Media To Work on 'Preservation' of RS *[Belgrade Radio]* 40
B-H: Banja Luka Mayor Comments on Economy *[Bad Vilbel VESTI 16 Apr]* 40
B-H: Belgrade Daily Interviews Serb Member of Presidency *[NASA BORBA 11 Apr]* 42
B-H: Teslic SP Holds Rally, Calls For 'Free State' *[Belgrade Radio]* 43
B-H: Teslic Socialists Call For Removal of SDS 'Extremists' *[Belgrade TV]* 44
B-H: Opposition Party Leader Calls for 'Unity' *[Hanau NOVA BOSNA 22 Apr]* 44
B-H: SDS Vice President on Unification With Serbia *[SRNA]* 44

CROATIA

Croatia: Granic, Hungary's Kovacs Sign Agreements *[Budapest Radio]* 45
Croatia: Hungarian FM Stresses Rights of Minorities *[Budapest Radio]* 45
Croatia: Deputy FM on Normalizing Relations With FRY *[TANJUG]* 45
Croatia: POW Committee Chairman Views Talks With FRY *[VECERNJI LIST 19 Apr]* 46
Croatia: Serb Leader on Future of Srem, Baranja Region *[TANJUG]* 48

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

FYROM: Assembly Commission Backs Agreement With FRY *[MIC]* 49
FYROM: Gligorov's Role, Political Polarization Viewed *[PULS 19 Apr]* 49

POLAND

Poland: Cimoszewicz Wants Full Disclosure on Oleksy Case *[Warsaw Radio]* 51
Poland: URM, MSW Disagree on Central Ministerial Reform *[GAZETA SWIATECZNA 20-21 Apr]* 51

Poland: Minister of Internal Affairs Interviewed *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 19 Apr]* 52
Poland: Control of Intelligence Services, Armed Forces *[GLOS SZCZECINSKI 2 Apr]* 55
Poland: President Accepts KRRIT's Annual Activity Report *[TANJUG]* 56
Poland: PSL Deputy on Coalition, 'Squabbles' *[Warsaw Radio]* 57
Poland: Rift Over Powiats Endangers Coalition Unity *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 22 Apr]* 58
Poland: Daily on 'Tension' Within Governing Coalition *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 22 Apr]* 59

ROMANIA

Romania: Iliescu Responds to Roman's Accusations *[VOCEA ROMANIEI 18 Apr]* 60
Romania: PD's Roman Challenges Iliescu to Debate *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 18 Apr]* 61

SLOVENIA

Slovenia: Thaler Briefs Spain on Negotiations With EU *[Madrid ABC 20 Apr]* 62

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

FRY: Milutinovic Arrives in Belgrade From Bucharest *[TANJUG]* 63
FRY: FM Comments on Friendship Treaty With Romania *[TANJUG]* 63
FRY: Deputy FM Receives Russian Counterpart *[TANJUG]* 64
FRY: Macedonian Tourists To Get Domestic Visitor Statur *[TANJUG]* 64

Serbia

Serbia: SPO's Draskovic Criticizes Milosevic at Rally *[Bad Vilbel VESTI 21 Apr]* 65
Serbia: Vojvodina Official Hails Good Minority Relations *[TANJUG]* 65
Serbia: Psychologist on Impact of Crisis on Serb Mentality *[DUGA 28 Oct-10 Nov]* 66

Kosovo

Kosovo: LDK Says Albanians Oppose Inclusion in FRY *[KOSOVA DAILY REPORT]* 71
Kosovo: Five People Killed in Shootings in 24 Hours *[Ljubljana Radio]* 71
Kosovo: 'Armed Terrorists' Kill, Injure 10 in Province *[Belgrade Radio]* 71

Albania: PS's Islami on 'Strategic Importance' of U.S. Ties

AU2204102496 Tirana DREJT in Albanian 21 Apr 96 p 3

[Article by Socialist Party (PS) Deputy Kastriot Islami: "We the Albanians and the United States"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Albania has a special political, historical, cultural, and religious position in the Balkans. It is one of the rare countries in the region of Christian origin but without religious homogeneity. The coexistence of three main religions is now a proven reality. Culturally and racially, Albania is neither Latin, Greek, nor Slav. The Albanian language, a separate branch on the Indo-European trunk, is entirely specific. Politically, Albania was entirely without democratic traditions until 1990: almost five centuries under Ottoman domination, 15 years as a monarchy, and 50 years under communist dictatorship. From the national point of view, the Albanians are the most disadvantaged nation in the region. When all the other nations were forming their nation states, the Albanians were living divided, as if they were different peoples with the same language. All these things put the Albanian state in a relatively difficult position in relation to its neighbors, who are either larger or have connections with one another on the most various planes. Put more bluntly, either for objective reasons abroad or subjective reasons involving the policies of its state leaders, Albania has been isolated or surrounded by ephemeral ideological friends. This has often left Albania off the discussion table, and the country has historically been reduced to a buffer state belonging neither to the East or to the West or to both at the same time.

Albania has always been of geopolitical interest. Historically, the United States has always been a friend to Albania and the Albanians. I prefer to add the word historically, because official policy was not able to reflect this reality until pluralism was established. Thus, for various reasons, the United States was not able to become a direct friend of Albania because of the power interests or ideological interests of the Albanian leaders. One of the main reasons why the United States is counted among Albanias sincere friends is that the United States has always been highly interested in peace and tranquillity in the region, whether in the structures that preserved an equilibrium before World War II, during the Cold War, or during the sudden outbreaks of nationalism in a Balkans racked by conflicting interests. It is precisely here where the wisdom of Albanian policy lies, in orienting itself toward its traditional friends. This is where Albanian policy must concentrate more intensely, on finally consolidating its traditional friendships.

The nineties meant the final opening of Albania and created the opportunity for Albanian foreign policy to exploit its historical and geopolitical position. It must be admitted that there have been considerable achievements during this time, although the pace could have been faster, in that the objective and subjective conditions pointed to something more.

U.S.-Albanian relations are without doubt of strategic importance in all areas, especially the political and military sphere, without neglecting the economy. Because the United States is the leader of NATO, it is quite natural for Albanian policy to also be parallel to that of NATO. This conclusion arises from the delicate balance in the region, the unclear political and economic position of the Albanians, and the U.S. interest in peace and tranquillity. Of course, Albanian policy is in a very difficult position because equilibrium seems to be constructed as a balance of regional powers, aligned on opposing axes. In this context, it is difficult to find a satisfactory axis for the alignment of Albanian policy in a highly confused Balkan conglomeration because any such solution results in a balance of positive and negative factors without any clear advantage. Even in this kind of settlement, the U.S. factor must be borne in mind, but, naturally, while not arousing any unpleasant jealousy among our neighbors. A nonaligned position is impossible for Albania, despite what some people may imagine, and it is therefore a historical necessity to join the Partnership for Peace program and to hasten progress toward membership of NATO. Thus Albania and the Albanians will realize an appropriate political and economic development within the framework of a democratic state, also securing a role as a factor of stability and peace in the Balkans.

Where the Albanian national question is concerned, the help of the United States has been foremost in ensuring that the Albanian-inhabited territories in the former Yugoslavia have not fallen victim to the conflicts of regional nationalisms and in preventing armed conflict from spreading to the southern Balkans. The Dayton agreement, although it may suggest to some a half-baked settlement for the Albanians, was an important moment in establishing tranquillity and peace and was a step towards a definitive peaceful settlement. The principles of not changing borders by force and of a dialogue of interested parties in the presence of a third person could open the way to a solution of the Albanian question, merely on the basis of the peace of Dayton.

The continual support of the United States for Albania's democratization has been important for strengthening the Albanian state, giving Albania the opportunity to contribute with wisdom and moderation to a settlement of the national question. Turning Albania's northern

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

border, without violence and in a Western way, into a route facilitating free cooperation among Albanians would be a highly important step and perhaps the best possible solution for the preservation of peace and tranquillity in the region. Of course, this long and difficult process would involve successive steps toward a definitive solution, and the entire process would involve Pan-Albanian unification and cooperation, in which Albania's tradition friends such as the United States would take the lead as foreign factors.

I end here by saying that wise Albanian policy must concentrate its main energies on achieving harmony with the policy of the United States and Albania's other traditional friends. Albania needs her traditional friends. This is a difficult task for Albanian policy, but one that is entirely feasible with political wisdom.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Bulgaria: SDS Daily Criticizes Program for Solana Visit

AU2304092996 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 19 Apr 96 p 1

[Article by Irina Yordanova: "Preparations Are Under Way To Isolate Javier Solana"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sofia—Yesterday the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry sent to NATO Secretary General Javier Solana a draft program for his visit to Bulgaria that includes no provisions for meetings with the opposition and the public. The Foreign Ministry plans and proposes that Mr. Solana should have lunch and give a joint news conference with Georgi Pirinski and be a guest at an official dinner hosted by Prime Minister Zhan Videnov.

The letter appended to the program, which DEMOKRATSIYA has at its disposal, states that the visit by the NATO secretary general on 2 and 3 May is in response to the invitation from Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski.

The NATO secretary general is coming to Bulgaria as part of his tour of NATO-partner countries, Bulgaria's ambassador to NATO, Lea Koen, told us over the telephone when we inquired. She added that various institutions and public organizations have sent invitations to him. In her view, the highest-level invitation comes from the president. She added that there are also invitations from the foreign minister, leaders of the parliamentary opposition, the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, and the Atlantic Club. "My information is that the secretary general would like to dine with the president, for which he has an invitation, lunch with the prime minister, if the latter invites him, talk to opposition leaders, and meet with the public at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences," Ambassador Koen said.

According to the draft program sent by the Foreign Ministry to Javier Solana and signed by Atanas Pavlov, chief of protocol, the NATO secretary general arrives at 1200 on Thursday, 2 May and will be accommodated in the Boyana Residence. He is to hold talks over a working lunch with Georgi Pirinski, which is planned to last two and a half hours. After this, he is to have a one-hour conversation with the defense minister. This is followed by a one-hour visit to Prime Minister Zhan Videnov and a 35-minute visit to President Zhelev. Then comes a visit to Blagovest Sendov's office and talks with National Assembly deputies, after which Solana and Pirinski are to give a joint news conference in the Boyana Residence. At the end of the day, an official dinner is planned in honor of the NATO secretary general, to be hosted by Zhan Videnov in the Boyana Residence. On the following day, there will be an official ceremony to see off Mr. Solana when he departs for Bucharest.

In answer to our question, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Pantaley Karasimeonov said that he does not have the draft program sent to Solana in his possession and therefore cannot comment. He explained that the draft program is being handled through diplomatic channels and is not meant for journalists.

Foreign Ministry sources have confirmed that the invitation for a meeting with Javier Solana that was sent to him by the leaders of the Bulgarian parliamentary opposition—Ivan Kostov, Anastasiya Mozer, Stefan Savov, and Ahmed Dogan—has been sent through the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry to the NATO secretary general's office. Solana's office has stated that it has also received the invitation from President Zhelyu Zhelev, who wants to have a personal meeting with Solana and give a dinner in the visitor's honor. Solana's office has also received the letter from Ivan Yukhnovski, president of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, inviting him to deliver a lecture to the scientific community.

Bulgaria: Lilov Rules Out Presidential Candidacy

AU2204141496 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 22 Apr 96 p 8

[Report by KONTINENT team]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Stara Zagora, Sofia—The results of the presidential elections will depend on the government of the left, whether it justifies the advance trust that people have put in it, Aleksandur Lilov declared at a meeting in Stara Zagora on Saturday 20 April. He said that he did not want his name discussed as a presidential candidate.

The BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] strategist believes that Bulgaria can no longer tolerate a weak government and that the left has made serious omissions in its administration. Lilov declared that he did not want his name to be discussed as a potential presidential candidate. He said that the left has strong presidential duos, mentioning the names of Georgi Pirinski, Professor Todor Vulchev, Blagovest Sendov, Professor Nikolay Genchev, and Nikolay Kamov.

At their conference, the Pleven Socialists rejected Blagovest Sendov as a presidential candidate. Their only criterion for the presidential candidate was that he should be "a strong figure and a BSP member." Professor Vladimir Topencharov told the delegates that soundings taken in some of the larger party organizations throughout the country indicated that Georgi Pirinski is running ahead of Lilov and Sendov. A poll

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

held in Kurdzhali also came up with Georgi Purvanov as a potential candidate. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: Zhelev on Elections, President's Prerogatives

AU2204135196 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 20 Apr 96 p 10

[Interview with Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev by Stefan Kostov; place and date not given: "With a Socialist President, Bulgaria Will Be Erased From World Map"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Kostov] Mr. President, the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] opposed your candidacy from the moment it was declared. Why did you nevertheless agree to participate in the primaries?

[Zhelev] I agreed to such an unusual—for the Bulgarian conditions—variant, such as the primaries, because our opposition proved immature and incapable of resolving such issues in a democratic manner. The opposition cannot find the road toward its unity in a much simpler manner such as the roundtable. [passage omitted]

[Kostov] The leaders of the blue [SDS] coalition maintain that you are threatening their unity by forming a third political force.

[Zhelev] The suspicion and speculations among certain SDS circles regarding a third political force only disclose their fear that the "blue" monopoly could be violated. This demonstrates the other complexes regarding a monopoly on the entire opposition space. This is lethal for a democratic opposition.

I regard those things in a calmer and more objective manner. A third political force cannot emerge on the basis of a prescription or at somebody's instruction, because of his own needs. It can only emerge as a result of an objective tendency and social needs. [passage omitted]

[Kostov] Could the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] manipulate the elections?

[Zhelev] Indeed, the Socialists are showing a suspiciously great interest in the elections, in certain aspects even greater than the interest of the democratic circles' representatives. This indicates that there perhaps will be attempts to manipulate the primaries. However, the more people vote the lesser the chances of a manipulation. If the elections are limited exclusively to elections by the party apparatus, the possibilities to manipulate them increase.

[Kostov] Will you abide by the election results if they are incorrect?

[Zhelev] I have signed a document and I will keep my word. However, if the elections really are incorrect and if the basic clauses of the agreement that was signed are violated, I think that the political forces that signed this agreement and which are supporting me should react first. I would also react in a certain manner, but I think that the important thing is to conduct the elections in the most correct manner. The Bulgarian democratic society has no other chance.

[Kostov] Whom do you prefer as an opponent in the real elections—Pirinski or Sendov?

[Zhelev] It would be incorrect on my part to commit myself to a specific answer because the BSP has not yet nominated its candidate against whom I will eventually run. I do not exclude the possibility that Academician Sendov will be my opponent. [passage omitted]

[Kostov] If Bulgaria's new president is a Socialist will there be any correcting mechanism in the ruling party's policy?

[Zhelev] No, there will be no correcting mechanism. With a Socialist president, Bulgaria will be erased from the world map. [passage omitted]

[Kostov] Are the presidential prerogatives really curbed so that the head of state only is a figurehead?

[Zhelev] There have been many speculations on this matter. The presidential institution in Bulgaria has enough prerogatives. I am not saying that they could not be increased or expanded. The entire command personnel of the Armed Forces and the entire diplomatic corps depend on the president. My postponing veto is not the greatest presidential prerogative or level of influence, but I can always turn to the Constitutional Court when bills automatically readopted by parliament are returned to me. Let us also remember my other prerogatives, such as the addresses to the nation and parliament. Those things should not be underestimated.

[Kostov] What book will you write if you end your political career?

[Zhelev] I have no intention of ending my political career.

Bulgaria: SDS Candidate on Presidential Powers

AU1804174796 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 18 Apr 96

[Report by correspondent Ginka Dimitrova]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today Petur Stoyanov, the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] presidential candidate, held meetings in General Toshevo and Dobrich with SDS members and supporters. The president can neither

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

stop inflation, reduce bread and milk prices, nor check crime, Petur Stoyanov said, pointing out that these are the prerogatives of the executive. I cannot speculate or make promises that all this will happen, Stoyanov said, but the Bulgarian Constitution grants sufficient powers to the president for him to powerfully influence the democratic processes in Bulgaria.

Bulgaria: SDS Leader Kostov Comments on Primaries

AU2204141096 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 22 Apr 96 pp 1-2

[Interview with Ivan Kostov, leader of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), by Galina Mineva in Shumen; date not given: "The Supreme Court's Ruling Marks the Death Knell for the Orion Group of Friends"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Mineva] As you foresaw, the truth has come to light about the bank that belongs to the Orion group of friends [Bulgarian Agricultural and Industrial Bank]. Are you pleased with the Supreme Court's decision to remove it from the court's register?

[Kostov] I am delirious with joy. The court decision is not only the start of the way out for Orion's "group of friends." I cannot see from where Veska Medzhidieva will collect the money for a new license under present conditions, despite what she said on television. It is no secret that the Bulgarian Agricultural and Industrial Bank was formed with 200 million leva of stolen money. I cannot understand how a person against whom charges are pending will be able to gather 800 million leva for a domestic license. It is a ridiculous idea for her to get a license from the Bulgarian National Bank [BNB]. If the BNB does nevertheless grant her one, we will immediately protest and submit a new report about the illegal activities of this credit institution. In the most friendly way, I advise Orion to forget the idea of the bank.

[Mineva] Which BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] candidate [in the presidential elections] would cause you to worry?

[Kostov] One that would consolidate the BSP. The name of the candidate is of no importance. It is more than certain that 83 percent of the electors will vote for the man that BSP headquarters recommends. At the moment, it seems that the names being mentioned most often are causing a split in the BSP. I remind you that the communists have failed to keep their promise to name a candidate, as 20 April has come and gone. This suggests that something has gone awry and that they do not have a man who can consolidate them. The procrastination makes me think that the candidate will be nominated with the help of an outside factor, which is humiliating for our country. It is emerging that the situation in Russia is playing a decisive role.

[Mineva] How many people do you expect to vote in the presidential primaries?

[Kostov] I will be happy if 10-15 percent take part.

[Mineva] How will you persuade people to vote?

[Kostov] With the appeal "Whoever does not vote helps the BSP." Active SDS members cannot permit themselves not to vote because this would mean that the primaries would fail. The failure of the primaries would bury the idea of a single united candidate once and for all.

[Mineva] Do any hidden pitfalls threaten the SDS in these elections?

[Kostov] I do not conceal the fact that we are worried by the existence of this agreement among 11 parties, which do not want to sign our own agreement. We cannot fail to be concerned that part of the opposition supports Zhelev, but refuses to accept the clauses of the agreement that state that, if Zhelev loses in the primaries, they will have to support our candidate. It is now emerging that their numbers include implacable opponents of the SDS.

[Mineva] According to Dr. Zhelev, the interest of the Socialists in the forthcoming elections [the opposition primaries] arouses suspicions. He does not exclude the possibility of the Socialists manipulating them. What is the SDS's view?

[Kostov] We are becoming increasingly convinced that our competitors have some neurotic fear of our candidate. By competitors I mean the president and, most of all, the People's Union. I consider that it would be more honorable for Dr. Zhelev to accept Petur Stoyanov's invitation to a debate. By so doing, he would neutralize the BSP's attacks against him. I regard as incorrect and intolerant the retort that the Communists would like people to go out and vote for Petur Stoyanov because he is less likely to be elected. The BSP will not take part in the primaries, because they will not issue the order to their political structures to spring into action for the simple reason that they want the primaries to fail.

[Mineva] The second SDS accountability-election conference in Shumen is now over. In which direction is the Shumen SDS organization moving, and what is the assessment of its activities?

[Kostov] The reelection of the organization's old leadership is in itself an important positive assessment of the work of Mikhail Nedelchev and his team. It shows that they have discovered the right steps that will bring

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

us into the leading position throughout the region. I believe that this leadership is extremely familiar with the situation and is capable of finding successful measures for the SDS as a whole. Personally, I have complete faith in these leaders.

[Mineva] Would you comment on the view expressed at the Shumen conference that the poor distribution of the DEMOKRATSIYA newspaper in the Shumen and Razgrad areas is yet another ideological move by the Socialists. Everybody knows that the 168 Chasa Press Group has taken over the distribution of the SDS daily.

[Kostov] I am grateful for this tip-off. I am sure that it is no accident. What is worse, it threatened the progress of our campaign on behalf of our candidate Petur Stoyanov in the primaries.

[Mineva] Do you see any ways and means of removing Shumen from the notorious "red triangle" of Shumen, Razgrad, and Turgovishte? Recently, your deputy Aleksandur Bozhkov pointed out that our place is in the vicinity of the SDS cities of Varna, Plovdiv, and Stara Zagora.

[Kostov] There are always ways of winning the public's confidence. We have to work and find the winning ideas. No districts are hopeless. I am sure that these are problems that will be resolved locally, not by SDS headquarters in Sofia.

[Mineva] You have declared that the return of Tsar Simeon II will benefit the SDS. Can you explain the malice of the Socialists and the insinuations they are casting against his majesty?

[Kostov] Of course. They are simply scared. They are worried because they see in his person the true rallier of the country around the cause of patriotism, which is of benefit to all of us. They do not want to admit that the tsar is the symbol of a strong national tradition and of our historical memory.

Bulgaria: SDS Leader Describes 'Third Political Center'

AU2204145596 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 22 Apr 96 p 8

[Interview with SDS Leader Ivan Kostov by an unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "We Are Very Worried About the Birth of a Third Political Center"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [STANDARD NEWS] Mr. Kostov, from your recent statements, it emerges that the opposition's presidential primaries will decide the future of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces]. Is this juncture really such a fateful one for your coalition?

[Kostov] At the moment, nothing is more important than the success of the primaries. Whoever among our members fails to cast his vote will in practice be aiding the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party]. If the primaries collapse and fewer than 10 percent of the expected voters take part, the losing side will not accept the results. This will bury the idea of a single candidate representing the united opposition and internecine strife will recommence, a power struggle that will create the most favorable atmosphere for the BSP.

For this reason, there is no more important task for all SDS members than to encourage the voters to take part. Our people must canvass from door to door and visit every house. My wife and I will be visiting every family in Dragalevtsi that belongs to our club. We have to make contact with everyone.

Over the last three years, our people have lost their socioeconomic positions and they are without jobs. This is what caused the BSP to take power. The Socialists operate on partisan principles and put their own people into jobs. Accordingly, the SDS message advocates a united opposition.

[STANDARD NEWS] However, at the same time, a third political center is being formed that stands firmly behind President Zhelev. Is this not so?

[Kostov] We are very worried by the birth of a new political formation that consists of 11 parties. They have refused to sign the political agreement on a single presidential candidate for the opposition. What is this group aiming at, by declaring that it opposes the primaries? In practical terms, they are opposing the unity for which we are striving. We, of course, want the parties that support President Zhelev to unite and declare their support for him clearly, but they should be part of our agreement. This will mean that they accept the main clause in the agreement, that they will all support the candidate who wins the primaries. Otherwise, we are really at a loss to understand why the formation that the president calls a third alternative is being created. A third alternative to what? Let us assume that Zhelev will act honorably and honestly and withdraw his candidature if he loses the primaries. However, these 11 parties may think of nominating someone else, with the result that the opposition will again turn out to have two candidates for the same elections. In the statements that these people have made we perceive an unconcealed hatred of the SDS. Where does this hatred come from? Where does their expectation that the SDS will disintegrate come from? In Sofia, there are some who think that their road to success runs over the corpse of the SDS. This will not happen. [passage omitted]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[STANDARD NEWS] It is said that the BSP will instruct its members to vote for opposition candidates in the primaries. Is such a manipulation possible?

[Kostov] These are suggestions put out by Zhelev himself. We are convinced that the BSP will not call upon its people to take part in the primaries. The Socialists will not go and sign their names on a list that is being drawn up by the democratic forces. Again, the BSP has quite enough problems of its own without thrusting its way into our elections. If, nevertheless, the Socialists decide on such a move, we will be the first to demand an explanation from BSP headquarters in Sofia. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: Belene Reactor To Be Commissioned by 2004

AU1804085296 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 18 Apr 96 p 6

[Article by Vesela Vaneva: "Belene Nuclear Power Plant Is Being Unblocked; Construction To Continue Next Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The construction of Bulgaria's second nuclear power plant is to go forward again, it became known yesterday after the startup of the Romanian Cerna Voda reactor. Konstantin Rusinov, chairman of the Committee on Power Supply, told TRUD that the investments in Belene have resumed, and that construction will also resume in 1997. The Bulgarian Energoproekt and the Russian Mosatomeneproekt Institutes have been commissioned to study the situation of the already constructed capacities of the Belene Nuclear Power Plant. The two studies are ready and by the end of April we will examine them, Mr. Rusinov said.

A check of jurists has revealed that there is not a single governmental act on stopping the construction of the Belene Nuclear Power Plant. No National Assembly document on this matter has been discovered. According to the new timetable, the first reactor should be commissioned by 2004. So far $1.3 billion has been invested in that reactor.

Bulgaria: Cabinet Said To Have Approved Belene Plant

AU2304103596 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 23 Apr 96 p 4

[FBIS Translated Text] [DEMOKRATSIYA report: "The Energy Industry Is Stirring in Connection With the Belene Nuclear Power Plant Project"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sofia (DEMOKRATSIYA)—There are signs of movement in energy industry circles regarding the construction of the second nuclear power plant in Belene, informed sources have reported. According to reports, one possible version being considered just now is to suspend the construction of the 1,000-megawatt reactor and immediately start building a second reactor, whose capacity is likely to be 600 megawatts. The construction cost of the smaller reactor is estimated to be around $1,700 per kilowatt. Two proposals for this reactor have been made: one by the Russians, and the other by the U.S. Westinghouse Company. The offers have reportedly not been assessed and examined in detail.

One deterrent factor is the lack of clarity surrounding the construction of the nuclear plant. However, energy experts consider that if we change over to constructing the second reactor unit, its cost is likely to be as high as that of the more powerful 1,000-megawatt reactor. Informed persons believe that it is inappropriate to draw a comparison between the Czech Temelin plant and Belene, because the Czechs have almost completely changed the original Russian project and altered the nuclear plant's equipment with Westinghouse's help. Specialists comment that our own energy system is not stable enough to permit the use of 1,000-megawatt reactors because if one of them suddenly breaks down when no standby supply sources are available, this would make electricity cuts necessary. According to informed sources, at the time when the 1,000-megawatt reactors were being purchased for Kozloduy, the then Soviet power industry minister advised our people not to buy 1,000-megawatt units but to choose reactors of lower capacity, but no one was prepared to listen to him.

At this stage, no one in the corridors of power would venture to adopt a clear decision regarding the construction at Belene, well-informed persons say, and for this reason preparations are being made in secrecy with the public being kept in the dark. However, by signing the national energy strategy document for the period until the year 2020 a few months ago, the government in fact said yes to the new plant.

Bulgaria: Politicians Accused of Selling Country's Assets

AU2204124996 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 22 Apr 96 p 8

[Article by Georgi Banov: "How We Become the Greatest State in the Balkans"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The other day, Romania made a blatant attempt to pull our switch. Furthermore, some German expert also tried to play games with us by offering us electricity from Cernavoda if we shut down the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant. Such a proposal from abroad does not look so impudent when it is

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

made to a country that has been without a national coat of arms for seven years; a country in which the ambassadors are divided into president's men and others, but not into Bulgarians and others; a country in which people have become billionaires from the Belene nuclear plant construction project; and a country in which foreigners decide when and how to shut down our largest power plant and what specimens should be taken from its reactor shell to make the plant unusable.

Energy is a token of national independence. If you have no electricity, you become a banana republic. It is clear that in the last 10 years no one has gained a big profit from this.

Every school student knows from his geography classes how poor we are in natural resources. Bulgaria has no native energy sources. Our largest thermoelectric power plants operate on coal imported from abroad. Our gas tap is controlled by Moscow and Kiev. What is left for us?

For every problem there are at least two alternative solutions. The easiest way is for us to continue our tradition of national nihilism and halt construction of the Belene nuclear power plant. This is elementary, and it will improve our image in the eyes of Europe's rulers. It appears that this is what will happen, at least this is what the president and the prime minister want. Even Edvin Sugarev, who personifies the wakeful conscience of our ecologists, has openly stated that the Cernavoda plant is safer than Kozloduy, but that he was worried about the people who will work there. Well, what if we give them the specialists from our own nuclear plant, who will otherwise be left on the streets? Thus, the wolf's belly is full, while Bulgaria remains intact.

Slowly and surely, democracy has transformed Bulgaria into the greatest country in the Balkans with more extensive territories than in the time of Tsar Simeon the Great [sentence as published]. The first to leave were the mayors of the DPS [Rights and Freedoms Movement], who decamped en masse to Turkey, despite Dogan's promises of prosperity. It was then the turn of Greece, which has taken our telephones and our water from the Mesta River, and now has its eyes on our gambling system. The Ilinden United Macedonian Organization has long dreamed of seeing Biagoevgrad the capital of a united Macedonia, and is drawing maps according to which Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] would annex a good portion of our 111,000 square kilometers.

Neither the statesmen nor the politicians are afraid of paying lip service to a more difficult decision—the Belene solution. The second nuclear power plant can solve our problems at a stroke. One should not disregard the projects for the plant that were approved long ago by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

However, this needs a little guts and Bulgarian patriotism, qualities that have been in short supply in recent years. Perhaps it only remains for the journalists to try to keep Bulgaria on the map since the politicians are looking hard to see what they can sell off abroad next, and it seems there is no one who is prepared to stop them.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Czech Republic: Havel, China's Qian Discuss Human Rights

LD2204123596 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President Vaclav Havel is meeting Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at Prague Castle at this moment. Eva Hulkova reports:

[Hulkova] The three-day official visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen is culminating in the meeting with President Havel. Before the talks between the two partners, Havel said that he intended to touch upon the infringement upon human rights in China during the talks.

According to preliminary information, the possibility of this question being asked is probably remote. The president and the minister will make their statements to journalists.

Ever since the Chinese foreign minister's arrival on 20 April, his visit has been accompanied by expressions of dissatisfaction. Various civic initiatives are demonstrating and protesting against the human rights situation in China.

There is calm at Prague Castle today. All the courtyards and Hradcany Square are filled with tourists, and the Castle police have not noted any protests. [Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech at 1200 GMT on 22 April adds: "When talking to Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at Prague Castle, President Vaclav Havel expressed his concern about the fate of Chinese political prisoners. According to the Chinese foreign minister, the problem of human rights in his country should be solved on the basis of a dialogue and not on the basis of confrontation. In his words, the meeting with President Havel today is one of the examples of this dialogue. President Havel also talked with the Chinese minister about relations between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan."]

Czech Republic: Comment: Yeltsin 'Lesser Evil' for West

AU2304094396 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 22 Apr 96 p 6

[Commentary by Michal Mocek: "The Issue in Russia Merely Involves the Lesser Evil"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The concept of nuclear safety was probably referred to more often at the Moscow meeting of the heads of the seven industrially most advanced states and Russia than the term electoral support—despite the fact that this was what it was all about here. Even Clinton's concluding assurance that the United States supports only the democratic reform forces in Russia and does not intend to advise anyone on whom to vote for could not disguise the fact that the West is clinging to its notion of the correct version of developments in Russia and that it means to promote it unwaveringly.

It would be hard to expect anything else two months before the Russian presidential elections. Hardly any Western politician would advocate inactivity face to face with the developments in Russia. Nevertheless, a whole series of possible actions between inactivity and uncritical support for what is regarded as democracy in Russia is on offer to realistic politicians.

But Western politicians would have to think hard about what democracy in Russia means. Namely, in practice, this concept manifests itself as a double-edged sword.

The Council of Europe found this out most recently. No sooner had it admitted Russia among its ranks as a democratic state than it had to take cognizance of the fact that Moscow, even now, does not intend to comply with the basic conditions that are otherwise strictly required of those interested in membership—for example, abolition of the death penalty.

Yeltsin again made it clear in Moscow on the weekend that he intends to use his status as a democratic statesman to establish Russia as an equal member of the group of seven most advanced states. With regard to saving democracy in Russia, no one dared to speak up and oppose him. In this case, as with the Council of Europe, Russia assumes that it is enough to have certain external signs that it is recognized as internally democratic or industrially highly developed. And then it will be revealed that it really is not.

So, now it could turn out that the West, which supports the current Russian president as a democrat without making a single critical comment, will, in a couple of months, be confronted with the demands and stances that it wanted to prevent.

Certainly even the greatest skepticism about democracy in Russia should not block the efforts to support the lesser political evil. It would be honest, however, to say that the issue in Russia merely involves this lesser evil and no kind of good.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Czech Republic: Talk of Cutting Military Service Premature

AU2204171296 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 20 Apr 95 p 5

[Article by Martin Polacek: "Military Service Will Not Be Cut"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Army is considering reducing basic military service, but it is not even thinking about a more precise date at the moment, said First Deputy Defense Minister Petr Necas in connection with the reports in the daily press.

A condition for reducing basic military service is, according to Necas, a substantially higher level of professionalization within the Army. "First and foremost, it is essential to fill the posts of the junior commanders and weapon specialists with longer-serving professional noncommissioned officers whose period of duty lasts from three to five years. Only this will create the prerequisite for being able to think about it at all. This is not possible in the current situation," reckons Necas. According to him, the Army would need 14,000 professional junior officers.

The second fundamental factor that would make it possible to cut basic military service from the current 12 months to 10 or even nine are changes in the training program. "Today, soldiers in basic service do not devote themselves fully to military training," claims Necas. "They carry out a series of other duties, starting with tidying up and ending with service in the kitchen." According to the deputy minister, such activities can be provided commercially as services, for example.

Necas also said that, in the current situation, any considerations about the date for cutting basic military service are premature. "It would be insincere to make any guesses. It all depends on how effective the recruitment of professional noncommissioned officers is. They have to make up the backbone of the Army."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Slovakia: Clinton Seen 'Defensive' on NATO Expansion

AU2304132496 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 23 Apr 96 p 10

[Commentary by Ivan Drabek: "Clinton's Moscow Defensive"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although Bill Clinton repeatedly rejected the idea that the chief goal of the Moscow summit was to express preelection support for Boris Yeltsin, their joint news conference cast doubt on this denial. In compliance with the "nonagression pact," the U.S. President was on the defensive and dropped the remark about the United States' unchanging attitude toward NATO expansion only when his host boasted about Clinton's alleged promise to exert influence on his collaborators not to accelerate this process. Yeltsin, on the other hand, has even hardened his negative stand on NATO's enlargement eastward. His statement: "The possibility should arise that no country will be admitted into the alliance without Russia's consent," can clearly be deciphered to mean a claim to the right of veto, on which Moscow previously did not insist. The fact that Clinton did not react adequately to this significant shift in the Russian position does not mean that the United States agrees to it. The fact that Clinton decided in Moscow to respect, albeit only unilaterally, the gentleman's agreement from the previous meeting in Egypt, where the U.S. and Russian presidents promised one another not to bring disputed issues to a head, apparently results from not being as pressed for time. While he has six months to go before the elections, his Russian counterpart has only two months left. From the viewpoint of Clinton's chances of being reelected, it is undoubtedly more important to have Yeltsin in the Kremlin, also after June, than to make a big thing out of the aberrations of a president who, by the time of the U.S. presidential elections, could be an ex-president.

Slovakia: Concessions at Clinton-Yeltsin Summit Analyzed

AU2304142996 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 23 Apr 96 p 9

[Commentary by Ivan Horsky: "Indications of Change From Moscow?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Less than two months prior to the Russian presidential elections, Western countries extended to Boris Yeltsin indirect, yet substantial help. However, only the number of ballots in the ballot boxes will show whether this help was productive or, rather, counterproductive.

The summit of the G7 + 2 (Russia and Ukraine) group on nuclear security, devoted to the developments in this sphere on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Chernobyl catastrophe, has yielded a number of positive results. The most important of them appears to be the promise to prepare a declaration on the complete ban on nuclear explosions for approval at the September meeting of the UN General Assembly. It will still be necessary, however, to overcome the reservations of China, India, and other countries asserting their specific requirements in this area. Apart from this issue, the discussions in Moscow also concerned upgrading the safety of nuclear power plants, especially those of Soviet (Russian) design. Ten of them, those equipped with reactors of the Chernobyl type, including the V1 at [Jaslovske] Bohunice, ought to be closed down expeditiously.

As far as NATO's expansion plans are concerned, it has been confirmed that, by hardening its stand, Moscow is trying in the preelection period to score points with domestic voters, long exposed to communist propaganda and the resulting fear of the alliance as a deadly enemy of their country. Although Boris Yeltsin tried once again to obtain for Russia the right of veto regarding the admission of new members, Bill Clinton has again publicly denied it to him. The impression is even arising that there exists a tacit agreement between the Kremlin and the White House, under which NATO can expand eastwards, while Russia is given the right to expand its influence in the post-Soviet territory. With the exception of Ukraine, of course, which is of immense importance to the West. For Moscow, this was simultaneously an important signal prior to Boris Yeltsin's upcoming visit to China. Some disarmament treaties, on the details of which it will still be necessary to confer at expert level, also fall into the context of mutual concessions. The United States accepted the argument that the modification of Russian commitments stemming from the Treaty on Limiting Conventional Forces in Europe is in the interest of strengthening the security of the Caucasus and Kaliningrad wings. In return, Washington received the promise of a more precise interpretation of the 1972 treaty banning antimissile systems (ABM Treaty). Congress is asking the U.S. Administration to build, in the interest of protecting U.S. territory, a limited antimissile system capable of protecting the country's territory against terrorist attacks by means of ballistic missiles.

Of great importance for the Kremlin was that the United States acknowledged the conflict in Chechnya as a matter of Russian domestic policy. Bill Clinton's appeal to deal with it by political means must be understood as unavoidable accompanying music designed to accom-

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

modate the worldwide criticism of the Russian Army's course of action.

The 10th anniversary [Clinton-Yeltsin] meeting showed, despite the White House chief's endeavor publicly to proclaim equal distance from all contenders for the Kremlin seat, that the incumbent Russian president is the most acceptable partner for him, also in view of their good mutual relations and the relatively good legibility [citatelnost] of Yeltsin's actions. This does not rule out, however, that the United States is also prepared for another alternative.

Slovakia: Schenk Expects Veto of NATO Expansion Act

AU2304121296 Bratislava SME in Slovak 23 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by "rk": "Will the U.S. Administration Veto NATO's Expansion?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Responding yesterday to journalists' comments that, recently, Slovakia has been dropped from statements by Western politicians concerning the first group of countries to be admitted into NATO, Minister of Foreign Affairs Juraj Schenk said that he did not think that "the situation has changed in any significant way in this respect." According to his words, "Slovakia is not changing its decision to become a full-fledged member of NATO." Commenting on the bill on NATO expansion drafted in the U.S. Congress, in which, supposedly, Slovakia is not named in the first admission wave, unlike the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, Juraj Schenk said: "Presidential elections are being prepared in the United States, and the Republicans are presenting problems somewhat differently than the Democrats in Congress. The position of the present Democrat-led administration is not to name anyone. Even if a group of congressmen were to put forward such a view of the Republicans, it is highly likely that, in the present period, the U.S. Administration would veto such a wording."

Slovakia: Chance of NATO Membership Seen Deteriorating

AU2304074896 Bratislava SME in Slovak 22 Apr 96 p 6

[Commentary by Ivan Kuhn: "Slovakia Moving From First Class to Second Class in the North Atlantic Alliance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The situation is serious. It is serious enough for Jozef Sestak, state secretary at the Foreign Ministry to have admitted that the bill of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress, which enables the U.S. Administration to provide assistance to alliance-membership hopefuls, mentions the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as membership candidates. The gravity of the situation is emphasized by the fact that in two similar laws adopted by the U.S. Congress in the past Slovakia was also mentioned. True, it is only a draft law, and even if it were adopted in its present wording, it allows the President to add other countries to the list. Nevertheless, the absence of Slovakia in the bill is a serious warning. Moreover, this fact confirms that the voices pointing out Slovakia's being degraded from the "first class," expected to "advance to the North Atlantic extra class" are more than just doomsayer voices of the "ill-wishers of the young Slovak statehood" but rather voices based on information from circles in which the future expansion of NATO will be decided or at least jiontly decided. To ignore these voices on the part of the government coalition could resuit in Slovakia's being actually degraded into the "second class." For the government coalition to question the categorization of the Central and East European countries into "classes"—while Western representatives claim that NATO does not divide these countries into groups advancing sooner, advancing later, and those not advancing at all—is only a very poor excuse for Slovakia, which "thanks" to the policy of the present government coalition, is moving farther and farther away from the criteria for joining the alliance. Although the application for NATO membership of each country certainly will be assessed individually, it is more than likely that in the formal process of acceptance into the alliance, more than one country will be admitted at the same time. It is, above all, in the hands of the present government coalition whether representatives of three or four countries will be present at the first admission ceremony (and whether the fourth country will be Slovakia or our "almost namesake" Slovenia).

Slovakia: Opposition Conspiracy Alleged in EU Demarche

AU2204183096

[FBIS Report] Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 18 and 19 April publishes items alleging that the EU demarche of late October 1995 had been "ordered" by the Slovak opposition at a "conspiratorial meeting" held in the Czech Republic in the night of 18-19 October. One of these items lists the participants in the meeting, who have reportedly included "two diplomats accredited to the Slovak Republic."

Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA (SLOVENSKO DO TOHO Supplement) on 18 April on page 3 carries a 1,600-word article by Gabo Zelenay, who is known as moderator of Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] rallies, entitled "Foundation of Fear?" The arti-

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

cle examines the phenomenon of "political invitations," of which it sees the 1968 "invitation" to the Red Army to save "socialism" in then Czechoslovakia as a "masterpiece." Zelenay deplores that the "germ" that produces such political invitations remains alive. In this context he says: "Hardly a day passes without our public being aroused by some bad news from the 'democratic' world. Lessons, demarches, reproaches, proposals, condemnations, conditions, raised warning fingers, and so forth....

"The meetings of people infected with this germ are held in secret. One such meeting took place on the night of 18 to 19 October 1995. And so that no one would see the participants leave their conspiratorial meeting, they departed to the other side of the Morava river for talks, to a state that is favorably inclined toward them. The chief organizer was Pavol D., the foreign policy adviser of the president of the republic. Top-ranking politicians from the Democratic Union [DU], the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDH], the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], and the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia [SDSS] were accepting advice and ideas and, at the same time, were attentively listening to their host.... Speaking on behalf of the hosts was, first and foremost, Pavol D. He not only analyzed the situation in great detail, but was also handing out assignments and sketching the direction of the onward path. The following assignments were handed out: It is necessary to belittle in the public the results achieved by the government, increase tensions between the president and the government, and support the president's decision not to resign under any circumstances. Further instructions included: Make use of the unpredictable development of the political situation in Slovakia, point out that the kidnapping of the president's son to Austria was the work of the Slovak Information Service [SIS] and the government, and make use of the 'independent' press, which sides with the opposition, so that it helps in this matter. Pavol D. said that he believed the time had come for the international community of states to support the president of the republic by clear statements and to warn the international community against the authoritative developments in the Slovak Republic. The president of the republic had supposedly already spoken with the Spanish ambassador about this. During their talk, the president supposedly expressed the wish that a clear political statement about the Slovak Republic be issued abroad.

"The SDSS and SDL representatives were somewhat more reserved in their statements because they were of the opinion that this might lead to another polarization. While the government would not be able to reject warnings addressed to it from abroad, people might interpret them as an attack on small Slovakia. The participants in the 'roundtable' learned from a well-informed guest that the EU Political Committee would send a demarche through the 'troika' [ambassadors of three EU countries] and would issue a press communique." As Zelenay reiterates, each member of the opposition was assigned its specific task at the meeting, which it pledged to fulfill. Subsequent developments in Slovakia confirm, according to Zelenay, that the opposition is fulfilling these tasks in a "highly disciplined way."

Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 19 April on page 8 carries a 2,800-word "abridged" speech delivered by historian Frantisek Vnuk at a meeting organized by the Slovak Heritage Foundation in Bratislava on 12 April to mark Vnuk's 70th birthday. The speech includes the following passage: "Conspirators always think that no one will learn about their actions. But the Slovak nature is such that nothing can be kept secret and everything involving more than two people always eventually sees the light of day. It is thus known, for example, that the last demarche against Meciar's government had been ordered by opposition representatives at a meeting abroad on 18 and 19 October 1995 (to be specific, I will reveal their names: Milan Knazko [DU deputy chairman], Bela Bugar [MKDH chairman], Pavol Demes [President Kovac's foreign policy adviser], Brigita Schmognerova [SDL deputy chairwoman], and Lubomir Bystricky [former SDSS deputy chairman]), in the presence of two diplomats accredited in the Slovak Republic." In the subsequent part of the speech, Vnuk warns against underestimating the Slovak opposition, which "has been able to recruit into its services even a part of the Catholic hierarchy and is openly seeking and mobilizing its allies abroad," and calls on the audience to "work and pray" so as to prevent another opposition "putsch" against Prime Minister Meciar.

Slovakia: Construction Firm at Iranian Power Plant

AU2304091096 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 22 Apr 96 p 6

[Article by Martin Benko: "Slovaks on the Construction of the Thermal Power Plant in Iran"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The participation in the construction of a thermal power plant at Iranshahr in Iran (near the Pakistani border) is, at present, the largest foreign contract of EZ-Elektrosystemy Bratislava. The Bratislavans supply electrical equipment to the main hardware contractor, Prva Brnenska Strojaren of Brno [the Czech Republic].

According to the director general of EZ-Elektrosystemy, Marian Orlicky, the deal is conducted by the Czech Republic. The construction of the power station has

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

been going on for several years, and therefore, it could not avoid an extended idle period. At present, the first unit of the power plant has been connected to the network and is undergoing complex tests. EZ-Elektrosystemy started their assembly work on the Iranian power plant, which incidentally is being built in a desert, a year ago. According to the contract, they are to complete the first two units of the power plant. Due to certain complications in contract relations, the connection of the second unit to the national grid is expected this September or October. The participation of the Bratislava firm—which is also taking part in the completion of the first two units of the Slovak Mochovce nuclear power plant—in the construction of the second two units at the Iranian thermal power plant depends on the results of further negotiations between the main contractor and the Iranian investor according to Orlicky. The deliveries and assembly of electrical equipment and the testing and supervising of domestic fitters' work on the first two units of the Iranian power plant should bring EZ-Elektrosystemy some 60 million korunas [Sk].

EZ-Elektrosystemy has recently executed several other contracts in the Middle East. At the end of last year, for instance, the company replaced the switching station at the Homs power plant in Syria and, in the same city, it also supplied spare parts for the refinery, where it had done some assembly work in the past. At present, the company is preparing another contract in Syria. It is again in Homs, in the Katina district. In this instance, it involves the modernization of the gas-distribution network in some power plant units. Nevertheless, according to Orlicky, EZ-Elektrosystemy pays the greatest attention to the possibility of participating again in the completion of the iron-ore mining and processing complex in Dolynska in Ukraine. They had to leave this construction several years ago at a stage of advanced work and partial material shipment.

Slovakia: Prosecutor Examining Breach of Language Law

AU1904161996

[FBIS Report] Slovak newspapers on 19 April publish reports revealing that 40 communities in southern Slovakia have issued decrees on the use of the Hungarian language in "official communication," which has prompted the General Prosecutor's Office to initiate an inquiry into a possible breach of the recently passed state language law.

Bratislava SME in Slovak on 19 April on page 2 carries a 150-word TASR report that states, among other things: "The General Prosecutor's Office has asked deputies of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] Committee for Public Administration, Territorial Self-Administration, and Ethnic Minorities for its standpoint on whether local self-administration bodies are authorized by law to issue decrees governing the use of the Hungarian language on the territory of the town or village. According to findings of the General Prosecutor's Office, 15 communities in West Slovakia, 21 communities in Central Slovakia, and four communities in East Slovakia have approved the draft of a generally binding decree, which contains provisions on the right to use the Hungarian language also in official communication with the community's authorities, as well as provisions on the residents' right to dissemination of information in Hungarian."

Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 19 April on pages 1 and 2 carries a 400-word article by "mrs" entitled "Language Law Given a Slap in the Face in 40 Communities; The Brazenness of Hungarian Extremists Does Not Stop Short of Anything." The report deals with a meeting of the NRSR Committee for Public Administration, Territorial Self-Administration, and Ethnic Minorities held in Bratislava on 18 April, whose agenda included the proposal to outlaw decrees on the use of the Hungarian language in local councils. The SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA correspondent says in this context: "Sparks were flying during the discussion of a proposal for the abolition of generally binding decrees regulating the use of the Hungarian language in local self-administration bodies. Such decrees have already been adopted in 40 towns and villages in southern Slovakia. According to Article 2 of this decree, citizens have the right to use the Hungarian language when taking part in the self-administration of the community. Article 3, section 1, reads: 'Citizens have the right to use the Hungarian language also in official communication with the community's authorities and employees.'

"Another section reads: 'In implementing the tasks of the community's self-administration, as well as in contact with citizens, the community's authorities and employees also use the Hungarian language.'

"The NRSR Committee is to deliver its opinion on this evident mockery of the valid language law at its next meeting. The brazenness of Hungarian extremists does not stop short of anything. They keep provoking and trampling underfoot the laws of the state-forming nation."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Slovakia: Councils' Decrees on Use of Hungarian Viewed

AU2204181196 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 20 Apr 96 p 6

[Report by TASR: "Independent Decisions on Administration and Property; Jozef Rea on Communities' Generally Binding Decrees"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"A community that issues a generally binding decree can do so only in accordance with Article 4, Section 1 of the Law on Communal Arrangement. Our parliamentary committee will therefore deal with the problem of decrees on the use of the ethnic minorities' languages that have been issued by some communities in the ethnically mixed territory. The deputies have been alerted to this problem by the General Prosecutor's Office of the Slovak Republic," Jozef Rea, chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] Committee for Public Administration, Territorial Self-Administration, and Ethnic Minorities, told the TASR correspondent yesterday.

The relevant article of this law clearly states that communities decide independently, and independently perform all operations, regarding the administration of the community and its property, unless a special law tasks the state or some other juridical person with these operations. A generally binding decree issued by a community must be in harmony with legal powers as defined in the relevant article. The chairman of the parliamentary committee emphasized that, in performing its self-administrative functions, a community performs operations concerning proper management, the social sphere, environmental protection, and cultural development. These main areas of the life of a community can be regulated by the aforementioned decrees.

Jozef Rea and his collaborators proceed clearly from the premise that a community's generally binding decree does not have the character of primary, original norm-setting, but that it is an administrative act having the character of a bylaw. If a law does not regulate a certain area, that is, if a legal vacuum emerges, a community can issue decrees only in harmony with the aforementioned article of Law No. 369 of 1990 on Communal Arrangement. The Constitution of the Slovak Republic addresses the problem of use of the languages of the ethnic minorities in Article 34, but the details are set out in a [separate] law—in the law on the state language, for example, which enumerates also other legal norms addressing this issue.

Jozef Rea labeled as unacceptable the communities' conduct beyond the framework of their rights, including their participation in the so-called higher administration, when the community wants to regulate citizens' rights and duties by its decrees. The protection of citizens' rights is the exclusive authority of the state with all its mechanisms. It is not possible for two competing norm-setting groups to exist in our state. The prosecutor can file a complaint against generally binding decrees and they can be rescinded by the NRSR at the proposal of the Government of the Slovak Republic, the prosecutor general of the Slovak Republic, or a parliamentary committee. The Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic has the same authority, he added.

Slovakia: Kovac Jr Accuses Investigator of Disinformation

AU2204160796 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 20 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by Zita Sujova: "Search for Kidnappers or Attempt To Document Legend About Simulated Kidnapping? Asks Michal Kovac Jr"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Within the framework of its "Today" news program, Slovak Television [STV] yesterday provided space for Michal Kovac, Jr. to react to one-sided information about the background of his abduction to Austria. He vigorously rejected all testimonies trying to present the matter as a simulated kidnapping and qualified them as untrue. He asked what motive he would have to simulate a kidnapping, in which he was kicked and intoxicated unconscious and following which he was forced to spend some time in prison and to live six months in Vienna at high costs and separated from his family. "What is the investigator working on, in fact? On identifying the kidnappers or on documenting the legend about a simulated kidnapping being foisted upon him by the true kidnappers?" he asked and accused Major Jozef Ciz, the investigator of the case, of participating in a disinformation campaign with his "dubious deductions" about the kidnapping on STV. Further evidence of the "investigators' peculiar practices," according to Michal Kovac, Jr., is their invitation to the so-called kidnapping witness, Peter Krylov, to come from his German prison to Bratislava. Although Krylov had confessed fraud against the firm Technopol and other frauds, the investigators not only did not detain him, but paid almost 20,000 korunas from state funds for his travel expenses. Michal Kovac, Jr. stated that he was ready to provide any information on the course and method of investigation, as well as on the unlawful steps being taken, in his opinion, in the investigation of both cases [kidnapping and Technopol fraud]. "The files do not contain anything that should be kept secret from the public, in my opinion," he said. He also quoted some passages from the verdict of the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Upper Provincial Court in Vienna, according to which there is a warranted suspicion that "Michal K., Jr. was deprived of freedom and forcibly taken to the Republic of Austria with the knowledge of the authorities of the Slovak Republic, through an institution subordinated to the Slovak Republic or, respectively, by persons working for this institution." He asked STV and investigator Jozef Ciz not to let themselves be drawn into "dirty unlawful practices" and asked citizens who recognized a man on the Identikit to announce to him, or his lawyer, the man's identity.

Slovakia: Former Investigators on Accusations

AU2204120796

[FBIS Report] Slovak newspapers on 19 April publish statements by Major Jaroslav Simunic and Major Peter Vacok, former investigators of Michal Kovac Jr.'s abduction to Austria, in which they respond to the accusation, leveled against them by Slovak Television [STV] on the basis of Interior Ministry sources, that they had forged witnesses' testimonies.

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 19 April on pages 1 and 2, under the headline "After Major Simunic, Also Major Vacok Has Left the Police," carries a 500-word report on an interview given by Major Peter Vacok to NARODNA OBRODA correspondent Zita Sujova in Bratislava on 18 April. Vacok, who was taken off the case of Michal Kovac Jr.'s kidnapping on 17 October 1995, first tells the NARODNA OBRODA correspondent that he has decided to leave the Police Corps "because of the situation in the section of investigations, but also in the Police Corps at large." He rejects the accusations against him as "totally untrue" and is confident that he will be able to prove this. Vacok also voices surprise at Interior Minister Hudek's failure to respond to the publication of "the contents of the investigation file" on STV, although the file has been designated as "top secret."

On the same day, on page 2, Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on page 2 carries a 500-word report by Zita Sujova entitled "Major Simunic Rejects Accusation That He Falsified Files." Simunic, who was taken off the case on 8 September 1995, assures the NARODNA OBRODA correspondent that his "conscience is absolutely clear" and qualifies the way in which STV and state agencies inform on the kidnapping as a "disinformation campaign reminiscent of the fifties." The report continues: "Major Simunic has information that people who have come into contact with the case—even as witnesses—are being intimidated or manipulated. He also has information that a change in the leadership of the Slovak Information Service [SIS] is being prepared for the very near future, which 'should establish conditions for the investigation of this case to sink into oblivion at a qualitatively higher level.' According to Simunic, cover documents, so-called legends, have been fabricated for months in the SIS to explain why some secret service members had been at the border at a certain time, where the surveillance people were, and the like." Simunic "rules out 100 percent" the possibility of a simulated kidnapping and reiterates his conviction that SIS members and vehicles had committed, or participated in, the kidnapping.

Bratislava SME in Slovak on 19 April on page 1, under the headline "Falsification Was Not Possible," carries a 600-word interview with Major Peter Vacok by Peter Toth. The place and date of the interview are not given. Asked to respond to the accusation that was entering in the investigation file facts which the witnesses never mentioned, Vacok says: "Such a thing is not possible. This case was investigated by a team that was appointed by the minister of interior. It was made up of members of the Criminal Police, investigators, that is, criminal prosecution bodies, and the management of the team. The identification and search for persons capable of providing information of importance to the investigation is the job of members of the Criminal Police. The discussion on the identified persons and the contents of their testimonies took place in the management of the investigating team. Following an agreement with the analytical group, whose position is always dominant in such work, it was then decided which of the identified persons would be questioned also by the investigator. Only such a testimony forms part of the investigation file. Other materials are in the criminal file, for which the investigator is not responsible. There was not a single case of discrepancy in the contents of testimonies given before the Criminal Police and, subsequently, before the investigator."

Vacok also tells his interviewer that, on 18 April, he filed a complaint against the publication on STV of parts of testimonies of persons who were questioned in the case, because the contents of the investigation file are designated as top secret. "It runs totally against the law when someone acquaints through television unauthorized persons with the contents of the investigation file," Vacok says, and calls it "startling" that "the interior minister takes absolutely no interest in the fact that secret facts are being made public through a so-called public corporation, facts for the leakage of which only members of the Police Corps can be responsible."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Slovakia: Kovac Suspicious of New Territorial Division

AU2304092596 Bratislava PRACA in Slovak 20 Apr 96 p 2

[Interview with Slovak President Michal Kovac by "raj" in the "One Question For" column; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] [PRACA] Voices are to be heard more and more frequently about a possible transfer of the Slovak capital to a different location, to the area between Zvolen and Banska Bystrica, for example. Do you consider this realistic?

[Kovac] Some other city's becoming the capital of Slovakia is related to a number of other issues. Some other aim could be hidden behind this talk, however. For example, to stop the present Bratislava municipal council from functioning because, as soon as the second tier of regional self-administration at the level of Bratislava is created, it will be necessary to elect the municipal council. When communities from the districts of Malacky, Senec, and Pezinok become part of Bratislava, they will have to be represented in the municipal bodies. A new self-administrative body will thus be established. This would be, in fact, an indirect attempt at wiping out the results of the will of the residents of Bratislava, who had elected the municipal council and the mayor. This would be an intervention into the system of functioning of the self-administrative bodies. However, all this does not mean that the capital should move elsewhere.

Slovakia: 'Political Criteria' Said Used in STV Layoffs

AU2304091196 Bratislava SME in Slovak 20 Apr 96 p 3

[Report by "r": "Slovak Syndicate of Journalists Commission Has Well-Founded Suspicion of Labor-Code Violations in Dismissals From STV"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"Following a meeting with L. Jariabok, chairman of the trade union of audiovisual authors in Slovak Television [STV], the Slovak Syndicate of Journalists [SSN] Commission for the Protection of Journalists' Rights notes that creative workers were dismissed from STV, within the framework of the decision on its rationalization, because of alleged redundancy, but their positions have subsequently been taken by newly hired employees with the same specialization. The well-founded suspicion arises that the Labor Code has been violated in a number of cases," reads a statement issued by the SSN Commission. It goes on to say that, as transpires from the official minutes of meetings of some editorial offices and the STV management, for the period from 6 February to 1 March 1996, for example, the Law on STV, provisions of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, and international conventions guaranteeing freedom of speech have been violated. In this context, the Commission voices the serious suspicion that political criteria were decisive in laying off STV employees. "The Commission voices sharp protest against the practices of the STV management, which are at odds with the status of this institution as a public service corporation," the statement reads.

Slovakia: Minister Fires Academia Istropolitana Director

96CH0076D Bratislava SLOVAK SPECTATOR in English 28 Feb-12 Mar 96 pp 1, 3

[Article by Daniel Borsky: "Institute, Government Tangle"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In late January, the Ministry of Education and Science stunned the academic community in Slovakia and abroad when it ordered the removal of Alena Brunovska, the director of Academia Istropolitana (AI), an institute of higher education in Bratislava.

Though the ministry had the right to fire the AI director—"They didn't do anything illegal," Brunovska said—officials affiliated with the school in Slovakia and abroad are confused why Brunovska was dismissed and no successor has been named.

In November 1995, the Ministry took over authority from AI to nominate and dismiss the institute's director.

In a rare public comment on the issue, Marian Tolnay, head of the higher education section at the Ministry of Education, brushed off any controversy in the ministry's move. "It's not a big deal," he told the SLOVAK SPECTATOR. "There's going to be a new director of the Academia. Nothing else is going on."

But Brunovska and other leading AI representatives tell a different story. They are furious at the ministry for what they see as its constant stonewalling of communication with AI officials.

"We've tried everything," Brunovska said in an exasperated voice. "All of our employees signed a letter to the (Education) Minister, (Eva Slavkovska), inviting her over in order to inform her. Nothing. Everybody signed a letter supporting me. Brunovska's unexplained dismissal was the final straw." "Recent developments do not leave any hope for appropriate communication with the Ministry of Education," wrote Andreas Worgotter, head of the economics department at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Vienna and an AI trustee, in an open letter dated February 15. "The minister's decision to remove Alena Brunovska from her position as director of

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

AI without any attempt to consider communication with the board is a clear and unacceptable break of the rules for managing academic institutions. My experiences at AI contribute a further stone to a mosaic of an unprofessional government administration neglecting standard principles of academic freedom in Slovakia."

AI enjoys a special status among Slovak institutions of higher learning. Although not a university in a full sense, AI provides its 75 students with special courses in public administration, applied economics and European studies. Its diverse course offerings made the school one of four finalists for the 1995 Hannah Arendt Prize, awarded by the Institute of Human Sciences in Vienna to the Visegrad Four's best institution of research and higher education.

Although it didn't win the award, for which 50 schools competed, it earned accolades from Lord Dahrendorf, the warden of St. Antony's College in Oxford and chairman of the jury. "AI in Bratislava has offered in the last three years graduate courses in subjects not otherwise represented in Slovak institutions of higher learning," Dahrendorf wrote. "Its courses are geared to the peculiar needs of a society in transition."

Dahrendorf also singled out Brunovska for special praise. "Moreover, it is the enthusiasm of women which has given the AI its special flavor," he continued. "Dr. Alena Brunovska, the director, represents this fresh, flexible, imaginative approach splendidly."

Slavkovska didn't seem to agree. On March 6, 1995, the minister sent a team of inspectors to AI. "The inspection was intended to check our handling of stipends, but instead they tried to burrow in everything else," Brunovska recalled. "It was like a witch-hunt," she continued. "They thought we were doing something politically obscure here. The inspectors wanted to see our list of employees and lecturers."

Last November, AI heard it was a finalist for the 1966 Hannah Arendt Prize, the second consecutive year the school had been nominated.

Then the roof caved in. On January 26, Slavkovska sent Brunovska a letter stating her immediate dismissal but not spelling out a reason why.

Money and politics could be the answers. The school that wins the award—the winner will be selected in May—receives a check for 300,000 DM (6 million Sk), considerably more than the 4.2 million Sk that the government contributed to AI-s 1996 budget. Even though state subsidies have declined steadily by an average of 1 million Sk a year from a high of 8 million Sk in 1992, AI has been able to saturate the remaining two-thirds of its budget with private money. Winning, the award would shower even more private funds onto AI's lap, thus further reducing the school's dependence on the government.

Brunovska therefore suspects the ministry dismissed her because it was afraid that AI will emerge as the winner and the government will lose its control. "I see there a clear link between our nomination for the prize and my being recalled," she said.

The truth is that AI's semi-independent status has attracted numerous personalities who at times have been openly critical of the present ruling coalition. A member of AI's science council is Jan Pisut, a former minister of education and a strong Meciar opponent; one of the school's lecturers is Gabriela Kaliska, who recently sued the ministry of finance for withdrawing the license from the Sporofond cash fund; and on the board of trustees sit Juraj Svec, a DU MP and President Michal Kovac. "We were openly reproached by the ministry for the fact that the president was on our board of trustees," Brunovska said.

That's no longer an issue, however, because the president took himself off the board at the beginning of this year because he didn't want to harm the institution by making it public knowledge he was on it, a well-informed source said.

While Brunovska seemed to understand Kovac's decision, she vigorously protested that AI is a refuge for opposition elements. "We always strove to keep the political affiliation of our lecturers balanced as much as possible," she said, pointing out that Rastislav Toth, a Meciar advisor, is a lecturer at AI. And Worgotter, the trustee who resigned, was a frequent adviser to Finance Minister Sergej Kozlik, Brunovska said.

While Brunovska and others go to great lengths publicly to defend AI, they are much more keen on making a private defense before the ministry. But the effort has been so far to no avail. "The ministry hasn't responded to any of a zillion of phone calls, letters or requests to meet," said Stefan Markus, a member of AI's science council. "The communication is absolutely blocked. Last year I was accompanying (Slovak-American) astronaut (Eugene) Cernan on his trip through Slovakia. Once he was asked when he got scared the most. He said it was when communication with Earth was interrupted for a couple of seconds. We find ourselves in exactly the same situation. We need to restore communication. As soon as we can communicate with the ministry normally, we won't have to worry about our school's fate. We will defend ourselves."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Slovakia: Public Works Projects To Lower Unemployment

96CH0076C Bratislava SLOVAK SPECTATOR in English 28 Feb-12 Mar 96 pp 1, 10

[Article by Rick Zednik: "Coalition Aims To Drop Unemployment to 10 Percent"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Aiming to bring the unemployment rate into single digits for the first time since general economic transformation caused it to balloon five years ago, the Slovak government approved its new employment policy in early February. The program intends to devote 3.5 billion Sk to putting people to work on public work projects in construction, agriculture and transportation.

Olga Keltosova, the minister of labor, family and social affairs (who the cabinet just named as Slovakia's new ambassador to the United Nations), said the government aims to drop unemployment from its January level of 13.7 percent to 10 percent by 1998.

The emphasis of the government's new plan is to allocate 1 billion Sk each to agriculture and transportation and 1.5 billion Sk to construction. Precisely how those funds will be used is up to the respective ministries, who will submit their proposals in the coming weeks.

Some critics believe the government's plan may be ineffective in the long term. "If it will be based on public works, I am very skeptical of its effectiveness," said Ivan Miklos, Slovakia's privatization minister from 1991 to 1992, who now serves as an analyst for a Bratislava think tank called MESA-10.

Rather than have the government create temporary, project-oriented work, Miklos said he would prefer to see more incentives for private businesses to create new jobs. Indirectly helping create such jobs would be a more long-term solution, Miklos said, because the private sector would then regenerate new jobs on its own.

Keltosova said the government is working with the private sector to create favorable conditions and she cited government efforts to requalify workers around Nitra in order to assist Volkswagen in its creation of 1,200 jobs there.

What the government is charged with doing is trying to repair the damage done in 1991, when the practical realities of Slovakia's postcommunist economic transformation hit hardest.

The change in philosophy spurring then-Czechoslovakia's transition began in 1989. But while the old system was being stripped through new legislation in 1990, big companies were still retaining bloated payrolls and unemployment stood at only 1.6 percent by year's end.

It was not until January 1991, when price liberalization hit, that firms began trimming personnel. As late as April 1991, only 40,000 people were jobless across Slovakia. Just eight months later, that number had reached 300,000.

Keltosova lays much of the blame on President Vaclav Havel's federal government in Prague, which put a priority on cutting arms production. She attributes the 260,000 newly jobless people to a bad inheritance from the "Czech conversion of the military sector."

But Miklos says Keltosova's explanation is too simple a scapegoat for Slovakia's unemployment woes. "It is a widespread story in Slovakia, but it is not true," he said. He argues that economically the country could have continued to sell arms abroad, but not politically.

Czechoslovakia's quest for acceptance in western circles made it politically impossible to sell arms to old markets like Iran, Iraq, or Syria. And yet its products were not competitive in western markets. Instead, Miklos attributed 1991's skyrocketing unemployment to the general process of economic transformation and restructuring.

Either way, Slovakia is now saddled with "huge long-term unemployment," according to Martina Lubyova, a labor policy specialist with the Slovak Academy of Science's Forecasting Institute.

Lubyova thinks the government is smart to try to put people to work while ameliorating the huge shortage of residences and improving the country's sorely underdeveloped transportation infrastructure. "It may be a good start," said Lubyova.

But Lubyova echoed Miklos when she said, "In the long run, it is obviously not very efficient. It is subsidizing big enterprises again. Long-term, it is more efficient to subsidize small enterprises."

However, then she added that for Slovakia's current situation, "the scheme is not badly designed," because "right now, in some regions there are no small enterprises to subsidize."

Keltosova, for her part, stands by her plan and remains confident that roughly 55,000 new jobs will be created in the next two years to bring the unemployment rate under 10 percent. "The labor market always depends on the economic situation," she said, citing a 6.6 percent rise in GDP for Slovakia in 1995 and an inflation rate that was down to 7 percent in January. "I'm confident these macro-economic indicators will be transferred to the micro-economic sphere. It takes about a year and so I am optimistic for this year."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Hungary: Defense Minister Views NATO Compatibility

AU2304090596 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 20 Apr 96 p 7

[Interview with Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti by Gabor Lambert; place and date not given: "Medicine for Russia's NATO Apprehension"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Both opposition and government party deputies brought up the issue of Defense Ministry purchases in Minsk recently, namely the purchase of T-72 tanks. In view of the NATO secretary-general's visit to Hungary this week, we asked Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti about how NATO integration requirements affect the ministry's long-term plans, including military and spiritual compatibility.

[Lambert] In addition to economic and professional considerations, to what extent does the defense minister consider national security factors in its decisions on development?

[Keleti] Our development concepts basically run in two channels. Regarding air defense, it is clear that we must introduce a totally different quality into the army. The Hungarian parliament's Defense Committee has just discussed our radar tenders and, according to plans, the government will review them this month or at the beginning of next month, and then it will ask parliament for authorization to issue tenders for the modernization of our air force around the turn of the century. One can also expect Russian interest in these tenders, but it is clear that there will be many more Western offers because, in the case of radar or aircraft, they can better fulfill NATO's compatibility requirements. Without anticipating the final result, the winner will probably emerge from this circle.

In the meantime, however, we cannot forget about the development of land forces. Regarding the types of tanks and armored personnel carriers, NATO does not "demand" close compatibility; instead, the built-in electronic and telecommunication means are important. One must not forget that we must also bear in mind compatibility within our own army, in addition to NATO compatibility, namely the coordination of the tactical characteristics of the existing Russian armored personnel carriers and tanks or the ones expected to come in exchange for the outstanding Russian debt. As for dependence, so far, we have been "dependent" on T-55 spare parts; from now on, we will be dependent on T-72's. In other words, we will experience the same dependence (if there has been any such dependence), but I think our position has improved, because the T-55's are so old that we can hardly get spare parts for them. On the other hand, the T-72's were built not only by the Russians and Belarusians, but also by Poles, Slovaks, and even Ukrainians, so we have the possibility of purchasing them from various channels and are thus in a more favorable situation.

[Lambert] Did the Defense Ministry coordinate this purchase through any channels with the future NATO partners?

[Keleti] We did not go through all the 16 member states; instead, we consulted with experts at NATO Headquarters. I would like to add a new aspect to all this: As we know, Russia is vehemently opposed to NATO expansion, certainly also because Russia fears for the market that it could lose. We discussed this matter with German Defense Minister Ruehe, and we came to the conclusion that this purchase will ease Russian apprehension from that point of view.

[Lambert] At the time Hungary purchased MiG-29's, there were unconfirmed rumors that the Americans actually encouraged us to strike a deal in order to support Russian industry. However, there will probably be U.S. firms responding to the Hungarian defense tenders this time....

[Keleti] I do not know any details about these background talks, because I was an opposition deputy at that time. I do remember, however, that the Americans maintained a different distance from this region in 1992 than they do today. For example, there was still a COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] list in force at that time. The U.S. Senate only made a decision about 18 months ago on selling certain military technology to this region. In any case, I find it strange that Jeno Poda, who was a key figure in shaping the Antall cabinet's defense policy, presented the purchase of MiG-29's as a positive thing, while he has now become one of the biggest opponents of the purchase of T-72's. Of course, it is the basic interest of the opposition to criticize the government, and I can accept that, but I think that defense is an area where one can expect some constructive opposition attitude. And this is not a constructive attitude.

[Lambert] Regarding the F-18's, the representative of the manufacturer told us that, although it is a matter for each country to decide itself with what armament they want to join NATO, the purchase of U.S. equipment has certain advantages.

[Keleti] First, acceptance into NATO requires the unanimous decision of 16 equal countries. Let me tell you that this issue came up last year when U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry and U.S. Chief of Staff Shalikashvili visited Hungary; I was present when the Hun-

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

garian prime minister received them. Both said that the United States does not demand that Hungary purchase aircraft from the United States for example. Besides, there is also U.S. interest in the Gripen, about 30-40 percent as far as I know. If that is true, with such a purchase, we would also satisfy the requirements signaled by our interlocutors, although perhaps not the expectations of their firms....

[Lambert] In the short term, NATO increasingly regards spiritual compatibility, rather than military technology compatibility, as essential. The Defense Ministry received criticism in this area too, for example for neglecting the research of security policy and defense strategy issues.

[Keleti] There are also certain budget limitations to all this. The Defense Ministry still has a Strategic and Defense Research Institute where experts deal with such issues, of course not with such a big apparatus as in Britain or France. In addition, I expect a considerable change from this fall or the end of this year, because a considerable change in personnel has begun and will end in the military leadership, because several of our highest-ranking commanders have reached retirement age. A younger generation will come, one that will have a key role in planning the future of our army. I endeavor to see people who, on the one hand, studied in Moscow, and I think this is currently essential, because our army's current stock of military technology is still almost exclusively Russian or Soviet-made. The use of this equipment must be planned on a strategic and operational level, and this requires that kind of knowledge. But the interim period, namely when we accept active participation in the partnership program until full NATO membership, also requires a new way of thinking, a new philosophy, something that these people were not able to learn in Moscow. For example, Ferenc Vegh, who can count on a serious position, graduated from one of the highest military institutes in the United States. And the new chief of staff will probably choose representatives of this new thinking, young people, people who have studied in various parts of the world, but in countries located West from here.

[Lambert] There are two recurring elements of the issue of spiritual coordination with NATO. One is the issue of the integrated ministry, namely that the Army Headquarters should also be under the authority of the Defense Ministry.

[Keleti] This was a historical need on 1 December 1989, when the separation took place. This guaranteed the army's depoliticization as well as its intact character. Among other things, it led to the fact that the army did not hinder the change in the regime in any way whatsoever. On the contrary, the professional soldiers even supported this process in their own way. However, comparing it with Western examples and experiences, I myself also think that we must put integration on the agenda sooner or later. For example, the first step could be that, for the time being, we will not fill the position of commander of the Hungarian Army, and we will eliminate this function later; for this, however, we must wait until the new constitution is adopted. We will create a new headquarters structure this year and, perhaps by the turn of the century, we will reach the state in which the headquarters becomes part of the Defense Ministry.

[Lambert] Could we say that this is planned for the turn of the century, parallel to the progress with our NATO membership?

[Keleti] I would not say that this is planned, because this does not appear in the government program. I would rather say that I and my colleagues are considering this among our long-term plans. Of course, when we reach the appropriate level, we would like to make this part of the government program, but we are not yet at that stage. Besides, at our request, British experts studied the structure of the current Defense Ministry and Army Headquarters, and they came to the conclusion that we are currently maintaining parallel structures for certain tasks. We are aware of this. This has to stop.

[Lambert] Did the aforementioned study deal with the other often-mentioned NATO requirement, namely making the ministry "civilian-controlled"?

[Keleti] On the basis of my own experience, I can say that I did not receive any criticism for this from my Western negotiating partners. The so-called civilian control differs from country to country. On the basis of one of its criteria, there are a lot more civilians employed in the Pentagon than in [the Defense Ministry in] Italy, for example, where (as far as I know) most of the staff of the Defense Ministry are professional soldiers. I can also mention a defense ministry in one of the northern NATO countries where the percentage of civilian and military leaders is similar to that of Hungary. All state secretaries and deputy state secretaries are civil servants in Hungary, and close to half the department heads are civilians, just like 40-42 percent of Defense Ministry employees. I think this is acceptable and I repeat that no criticism whatsoever has been formulated against me or my colleagues in this connection.

[Lambert] So you do not even want to make any changes to this in the future.

[Keleti] Of course we want to make changes when there are civilians who "can have a say" in this respect in the ministry. Unfortunately, experience shows that, despite

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

publicizing various courses with certain NATO support (in the form of lecturers, etc) last year and the year before, people did not come to inquire. There were no candidates. Besides, there will also soon be changes in ministry leadership. We will bring in people who are better known internationally and in NATO, and I do not mean soldiers here. We also want to follow the integration and structure of the Foreign Ministry, although not with the state secretariat because there are different tasks here. Our ministry should have at least an organization dealing with NATO integration.

Regarding criticism, let me say that, when we are criticized regarding civilian control, and this also emerged in the British study, it is mainly because of budget transparency and the preparation of the so-called program budget. As for transparency, the ball is not only with us but also with the Defense Committee, which could demand much greater authority in precisely this area. The other thing that I regard as extremely important and many people suggest is long-term planning. The way things work today, parliament decides the Defense Ministry budget within the framework of the overall budget every year on 31 December. In the West, however, there are certain guideline figures for the following year and for the next two to three years. They can see what they can expect for several years ahead. In starting a development program, one cannot do things like, say, purchase the air-defense-missile launching pads when, next year, the budget does not provide funds to purchase the missiles. One could say that, in that case, the army should find the money for this, but the military budget is so limited today that it cannot bear larger development projects.

[Lambert] A U.S. study on the possible expenses of NATO expansion was made public recently, and even the cheapest version mentions billions of dollars. Does the Hungarian Defense Ministry have relevant figures or ideas on the costs of neutrality, the alternative that some people suggest?

[Keleti] No, it does not because, for example, NATO did not tell us how many years it would give us to modernize our military technology. Besides, one cannot be surprised at the figures mentioned here, when this country spends 1.4 percent of its GDP on defense. This figure is about 3.5 percent in Switzerland, a neutral country, and there is no NATO country that spends less than 2.2-2.4 percent of GDP on defense. We should add that the GDP sizes cannot be compared either. One should not be surprised that a qualitative development will cost more when we spend so little on defense today. As for neutrality, it is enough to say that we received a lot of help from various NATO countries in the past year, not only in money but also training possibilities, for example. Without this, it would cost a lot more to reach at least the spiritual level we want to create in connection with our NATO membership. And I did not even mention military issues like whether it would be sufficient to keep an army of 60,000 troops to defend a lone country because, in reducing military personnel and the size of the army, we think that we will be part of a uniform European security system. NATO membership comes cheaper than the military budget of a neutral country precisely for this reason, although I doubt whether one can speak of neutrality at all today.

Hungary: Major General Vegh Assesses U.S. Visit

AU2204203796 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 22 Apr 96 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Major General Ferenc Vegh, deputy chief of staff, by Oszkar Fuzes in Washington; date not given: "There Is No Way Into NATO Without Military Reform"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The military delegation led by Major General Ferenc Vegh, deputy chief of staff, returned home from its one-week U.S. visit with an offer of F-18 fighters, recognition as a partner, and experiences hoped to be used to reform the Hungarian military. Vegh spoke to our Washington correspondent about plans to reform doctrine and regulations, training, and personnel management.

[Vegh] It was good to feel that we were received everywhere as friendly partners. They thanked us for the Implementation Force [IFOR] cooperation which they highly appreciate. We studied U.S. and NATO standards of doctrine, training, and personnel. We visited the headquarters that deal with these issues and the operational and tactical Air Force. We gained useful information on organizing logistic support systems. We are also taking home regulations, CD-ROM's, and educational support materials.

[Fuzes] Anything bigger?

[Vegh] The Navy's admiral dealing with international relations made an interesting offer: They are ready to sell F-18 fighters to Hungary because Hungary is seen as a reliable partner and, in their view, this model meets Hungarian needs. They wish to participate in the bids. They are examining leasing and possibly the sale of used planes to us.

[Fuzes] Bearing in mind the huge differences, do you have any really useable U.S. experience?

[Vegh] We are not at all saying that the Hungarian Army should be Americanized, but we can learn some useful things from them. For example, it is interesting that the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

training and doctrine headquarters plan 20 to 25 years ahead with the involvement of officers and even warrant officers who have considerable troop experience. The guidelines are adjusted to changes every 18 months, and they have already started to process the IFOR experiences.

It is important that the U.S. officers and warrant officers are trained to be high-level experts who are also valuable in civilian life and are not separated from society, in fact, the majority of the regulars enter the Army with civilian qualifications. The U.S. Armed Forces' social esteem is enviable. We must also take more care of our soldiers, the relationship of officers and warrant officers, and asserting the rights of soldiers.

[Fuzes] Has it been suggested that U.S. troops might remain in Hungary after the IFOR mission is finished?

[Vegh] It has not. We talked about continuing the tasks performed by IFOR but it still stands that IFOR's mandate expires at the end of 1996 and the plans for withdrawal have already been made.

[Fuzes] What are you taking home with you from the Air Force headquarters?

[Vegh] In the United States, air defense is run by the National Guard, rather than the Air Force. They recommend that we consider linking our air defense to the system of territorial defense. The 21st Century was present everywhere. Training is also done on computers and the Internet. We can also link into this from Hungary, whole teaching materials can be copied. They are also prepared to receive Hungarians for logistics training.

[Fuzes] Compatibility, namely the ability to link and to jointly use the units and the armaments is the military precondition of getting closer to NATO. How far along are we this area?

[Vegh] We can precisely see our tasks and we have concrete ideas on how to overcome the obstacles step by step.

[Fuzes] For example?

[Vegh] We still have not managed to dismantle the old structure. Compatibility is not expensive but it requires time. In addition, as the Army is in a budget crisis, either the organization has to be slimmed down to the budget or the budget has to be increased. The Americans again often emphasized that 1.4 percent of GDP is not enough to maintain and develop the army of a NATO member state.

[Fuzes] You seem determined on the issue of military reform.

[Vegh] There is no alternative. Without the reform of the Hungarian Armed Forces, there is no way into NATO and it is impossible to overcome the Army's current crisis. The so-called cornerstone units have to reach suitability for NATO as soon as possible.

[Fuzes] According to the news, you will soon be Hungary's highest ranking soldier. Is it at all possible to defend Hungary?

[Vegh] I prefer to not talk now about the position of head of the chiefs of the staff—which is to be changed—appointments in the Army can only be taken for granted when they have been made. The possibility of defending Hungary is a complex issue. The essence is that, at the moment, no war is threatening us, we are not in danger of being swept into a conflict. None of our neighbors are threatening us, and their armies are also struggling with major problems. No matter how difficult our situation is, we should indeed do our job more efficiently. All those who are serving in the Army are willing and able to fulfill their duties.

[Fuzes] Russia has held out the prospect of countermeasures if Hungary joins NATO. According to this, on one hand we would become more secure and, on the other, threat from the East would increase.

[Vegh] Considering counteractions is Russia's domestic affair, and NATO membership is Hungary's domestic affair. We must invariably maintain balanced military partnership relations with Russia, even in the future as a NATO member. This applies even more to Ukraine and to all of our neighbors which will not be included in the first round of expansion. We must strive for trust, transparency, and militarily useful and mutually reassuring partnership exercises.

Hungary: Prospective MDF Leader Gyorgy Gemesi Interviewed

96CH0050B Budapest 168 ORA in Hungarian 30 Jan 96 pp 17-18

[Interview with Godollo Mayor Gyorgy Gemesi by Andras Piko; place and date not given: "Turn to the Right—Who Will Be the Captain?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Mayor Gyorgy Gemesi, whom chairman nominee Sandor Lezsak called in his speech the party's future second man, became a key figure at the MDF's Godollo convention. Gemesi, a little-known politician, has thus become an important figure among the pretenders. Will the officers who identify with the spirit of Lakitelek assume command at the bridge—with the help of a few young people? The "man of the future" was interviewed by Andras Piko.*

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Piko] Sandor Lezsak said recently that he will use your experience as an educator—indeed, special educator—if he becomes MDF chairman in March. As the future second man, do you think that there will be a need for your expertise as a surgeon?

[Gemesi] I believe in conservative therapy. In the case of the MDF, what is needed is not surgery but medication and poultice on the infected areas.

[Piko] I am curious about your diagnosis.

[Gemesi] During the past year and a half, the MDF has been continually losing its popularity, and the present party leadership has been unable to halt this trend. In addition, financial, organizational, and operational problems have also surfaced. We have been unable to present our policies to the public clearly enough. The reason is not that our basic values are ill-defined. Regarding these issues, the difference between the two groups is a matter of emphasis. The reason can be found in the problems of leadership, the result of which is that the initial postelection confidence has melted away. I refer primarily to administration. The MDF has become a quarreling party and, as a result, it does not enjoy voter confidence. The membership used to have confidence. But it did not know how to put it to good use.

[Piko] Do the issues of the policy of alliance divide the party?

[Gemesi] I am convinced that our policy of alliance is also clear. At present no one thinks seriously about cooperating with Jozsef Torgyan, but 1998 is still far away. We must leave open the road leading to the Smallholders. We have been able to cooperate beautifully in many local governments. A large segment of society sympathizes with the Smallholders Party. If our party leadership does not recognize that, that is a mistake. Developing a policy of alliance is also a matter of proper leadership. But, again, this is a difference in emphasis.

Radical Innovation

[Piko] Could this situation have been avoided, had a personal restructuring taken place back in 1994, after the defeat in the elections?

[Gemesi] Attempts have been made, but the situation was not yet ripe.

[Piko] You were indeed able to avoid a split in the MDF, but you inherited an executive committee whose members were part of the former administration, and they find it hard to forget their former greatness and feel uncomfortable in their new tight jackets.

[Piko] This is partly true. Personal conflicts do surface naturally in a situation of failure—this is why I say that the situation in 1994 was not ripe for any radical change—and quite a few people found it hard to adapt to their oppositional role. We must recognize that we must do the work ourselves, that we cannot pass on the tasks to someone else because the earlier support system does not exist anymore. Although it has the capacity—for its members include numerous experts and politicians with government experience—the MDF is unable to play the role of the biggest party of the opposition. We are still just talking. This party has an action program but does not act. When a party is not being operated, then it can do nothing but talk. Do not misunderstand me, this is not a personal conflict. I have good personal rapport with the present members of the executive [committee], but I think nonetheless that they are not the best-suited persons for the task.

[Piko] The field of action of a party of the opposition is rather limited. In your opinion, what should your party do what it has not yet done?

[Gemesi] There is the sphere of local governments where we can indeed produce results. We can initiate. To have ourselves accepted is another task.

[Piko] I think that the party leadership has also produced some results. For instance, the MDF's relations with the press is much better now than earlier, and not just because it is not a government party anymore.

[Gemesi] Yes, that is nice, but one must not forget that it is not the press but the people who will vote for us. I do not want to underestimate the significance of good press relations, but if we become an elite party and cannot talk to the citizens, then correct relations with journalists will not do us much good. I think many people do not understand us. What we need is not Torgyanian rhetorics but clearly understandable messages for society that reveal that this party is indeed able and willing to offer solutions to people's everyday problems.

[Piko] I might understand better what you are referring to if you give me a concrete example.

[Gemesi] As you wish. For the past three years, I have been doing volunteer work for the For Home and Fatherland Foundation, which has been repeatedly called an MDF foundation. It is not true, of course. The foundation committed itself to solve the problem of house construction in Hungary. I must say that we were unsuccessful between 1990 and 1995, and now we are in an even more difficult situation because the administration has taken away from the local governments even the 9 billion forints that were alloted for helping young people build a house. The foundation, which is independent

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

of parties and churches, has built 50 homes despite the difficulties....

Lezsak the Doer

[Piko] Excuse me, but how can the MDF profit from this foundation if it is independent?

[Gemesi] True, but Sandor Lezsak and the Lakitelek Foundation had funds amounting to a few million forints in the beginning. Lezsak helped only at the start, but it was a program that brought results instead of unfulfillable promises of 20,000 new houses.

[Piko] I still fail to understand why anyone would think of the MDF in connection with a foundation that is independent from the MDF.

[Gemesi] Why not, since the MDF is committed to provide controlled budgetary funds for this program once it will be in power again. Every party had this opportunity, we sent the program to all of them. None of them responded.

[Piko] But this would be, in addition to the Lakitelek Foundation, another foundation operated by the MDF with public money?

[Gemesi] Excuse me, this is foolish. When a foundation solves a problem, no one is looking at what kind of a foundation it is. The Lakitelek Foundation, too, has created something of value. They have 120 or 130 people working for them. This is why I respect Sandor Lezsak, who did not pocket a single penny, and we also know of politicians who spent much of their own money to help their party's election campaign.

[Piko] But, after all, the Lakitelek Foundation was created with taxpayers' money.

[Gemesi] But it contributes something of value and, as it turns out, it is a forum for any political leaning. If I gave you this much money, could you accomplish the same thing? Lezsak is a doer and—I do not want boast—I am, too. We want to introduce this kind of activity in the MDF.

[Piko] Many think that one of the reasons for the present crisis is that the MDF has no leader who could fill Jozsef Antall's position on the basis of earned respect and an integrating role. Is Lezsak such a person?

[Gemesi] It is extremely difficult to fill Jozsef Antall's position. Any comparison would be unjust. This is what the present membership is like, and these are the possibilities. If there is willingness and good intentions, then Lezsak could be a good party chairman. The membership does not want to split the MDF.

[Piko] Can this lead to a point where the delegates force you into a short-range and bad compromise?

[Piko] I think the membership is wise although the present situation is rather unclear indeed. The membership is afraid because it likes its leaders who are now in conflict with each other. It is the leaders' responsibility to ease the membership's situation. We must conduct a correct campaign within the party that is free of personal bickering.

The Second Man?

[Piko] If your hopes come through and you will become the MDF's second man, you will be the "new boy" in the party elite. Are you not afraid that you will be one of those whom the "gurus" put on the top and then drop when they reconcile with their adversaries?

[Gemesi] Rejuvenation frees new energies. On the other hand, I believe in a pyramidal structure, i.e., in that the foundations for carrying out the new tasks must be laid ahead of time. The vice-chairmanship and the mayoralty gave me a good foundation.

[Piko] You are great because of Peter Boross's and Sandor Lezsak's company. But it is possible that your competitors within the party do not take you seriously. They may think that they will be able to easily control you.

[Gemesi] Do you think that here, at the local government, I do not have to fight my battles every day? Why do people think that one cannot acquire executive experience at a local government? I do not want to be smug but I, too, must thoroughly examine certain issues so that I can be an equal partner to those who think and say such things about me. I will work hard.

Photo Caption

The Surgeon—Gyorgy Gemesi, a surgeon from Godollo who is known as a former member of the national fencing team, joined the MDF in 1989. In 1990 he was elected mayor of Godollo. Since 1991, he has been president of the Alliance of Hungarian Local Governments. He was elected to the MDF executive committee at the [MDF] national convention in the fall of 1994, at the recommendation of Lajos Fur. Vice-Chairman Gemesi, who is responsible for the party's local government policy, organized the Godollo convention, which is considered the opening of Sandor Lezsak's campaign as chairman.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

B-H: Izetbegovic Tells Buzim Crowd: Country Not Yet Free

AU2204195396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] As part of his visit to the Una-Sana Canton, Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, has been visiting Buzim today. The president was accompanied by Presidency member Dr. Ejup Ganic, Republic Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic, and Army General Rasim Delic. Nedzip Vucelj reports on the visit by the senior Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation to the youngest Bosnia-Herzegovina Municipality:

[Begin recording] The guests, headed by Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, were greeted by more than 10,000 citizens of Buzim and the nearby villages. Mr. Husein Anic, head of the Buzim municipality, organized a meeting of the top Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation with directors of public institutions and companies, and members of the Party of Democratic Action. First he briefed the senior guests about the current problems of this young municipality, explaining Buzim municipality's development guidelines. Among 18 priorities, Anic particularly singled out the problem of space and skilled personnel.

Mr. Alija Izetbegovic was especially interested in problems with the water supply, education, health care, telecommunications, and information, that is, problems with the reception of Radio-Television Bosnia-Herzegovina. He was told that Buzim still cannot watch Bosnia-Herzegovina television, while radio reception is greatly hampered.

Mr. Hasan Muratovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, [as heard] informed all those present that first to receive funds will be projects aimed at the development of the water system, transport, agriculture, the purchase of agricultural machines, and increase of livestock. He warned that the World Bank and other international investors primarily want to invest money in the development of small, private enterprises.

Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency member Ejup Ganic also inquired about the number of students from this region and concluded that the their number is shockingly low. [passage omitted]

It was demanded that all necessary projects, for which funds will always be approved, be created as soon as possible to accelerate development. Here, special priority in employment would be given to soldiers, war invalids, and the relatives of fallen soldiers. All those present were also told that 400,000 German marks [DM] had been approved to surface a section of the very important Buzim-Cazin road with asphalt and that DM80,000 would be approved for the successful completion of the academic year by the students of the dislocated Buzim unit of the Bihac Pedagogical Academy.

After the meeting, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic addressed a crowd of more than 10,000 residents, saying, among other things, that his special wish was to see the day when Bosnia would be free, which it was not yet. However, it would have been had it not been stopped by the iron fist of the world. However, the future is ours, thanks to our youth. He said that the enemy would never tread here thanks to the powerful Buzim wall. I have especially enjoyed coming here, President Izetbegovic stressed at the end, because it makes my soul happy.

After addressing the people, President Izetbegovic, his senior delegation, and his hosts strolled through Buzim without any special security precautions, greeting the town people who received him with great excitement and the message that Buzim has never been defeated, because even the oldest of its residents cannot recall an enemy boot marching here, nor will this ever be the case. [end recording]

B-H: Izetbegovic Visits Bosanska Krupa, Champions Integrity

AU2204153596 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, and members of the state delegation visited Bosanska Krupa today. They discussed the efforts, results, and problems that should be resolved to build a new town out of the ruins and create the living conditions for the residents who are returning daily. Ibrahim Skenderovic reports from Bosanska Krupa:

[Begin recording] This was solely a working visit that was, apart from the municipal officials, also attended by representatives of the economic, cultural, and public life of this municipality.

Municipal head Ibriz Ezic informed the members of the state delegation about the outstanding efforts, great [words indistinct], and even greater problems that they encounter in an attempt to build a new, more beautiful town out of the ruins, to which 8,700 people have already returned. On the territory accounting for 85 percent of the municipality's territory, which is the share that belongs to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation according to the Dayton maps, 25,500 people have returned so far.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

They also presented the fact that about 1,800 primary school students from first to eighth grade and approximately 650 secondary school students are studying in makeshift premises that lack water. There are also great difficulties in supplying the town with water and electricity, the post office only operates with some 100 telephone lines, while (word indistinct) has to be built from scratch.

The president of the state Presidency was particularly interested in the top-priority investments which would resolve vital problems in the shortest possible time [words indistinct]. In connection with this [word indistinct] he promised 200,000 German marks in aid, primarily to secure the Radio and Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina signal and repair a bridge across the Una. The businessmen also received support for the programs that can be realized in a relatively short time.

President Izetbegovic, with the members of the delegation and his hosts, visited a portion of the [word indistinct] demolished Bosanska Krupa. Upon leaving this town, he emphasized that an integral and democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina remains our main goal. At the moment we are fighting the second stage of the war which we will definitely win, because [words indistinct] which is recognized on the faces of all Bosniaks that he had met so far. [end recording]

B-H: Izetbegovic Pledges Aid to Western Bosnia at Bihac Rally

LD2004213296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 20 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] We have just received a report from Bihac. Namely, a ceremony marking the fourth anniversary of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army was held in Bihac this evening. It was attended by a top state and military delegation. Damir Suljic reports from Bihac:

[Suljic] [Passage omitted] Congratulating the soldiers and officers of the 5th Corps on the magnificent results achieved in their four-year-long struggle against the chetnik aggressor, Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic said:

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] The last time I was here was on 8 August 1995—two or three days after liberation, after the Bihac region's blockade was lifted. That was an unforgettable day for me and the people accompanying me. That was a day when we felt the winds of freedom blowing in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and we became convinced that the 5th Corps and the people here are the fortress of the westernmost part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, an invincible fortress.

My associates and I have once again come here to see the parade, to see a part of this force. I am calling on you also to attend, so we can all witness the might of our army—of our corps and its heroes [applause].

I have come here with my associates to see what we can do for you. I want to assure that we will do everything—as you can see, with me here are Prime Minister Muratovic and Economy Minister Kreso—and our intention is not only to be on parade here [applause], but to see what we can do for you.

We do not have much; Bosnia is only beginning to emerge from the rubble and ashes—even though we do not have much, what we have we will share with you and I will show you tomorrow that we will share with you the little we have, so you can move forward [applause]. [end recording]

B-H: Muratovic Comments on Ties to Serb Republic, Croatia

AU2204084496 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (European edition) in Serbo-Croatian 18 Apr 96 p 4

[Interview with Hasan Muratovic, prime minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Mirjana Micevska; place and date not given: "There Will Be No Negotiations Before Radovan Has Gone"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Micevska] The powers of the Federation and the Republic government were split three months ago. To what extent are you, as Republic prime minister, pleased with that process and the work of the Republic government so far?

[Muratovic] I am not completely happy with its work, that is, I am happy only with the work in some areas. As is known, when we established the government, we made economic recovery and employment our priorities. In that respect, we have achieved a lot, so we can be pleased. We have completed large tasks with the World Bank and IMF; we have also completed the Donors' Conference. I am, however, not pleased with many other things that we have not succeeded in resolving, such as which government is in charge of which issues in the field of foreign and domestic trade, although a Croat is the minister both in the Federation and at the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Certain things are illogical; there are people who still want to perform some tasks they were in charge of during the war, since certain privileges went with them. They do not want the powers to be distributed in the only possible way in which they can function. We have not resolved all matters in the field of finance, so that the ministries could not be completed. There are still some joint fields such as privatization in general, privatization of apartments, and some laws.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

They Only Promise

[Micevska] How far have you come with privatization?

[Muratovic] Commissions work on laws endlessly—instead of taking a successful one from abroad and adapting it. They could launch it with minimal changes and start organizing the Privatization Agency or propose it to the National Assembly instead of only promising.

[Micevska] Have certain time limits been set?

[Muratovic] I feel uncomfortable commenting on this, since the Federation is in charge of these commissions. I have to say, however, that I was a minister throughout the war, and the commissions were established when we had only one government. They traveled around the world, attended various seminars; they have been working for a very long time already. It was promised a month and a half ago that they would finally complete the privatization issue.

No Results

[Micevska] Has the Republic government made progress in the negotiations with the Serbian entity?

[Muratovic] There are no negotiations at the moment. Karadzic has taken power again, he appointed himself chairman of the Commission for International Relations. This means that he will have contact with the High Commissioner, IFOR [Implementation Force], and in general with all international organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He is hindering the activities of the people who started working with us. There have been no significant contacts so far.

At the beginning, we discussed trade and money transactions. The representatives of the Serbian entity stopped coming to the meetings we had agreed upon. On one occasion they were objectively prevented, but the other time the participation was certainly prohibited by Karadzic.

[Micevska] Can Carl Bildt, the high representative, do anything about that?

[Muratovic] He is trying to, but there have been no results so far.

[Micevska] Does this mean that the process of reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been stagnant?

[Muratovic] It is evident that it has been stagnant. It will go very slowly until the next election and as long as Karadzic has power. We shall be able to work more quickly only if there is a change in the ruling power in Pale or Banja Luka after the election.

[Micevska] Your meeting with President Milosevic in Geneva has been a matter of discussion in public lately.

[Muratovic] We had a long conversation in Geneva. We discussed several issues, but the key one is the establishment of embassies. The Serbian side thinks that we can do many things even before embassies are established, that we could start air traffic for example. How can air traffic be established if there is no place for the people to obtain visas? How can we establish economic relations right away? It is necessary to travel in order to establish these systems. In other words it is impossible to organize all that without our office in Belgrade and theirs here. We have discussed many topics, and many things can be set in motion once embassies are established.

Political Problems in Croatia

[Micevska] How are the negotiations with Croatia going, how far have you come with the contract on the use of the Ploce harbor?

[Muratovic] We have been working on it constantly, and these contacts are going very well. We have received the latest proposal for an agreement on the Ploce harbor. We are working on it at the moment. It is planned that this should be a temporary agreement with a six-month validity. If it contains everything that should be contained in the permanent one, it will be valid for 99 years. There are political problems with the lease of the Ploce harbor to Bosnia-Herzegovina for 99 years. The agreement contains certain things we cannot approve of, but we expect that they will be solved in direct contacts.

[Micevska] What is it concretely?

[Muratovic] First, the zone to be offered to us has not been defined yet. Second, there are some details about the presence of the Croatian authorities in the zone; the Croatian authorities should not control anything in that zone, since it should function according to our laws. Third, the road transport from the Ploce harbor to the border has not been regulated in a satisfactory way, in contrast to the river and railroad traffic.

And finally, we see this contract in connection with the right of passage through Neum, and this agreement has not been offered. It has to be admitted that these are two contracts, but the Washington agreement makes it a condition that both of them are made for 99 years. We should give Croatia a completely free passage without controls in Neum, and they should give us a part of the Ploce harbor.

[Box, p 4]

Banking Agency Controversial

[Micevska] The bill on the Banking Agency of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina has stirred up a tumul-

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

tuous reaction in the latest session of the Constituent Assembly of the Federation. The work of the Assembly was even interrupted.

[Muratovic] We really do not need that Agency. It was, however, decided that it should be established before the two governments split. We agreed to it. The Agency performs some of the tasks of the Central Bank, so that it should be abolished after the law on the Central Bank has been adopted. Since it performs some of the Central Bank tasks, it should be a state-run agency, not an agency of the Federation. It need not be, but it could be a National Bank department. The core of the matter is granting of licenses to banks in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

According to our current law, the licenses are granted by the National Bank, but, since Herzegovina has not accepted these licenses, banks in Herzegovina do not have them. Therefore they need an agency that will issue licenses by the time the Central Bank is established.

[Box, p 4]

There Is Only One Sarajevo

[Muratovic] If the Serbian entity does not respect the Peace agreement, it will not receive international help. They now have to adapt their Constitution to the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was already under way, and there was only one unresolved issue in connection with the capital. Karadzic stopped all this, however. The text of the Constitution they sent to us was made very correctly and it was adapted to the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They wrote, however, that the capital was Sarajevo, which is impossible. This is what the authorities from Pale write in order not to mention Banja Luka as the capital.

B-H: Izetbegovic Stresses Importance of Elections

AU2204154196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 22 Apr 96

[Report by Zarid Sahic from (?Lucka Palanka)—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] As a part of the three-day visit to the municipalities of the Una-Sana canton—following an impressive line up of the 5th Corps units in Bihac and the visit to Bosanski Petrovac and Sanski Most—the high-level Bosnia-Herzegovina state delegation, which comprises Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency; Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic; Ejup Ganic, Federation vice president and Presidency member; and other senior officials visited Prijedor residents temporarily residing in (?Lucka Palanka) today.

Sead [word indistinct], president of the Prijedor municipal council, and his assistants informed the members of the state leadership about the life and the activities of the Prijedor residents in their temporary abode. The Prijedor residents are resolute in their intention to return to their homes in Prijedor, [words indistinct]. Their sole demand, if we can call it that, was that the political leadership of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina supports them in their intention.

The coming elections are a great chance for the Prijedor residents [word indistinct] to return home by political means. For that reason, all Prijedor residents without exception, regardless of where they may reside, must take part in the elections. The war is not over yet, President Alija Izetbegovic repeated [words indistinct], until Bosnia is free.

[Words indistinct] belonged to its residents, he said when [words indistinct]. We can tell good from evil [words indistinct] widely known [word indistinct]. In this way, Prijedor shall again be [word indistinct].

B-H: Prlic, Casado View 'Need' To Meet Election Deadlines

AU2204200796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 22 Apr 96

[Report by Mirsad Behram from Mostar—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Behram] The meeting of Dr. Jadranko Prlic and Ricardo Perez Casado, former Valencia mayor and new EU Mostar administrator, took place behind closed doors. Afterward, the partners in talks addressed all the journalists present.

Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Dr. Jadranko Prlic said that they mostly discussed the current situation in Mostar and stressed:

[Prlic] I wished to see him on his first working day in Mostar to extend him the support of the central Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities, bearing in mind that he is faced with an extremely important task, namely, the implementation of all that was agreed on in Mostar, which is very important for the creation of the Federation as the cornerstone of the implementation of the entire peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Unidentified reporter] Was there any talk of (?unified administration)?

[Prlic] We especially discussed the need to hold elections within the envisaged deadlines. The relevant legal order can only be established with the elections in Mostar and in all of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Behram] New EU Mostar Administrator Ricardo Perez Casado thanked Minister Prlic for the visit and the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

greetings. The unification of Mostar is the basis of the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace process, Ricardo Perez Casado said.

B-H: Ukraine To Allot $50,000 for Organization of Elections

AU1904133596 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 19 Apr 96 p 4

[Unattributed report: "$50,000 for Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 18 April—Yesterday, in Sarajevo, Jadranko Prlic, foreign minister in the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Volodymyr Khandohiy, deputy foreign minister of Ukraine, signed the agreement on trade and economic relations and the protocol on cooperation between the Foreign Ministries of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Ukraine, says the statement issued at the news conference.

"This is the first official visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina by a Ukrainian official since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Bosnia-Herzegovina," Minister Prlic said.

Minister Prlic and the Ukrainian deputy foreign minister exchanged opinions regarding the political situation in Europe and the implementation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace accord.

Khandohiy said that this meeting testified to Bosnia-Herzegovina's and Ukraine's desire to establish contacts in the spheres of economy, politics, trade, and technology.

He pointed out that Ukraine's participation in the process of the political settlement of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the peace efforts of the United Nations was not motivated by any political interests.

"We have concentrated on finding forms of reconciliation that are acceptable to all sides, which ought to be done through peaceful negotiations," Khandohiy said. He also said that, despite a very difficult economic situation in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Government had decided to allot $50,000 for the organization of the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Ukraine deputy foreign minister also met with Ejup Ganic, member of the Presidency of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic and vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and handed him a message from Ukraine President Leonid Kuchma for Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency.

B-H: NATO Head Solana Gives 'Top Priority' to Elections

LD2204133396 Madrid RNE-1 Radio Network in Spanish 1200 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] One hundred and twenty days after the start of the massive deployment of NATO forces in Bosnia, Javier Solana, secretary general of the Atlantic alliance, has made a first assessment of NATO's most important military operation since its creation. Solana believes the deadlines and objectives are being fulfilled, albeit, with some delays. At the same time, he gives top priority to holding elections in Bosnia to consolidate peace. Our correspondent Nacho Hernandez reports from Brussels. Hello.

[Hernandez] [Passage omitted] One hundred and twenty days after IFOR's [Implementation Force] deployment, a large part of the former combatants' heavy weaponry—about 90 percent—has been withdrawn. The troops are returning to barracks or being demobilized. There are, however, technical difficulties, although Javier Solana, secretary general of the alliance, has already warned that he is prepared to take measures if the parties do not fulfill their obligations within a reasonable time. Efforts will now be concentrated on holding elections in Bosnia, initially planned for the first days in September.

[Begin Solana recording] The electoral process in Bosnia is absolutely fundamental, and this will allow us to have a stable future in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are going to cooperate as much as possible with those responsible. We are not responsible for them—the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is—but we can and must cooperate with them. This is what I wanted to say. [end recording]

The alliance also believes there must be a reduction in weaponry before 6 June. It is possible, said Solana, to respect the Dayton deadlines, which give IFOR a year to implement the Bosnian peace plan.

B-H: EU Sets Out New Rules for Return of Refugees to Mostar

AU2204165996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The EU has informed the Bosnia-Herzegovina mission in Brussels of an EU administration decree on housing rights in Mostar and some amendments to it.

According to this document, all Mostar residents who own private houses and apartments, or have housing rights, and wish to return must register with the EU

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

housing administration in Mostar by 30 April at the latest. Nedzad Hasimusic, head of the Bosnia-Herzegovina mission to the EU in Brussels, has obtained the text of this document and has confirmed its authenticity to our Zagreb correspondent Nasa al Issa:

[Begin al Issa recording] The deadlines for some positive EU decisions on housing rights and the return of refugees to Mostar have already expired without being fulfilled and the European administration was, therefore, compelled to make amendments to some decrees to allow the speediest possible return. To facilitate this, all houses and apartments must be registered and accounted for. The EU is calling on all owners of houses and apartments or the holders of housing rights who wish to return to contact the EU housing administration in Mostar with their requests for return by 30 April. The requests should be forwarded to the following EU fax number: 387 88 317 614. [passage omitted]

We must particularly emphasize that Nedzad Hasimusic, the Bosnia-Herzegovina ambassador to the EU, has told us that the refugees and the returnees accommodated in buildings in Mostar on the basis of a decision by the housing authorities should not fear this return. Namely, they will remain in the houses and apartments until other suitable accommodation is found for them or until they finally return to their original places of abode. However, those who have moved into abandoned houses or apartments unlawfully will have to move out within a deadline set by the EU housing commission, which will be no longer than three months. I must also add that, according to the document published in Brussels, all houses and apartments are considered abandoned if their owners have not used them for at least six months. However, houses and apartments which their owners had to leave under duress as a result of the war are not considered abandoned, irrespective of how much time has passed. [passage omitted] [end recording]

B-H: EU Officials in Mostar Deny Embezzlement Charges

AU1904144696 Paris AFP in English 1431 GMT 19 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, April 19 (AFP)—The European Union administration in the Bosnian town of Mostar on Friday categorically denied charges of embezzlement and fraud in its running of the divided city.

Allegations that the EU administration of Mostar had been racked with fraud were "really false and misleading," EU official Klaus Metscher said.

The European Union has administered Mostar since July 1994. The city is divided between Moslems and Croats, who have resisted attempts to reunify the once attractive southern Bosnian town.

The European Union's spending watchdog recently completed a preliminary report identifying financial irregularities in the Mostar administration, sources in Brussels told AFP Tuesday.

The sources said the report, which is to be published in June, noted "irregularities" but added that they "do not appear serious given the difficult circumstances."

Metscher confirmed the suggestion Friday, saying there was "not the slightest allegation of an improper way of using of money," in the report.

The administration had received advice on its "international procedures but they are nothing to do with criminal acts like corruption," he added.

Hans Koschnick quit the job of EU administrator earlier this month after rowing with the European Union over what he said was its lack of support for his administration.

Koschnick was attacked by Croats who want to make Mostar an entirely Croat city. He has criticised German policy in particular which he said favoured the Croats in Bosnia.

Koschnick said Tuesday it had been impossible in the early days of the administration to keep normal accounts given the fact that the Moslem-Croat war which destroyed much of the city had only just ended.

A new EU administrator, Ricardo Perez Casado of Spain, is due to take up his post in Mostar on April 22.

B-H: Diplomatic Relations Established With Latvia

AU1904190796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 19 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina and Latvia have established diplomatic relations today. The protocol on establishing diplomatic relations between the countries was signed in Stockholm by (Iman Sulegi), charge d'affaires of the Republic of Latvia in the Kingdom of Sweden, and Izet Serdarevic, ambassador of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Kingdom of Sweden.

Both sides expressed the belief that the establishment of diplomatic relations will improve and strengthen future cooperation and the development of friendly relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Latvia.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

B-H: Refugees Plan More 'Mass Returns' to Former Homes

AU2204174596 Paris AFP in English 1717 GMT 22 Apr 96

[By Peter Cunliffe-Jones]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, April 22 (AFP)—Fed up with being told they cannot go back home, refugees from all sides displaced by Bosnia's war are planning more "mass returns" to their former houses, aid officials said Monday.

A group of around 600 Serbs from Banja Luka are planning to return to make a mass visit to their former homes in the Croat-held western Bosnian town of Glamoc on Wednesday, Mans Nyberg, a spokesman for the UN refugee agency said in Banja Luka.

And next Sunday, a group of Moslems are planning to return from homes in the northern town of Moslem-held town of Celic to visit their former homes in the nearby Serb-held towns of Lopare and Koraj, Nyberg added.

"We are now in a situation where people are losing patience," the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) spokesman said. "They are fed up with people telling them they cannot go here or there. They just decide to go."

News of the planned "mass returns" came after Serb and Moslem civilians clashed violently over the weekend in the first large-scale civil unrest here since Bosnia's peace agreement was signed in December. [passage omitted]

Major Simon Haselock, spokesman for the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) said that incident and another flare-up on Friday appeared to result from "cynical manipulation" of refugees' desire to return to see their former homes.

"Whilst we clearly understand and support the right of individuals to return to their pre-war homes...we are concerned by what seems to be a cynical attempt to manipulate the legitimate concerns...for narrow political ends," Haselock said.

He said IFOR had called on "political authorities across the spectrum and up to the ministerial level" to stop the incidents recurring.

IFOR is concerned about the risk of getting its troops involved in incidents such as that Sunday at Doboj.

IFOR always insists that, as a military force, it has no policing role in Bosnia, which it says is the responsibility of recalcitrant local civilian authorities.

"We are laying the responsibility where it lies, on the civilian side, on the politicians," Haselock said.

The UNHCR has been trying since the Bosnian peace treaty was signed in December to broker small-scale return visits by refugee representatives to their homes.

A problem is that many of the homes are now occupied by people who have often themselves been forced out of homes elsewhere.

Aid officials working with refugees suspect the local authorities on all three sides—Moslem, Croat and Serb—want to stop people returning to their homes.

UNHCR spokesman Randolf Ryan said the UN agency had asked the central authorities of all sides to put pressure on mayors and local governments to allow people to return home.

With some 1.3 million displaced people and nearly a million refugees, there is "growing pressure all over the place from people wanting to go home."

B-H: 50 Muslims Reportedly Missing in Serb Town of Doboj

LD2204220796 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Correspondent Hajrudin Redzovic] Yesterday, Serb extremists using stones prevented the displaced Doboj citizens from entering the town. The incident happened at the entrance to Doboj on Sarajevo Street. At the same time, several groups of displaced Doboj citizens entered the town via other routes. As it happened, some 50 citizens who, via the suburb of Makljenovac, went to their homes and properties in outlying town districts, up to this moment, have not returned to the territory of the federation. [passage omitted]

The Doboj police station, whose seat is in Tesanj, reacted, and through the liaison officer demanded that the Nordic-Polish IFOR [Implementation Force] brigade take urgent steps for the release of Doboj citizens who in all probability had been arrested.

Concluding, we should say that the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities should exercise serious pressure on IFOR so that it could finally start acting within the framework of its extended mandate. And that extended mandate, let us remind you, was adopted by the NATO council over six weeks ago. It allows IFOR intervention in the civilian section of the Dayton agreement.

It means that now its mandate includes annex 7, the security of citizens returning home. If not:

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Begin recording Reuf Mehmedagic, president of Doboj municipality] I do not think a man can look at his house for long without returning to it. If it does not happen, then the Dayton agreement is pointless. [end recording]

B-H: 'Most' of Velika Kladusa Under Croatian Army Control

LD2204164396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1518 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bihac, 22 Apr (SRNA)—Muslim radio in Bihac has claimed that the Croatian Army troops "have entered most of the territory of Velika Kladusa municipality and are advancing on Cazin."

The radio warns that mobilization is underway in both Croatia and the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia because of Zagreb's plan at any price to take control in the area of Bihac and to prepare grounds for his man—Fikret Abdic.

The Muslim radio says representatives of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the command of the 5th Muslim Corps, and civilian authorities have been meeting daily in response to "a high degree of anxiety among the Muslim population caused by the latest developments."

According to the same source, the leader of Bosnian Muslims, Alija Izetbegovic, [words indistinct] intentions of the Croatian leadership to isolate Bihac region from the Muslim part of the federation politically, economically, and militarily and is expected in Bihac over the next few days.

Several days ago, as part of a "humanitarian action," a group of musicians from Croatia toured Bihac region. According to local media, Croatian patriotic songs were received in Velika Kladusa with standing ovations.

B-H: Croatia To Establish Air Links to Sarajevo, Mostar

LD2204211596 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Croatian national carrier [Croatia Airways] has completed preparations for the establishment of civilian air traffic between Zagreb and Sarajevo, and Zagreb and Mostar.

Kresimir Magdic, assistant director for Marketing, Sales, and Services [of Croatia Airways], has said that the first ATR-42 plane should take off for Sarajevo on 1 May and for Mostar on 1 June.

According to an already prepared flight schedule, the Croatian company will fly from Zagreb to Sarajevo and back every day of the week except Saturday. A return ticket will cost around $326.

B-H: Commission Demands Belgrade Release of 4 Bosniak POW's

AU2204174696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Belgrade-Pale axis continues to function excellently. The activities of these two regimes are perfectly synchronized. While war criminal Karadzic is holding 19 Bosniaks and Croats in prison in Pale accused of alleged war crimes, Slobodan Milosevic, who has arrested and is keeping four Bosniaks who are [words indistinct] in a Belgrade prison without any basis, is doing the same, reads a statement by the State Commission for the Exchange of Prisoners of War.

The arrests of the four refugees merely represents the continuation of the constant abuse of Bosniaks in Serbia and Motenegro. To recap, a large number of Bosniaks were arrested in Serbia and at the Montenegrin coast in spring 1992 were subsequently deported to Bosnia, and, contrary to the Geneva conventions, were handed over to Karadzic's paramilitary formations, after which all trace of them was lost. At the same time, injured and sick people transferred from a Gorazde hospital to a Belgrade hospital [words indistinct] disappeared without a trace.

The supposed investigation into the missing Bosniaks from Sjeverin and Strbac failed to yield any results even after two years of work. The Belgrade regime is responsible for the fate of the Bosniaks deported from Foca prison to Serbia in summer 1992.

The latest arrest of the four Bosniaks on the allegations that they are war criminals is yet further proof of the direct participation of the Belgrade regime in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. For that reason, unless these four innocent Bosniaks are not immediately released from the Belgrade prison, we will consider the conditions for the suspension and abolition of sanctions against Serbia [words indistinct] and for their reintroduction, reads the public statement by the State Commission for the Exchange of Prisoners of War.

B-H: Serb, Croat Councils Propose District for Sarajevo

LD2004220296 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 20 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In a letter sent to Ambassador Michael Steiner, the Croat People's Council and the Serb Civic Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina propose that

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Sarajevo should become a district. They also propose that the equality of the Bosniak, Croat, and Serb people, whose aim is to safeguard and further develop the multiethnic structure of the city as a nucleus for the reconstruction and reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is ensured within the city government.

We ask you to bear in mind the positions of the Croat People's Council and the Serb Civic Council when implementing the peace solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croat People's Council and the Serb Civic Council say in their letter addressed to Amb. Steiner.

B-H: Croat Council Prepared To Defend War Crimes Accused

LD2204174396 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The 46th Session of the [Herzeg-Bosnia] Presidential Council was held in Mostar today under the chairmanship of its Acting President Ivan Bender.

The discussion focused on the implementation of the Dayton agreement and the reports on this submitted by top officials of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosna and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.

A critical analysis of recent political decisions and developments showed that the Croat side is displaying exceptional cooperativeness in the implementation of the Dayton accord and post-Dayton agreements. The readiness to transfer structures of authority, the completion of cadres [as heard] and flexibility in resolving disputed issues are characteristics of the Croat approach to the implementation of the agreements. This, however, is not possible without reciprocal measures by the other sides.

The Presidential Council today pledged to continue on this course but also recalled its obligation not to allow Croat national rights to be jeopardized in the case of nonadherence to the spirit of the Dayton agreement by the other two constituent peoples.

Concerning the decision by the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina presidency on indemnities to members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army for the time spent in defense of the country, the Presidential Council concluded that it was absolutely unacceptable to exempt soldiers and officers of the Croat Defense Council-Bosnian Croat Forces [HVO] from this category. Moreover, the presidential council initiated measures to likewise assess the contribution by the soldiers and officers of the HVO, not having to wait for a final say by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina. [passage omitted]

Ivan Lalic submitted a report on the work of the office for legal aid and social protection for the persons on trial at the Hague International Court. The presidential council reached a decision to formally regulate the problem of legal, moral, and financial aid to the officers on trial in the Hague. These people are commissioned officers of a regular army which was defending the people, so their fate and the assessment of their work cannot only be their private matter. It was therefore concluded that the office should be urgently and adequately staffed and equipped.

The government of Herzeg-Bosnia was asked to pass legislation by which 2 percent of the April salaries of all employed in Herzeg-Bosnia would be allocated for the defense of the accused. [passage omitted]

B-H: Government Wants Case Against Djukic To Continue

AU2304093696 Paris AFP in English 0912 GMT 23 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, April 23 (AFP)—The Bosnian Government wants the UN war crimes tribunal to continue its case against Serb General Djordje Djukic despite the fact that he is dying of cancer, a government spokesman said Tuesday.

The International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague is examining a request to release Djukic, who is charged with crimes against humanity for his role in the shelling of Sarajevo, on the grounds that he is dying of cancer of the pancreas.

"If he (Djukic) is ill, it does not mean he is not still guilty. We would like to see the case continue, because the recognition of the war crimes and genocide here is a very important issue. But we must respect international order and will respect the decision of the court," foreign ministry spokesman Mirza Hajric told AFP.

Djukic, a former officer in the Yugoslav Army (JNA) and the logistics chief of the Bosnian Serbs, was arrested by Bosnian police in January after the car in which he was travelling took a wrong turning in a Sarajevo suburb.

He was later transferred to The Hague and indicted. He pleaded not guilty to the charges against him.

Lawyers defending Djukic on Monday said the case against their client should be dropped for legal, not medical, reasons.

Defence lawyers Milan Vujin and Toma Fila said that while Djukic's health was a matter for concern, the court should drop charges because "the case is empty."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

As logistics chief of the Serb army Djukic was responsible for the provisioning of the shells used against Sarajevo for nearly four years of the war and was credited with the creation of a powerful, rocket-propelled, "flying bomb" used in spectacular attacks against the city last year.

B-H: Goldstone Sees Trial as Way To Prevent Conflicts

MS1804115996 London THE EUROPEAN in English 18-24 Apr 96 p 11

[Report on interview with Judge Richard Goldstone, prosecutor at the international war crimes tribunal in former Yugoslavia, by Ian Mather in Goldstone's office in The Hague; date not given]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In a fortified courtroom protected by bulletproof glass, Dusko Tadic, a Bosnian Serb, is about to become the first person to go on trial for war crimes in Bosnia. Tadic is accused of "crimes against humanity," which include the alleged killing and rape of Muslim civilians at a detention centre in northwest Bosnia where he was commander.

His accuser at the 7 May trial will be the man appointed by the United Nations as prosecutor at the international war crimes tribunal in former Yugoslavia, Judge Richard Goldstone of South Africa.

For Goldstone it will be a significant step along a course that has never been attempted before. His highly ambitious aim is to transform the nature of war by making those who prosecute it liable to legal prosecution themselves if they break the rules of war.

So far, only 57 people have been indicted, and only four of them—three Bosnian Serbs and one Bosnian Croat—have been incarcerated in Goldstone's cells, despite the fact that the war in former Yugoslavia has produced hundreds of thousands of victims.

In his office above the courtroom in The Hague that will soon be the scene of a clinical examination of some of the grimmest episodes of the war, Goldstone spoke to The European and gave his assessment of what the tribunal has achieved so far, and of its limitations.

Q: At one end of the spectrum there are those who say that all's fair in love and war. At the other extreme are people who argue that all war is a crime against humanity. So what is a war crime?

A: We are talking about international humanitarian law, the principles of which are clear. The purpose of the law of war is to protect innocent non-belligerents. Making war is not a war crime in international humanitarian law. Just as with the Queensberry rules that apply to boxing, the aim is to make what is a dirty affair less dirty.

Q: Taking the example of Sarajevo, where the Bosnian government had much of its artillery among the civilian population, what was the other side supposed to do?

A: It is entitled to go against military targets, but in a manner that will cause the least amount of death and injury to civilians. If there's an ammunition factory in the middle of a civilian area, the enemy is entitled to take it out, and if that means killing innocent civilians, that's not a war crime. But if they do it in a way that kills more civilians than is necessary or is justified by the operation, that is a war crime.

Q: The criteria you are seeking to apply have never been applied before.

A: That is an argument for a permanent court to see that the rules of war are always applied. The rules go back thousands of years, but these tribunals are the first time that the international community has sought to enforce them.

Q: What is your judgment on the co-operation you are getting from the parties in Bosnia?

A: It's not as good as I'd like but it is certainly better than it was, especially on the Serb side. We are opening an office in Belgrade, and the Serbs have delivered two important potential witnesses to us, significantly in a case against Radovan Karadic and Ratko Mladic. The Croatians have always cooperated with this office. The only thing they did not do was to have legislation enabling them to surrender Croatian citizens to us. That legislation is before the parliament. It is taking too long.

Q: Do you apply the same criticism to Bosnia?

A: The Bosnians have been the most co-operative of all. They have the legislation and they have complied generally with requests. But I'm disappointed that they have not yet arrested and handed over Hazim Delie and Esad Landzo (two indicted Bosnian Muslims). So far, three Muslims have been indicted. One is on his way here after being arrested by German police. The other two are in Bosnia.

Q: None of the parties has handed over to you a single indicted person. Tadic was arrested by the Germans. All those you have your hands on have come to you through vicarious means. Is that a disappointment?

A: Of course. And it is a clear violation of international obligations. But it is out of our hands. All we can do is issue arrest warrants.

Q: Can you not ask the Nato implementation force (I-FOR) to pursue a more active policy?

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

A: We can ask. Again, there is nothing formal we can do.

Q: Are you now satisfied that I-FOR is doing everything you would like?

A: No. I think they are co-operating within what they believe to be their mandate. Their attitude is that it's not their job to arrest people. I understand to an extent, because the primary obligation is on governments.

Q: You are not pursuing rank and file people. You seem to be accepting the "only obeying orders" syndrome.

A: We have only two courts. So we can go after only a limited number of people. We have to get those who are most guilty. Under our statute obeying orders is not a defence. That is the position in international law. It is an inheritance from the Nuremberg trials.

We try and deal evenhandedly with similar offences. The Serbs have made it difficult to investigate cases of victimisation of Serbs, though that may be changing. It is the Serbian authorities and the Republika Srpska that have been blocking this. We haven't been allowed access to Bosnian Serb and Serb victims, many of whom have become refugees in Serbia.

Q: Do you do see this job as helping the peace process?

A: It essential to the peace process. If there is no justice, if there is no acknowledgment of what happened to this number of victims, the cries for vengeance will continue. I believe that's the reason you have cycles of violence in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Many hundreds of thousands of victims have had no justice. The hate goes on from generation to generation.

Q: Do you think the tribunal has been a success so far?

A: I think it has achieved a great deal. It is being taken seriously and is having an effect in the international arena. But it would be premature to say it's a success.

Q: Do you think it's possible to change the conduct of future wars?

A: If military and political leaders know that there is a court before which they could be compelled to justify their actions, they are going to act differently.

B-H: Goldstone: Chances Improved To Arrest Bosnian Serbs

AU2304080896 Paris AFP in English 2347 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Stockholm, April 23 (AFP)—The chances of arresting Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic for war crimes have improved, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia said Monday.

Richard Goldstone said the pair, who have been indicted for war crimes during the Balkans war, had been "marginalized" and no longer could act as leaders "from an international point of view."

"That makes them more expendable, and maybe their own people will hand them over," he told reporters at a seminar in Stockholm on the tribunal's work.

He added that it would "clearly be in our interest" if the NATO-led peace Implementation Force in Bosnia was given the authority to arrest the two men.

IFOR commander Admiral Leighton Smith has said that his multinational force could only stop suspected war criminals if they come across them in the normal course of their operations.

On the release Sunday of 11 war-crimes suspects in Sarajevo on grounds of lack of evidence, Goldstone bemoaned a "lack of resources" to delve deeper into cases such as theirs.

"It may well be that with more resources, we could have had a different result," he said.

Goldstone also said it was high time for the world community to be served by a full-time war crimes tribunal.

"It is unsatisfactory that a political body like the UN Security Council decides from time to time that international humanitarian law should be applied in one country and not in another country," he said.

"It should be applied equally to all people," he added.

B-H: Karadzic Calls Hague Tribunal 'Political Farce'

LD2204205996 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Radovan Karadzic, the president of the Serb Republic, today in Pale received Aleksa Krsmanovic, a colonel in the Serb Republic army.

[Correspondent] In his conversation with Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic, Karadzic expressed satisfaction with the fact that justice was attainable after all. He said that the whole incident, Col. Krsmanovic's kidnapping, his transfer to The Hague, and his release, has the hallmarks of a skillfully staged process. He said that since 1992, when it formed its army, its state organs and other bodies, the Serb Republic had behaved in line with Geneva Conventions and other international regulations and that it was, therefore, impossible to come up with any evidence against those whom the international community wanted to try.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Begin recording] [Karadzic] We were all very worried and angry about what happened to him and General Djukic. As you remember, in response we hardened our relations with the international community, stopped all contacts at that time. After that, the people, feeling humiliated and offended, insisted on us assuming a tough stance vis a vis the international community. Assembly Speaker Krajisnik, who in this war worked hard on prisoner exchanges, has succeeded in ensuring the release of 10 Serb soldiers and Col. Krsmanovic from the Muslim prison where Col. Krsmanovic should never have been sent. The soldiers should have been exchanged and released a long time ago.

As for Gen. Djukic, we have recently issued a demand for his release. We think that the explanation that he is being released for health reasons is not on. The Hague tribunal is trying to wriggle out of this situation because it has no evidence against a logistics general. He was not a commanding general, and in any case there is no evidence against any of our generals. The tribunal has behaved in a scandalous way in the case of Gen. Djukic and Col. Krsmanovic. [end recording]

[Correspondent] The world media have recently been attacking the Hague tribunal and its work. Does this mean that a campaign in favor of the Serb people is underway?

[Karadzic] Well, there is a bit more truth around about the Serb people. But, what is important is that many experts, eminent lawyers, can no longer stay silent about the tribunal that is, in fact, a political farce with no legal grounds. I see that lawyers throughout the world have been questioning the legality of the tribunal. I think that this will serve to develop respect for the legal profession and for judiciary as a whole. [end recording]

B-H: Karadzic Orders Investigation on Banja Luka IFOR Base

LD2204131996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1238 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 22 Apr (SRNA)—The [Bosnian] Serb Republic has not given its consent to locate the headquarters of the IFOR [Implementation Force] British unit in Banja Luka, SRNA has learned from sources close to the Serb Republic state leadership.

In the opinion of the state leadership, the university, cultural, and business center of the Serb Republic—Banja Luka—would face changes detrimental to citizens of Banja Luka if a foreign army is stationed there.

In addition to this, the state leadership of the Serb Republic recalls, such a decision is of utmost strategic importance and can be reached only by the People's Assembly or the president of the Republic, in consultations with whole state leadership and the General Staff of the Serb Republic Army.

This is why Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, has ordered an investigation into who exactly gave permission to station the IFOR British troops' headquarters in Banja Luka, despite the opposition by the People's Assembly and the state leadership.

B-H: Serb General Wants IFOR To Be Tougher on Muslims

LD2304141996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1237 GMT 23 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 23 Apr (SRNA)—General Dragomir Milosevic, commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps of the Army of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, warned today that there is still no satisfactory degree of trust among the teams working on the withdrawal and storage of heavy weapons.

In a statement for SRNA, Gen. Milosevic singled out the fact that the Implementation Force [IFOR] has not yet definitely established to what extent the Muslim and Croat side has been observing the agreement on the withdrawal of heavy weapons, as envisaged by the Dayton agreement.

"IFOR is very keen to monitor the movement of our howitzers, but are not that rigorous when it comes to the activities of the other side, although their statements, probably out of courtesy, speak about their satisfaction with the conduct of both our and the Muslim command," Gen. Milosevic said.

According to him, "it has been noted that the Muslim side is not that keen to abide by the provisions of the military section of the Dayton agreement, and when it does it is not guided by its desire for peace but by circumstances and IFOR pressure."

Referring to the control and defense of the borders, Gen. Milosevic warned that our response to any potential movement of armed Muslim formations will be prompt and resolute.

"We will no longer tolerate attempts to penetrate deep into our territory and any possible attack will be repulsed in an energetic way. The army of the Serb Republic has enough resources and military determination for it," Gen. Milosevic said.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

B-H: Bosnian Serb General Protests Helicopter Incident

LD2304122096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1040 GMT 23 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 23 Apr (SRNA)—Colonel-General Ratko Mladic, commander of the Main Headquarters of the [Bosnian] Serb army, sent a protest letter today to the commanders in chief of NATO and IFOR [Implementation Force] on the incident that took place in Doboj on 21 April, claiming that in the incident the multinational forces wounded two and injured 10 Serb civilians.

The protest letter, which was addressed to NATO Europe Commander General George Joulwan and IFOR commanders Admiral Leighton-Smith and General Michael Walker, claims that on 21 April the multinational forces allowed 3,000 Muslims to cross the border near Doboj and enter some 1.8 km into [Bosnian] Serb Republic territory.

"The civilian population of Doboj stopped the mass of people with their own bodies, while an IFOR major fired into the Serb civilians and wounded two of them. This is a flagrant violation of the IFOR peace mission and the principles of its neutrality," Gen. Mladic said in his protest letter, which continues:

"Later, two heavy IFOR helicopters, flying at low altitude, chased away the Serb civilians, and injured 10 persons with debris lifted from the ground [by the turbulence from its propellers]."

Reminding [NATO and IFOR officials] that "the army of the Serb Republic has no forces of its own in the zone of separation, Gen. Mladic expressed his "concern over the possibility of spontaneous revenge by Serb civilians against the IFOR troops if similar incidents are repeated," and demanded that IFOR "immediately halt any similar actions."

B-H: Pale Serbs Accuse IFOR of Encouraging 'Aggression'

AU2204142896 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Muslims want to create incidents, warns the Serb Republic interior ministry, appealing to the citizens not to succumb to panic and fear in the event of attempts by citizens of the Muslim-Croat federation to stir up trouble. Radovan Brankov reports from Banja Luka:

[Begin Brankov recording] The Muslims who recently crossed into the territory of the Serb Republic were particularly aggressive toward members of the Serb police. There is a lot of talk about this in Banja Luka and Doboj today.

By encouraging mass entry by their people into some areas of the Serb Republic, the Muslim authorities are trying to provoke incidents and conflicts. As the interior ministry of the Serb Republic warns, all this is being done to undermine the legitimacy of the bodies of authority of the Serb Republic.

The Serb Republic interior ministry statement says that Muslims are being deliberately sent to the territory of the Serb Republic with the aim of provoking incidents in an organized way in the areas of Doboj, Teslic, Brcko, and other towns. The Serb Republic interior ministry informs the public that it will continue to protect the constitutional organization and property safety of Serb Republic citizens with all means and forces available, in line with the constitution of the republic, its laws, and other regulations.

They expect that previous experience is enough for the Implementation Force to stop encouraging and protecting mass displays of aggression by the Muslims, says the statement by the Serb Republic interior ministry. [end recording]

B-H: Serbs Allege 'Biased' Treatment by NATO, Police

LD2204175696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 22 Apr (SRNA)—Dragan Kijac, minister of interior of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic has sent a letter to the commissioner of the International Police Task Force and the commander of the Implementation Forces protesting the latest examples of their biased behavior in exercising their mandate.

The recent staged events in Brcko, Otoka, and Teslic [when Muslims from the federation attempted to visit their former homes in the Bosnian Serb Republic territory] clearly show the determination of the Muslim side to continue the war, the statement warned.

"In the case of Doboj, all aggression was aimed at the Serb side. [Gun] barrels and arms also [were aimed at the Serbs]. Several Serb civilians were wounded yesterday." The statement referred to yesterday's attempt by Muslims to enter Doboj by force. [passage omitted]

Attempts to define the Muslim mass arrivals in the Serb Republic as freedom of movement are "transparent and familiar" and are only another example of unequal treatment "as the Serbs are deprived of the same right." [passage omitted]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

B-H: Serbs, IMF Officials Discuss Payments, Currency

AU2204134696 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 21 Apr 96 p 5

[Unattributed report: "One Bosnia, Three Currencies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Petra Markovic, vice governor of the National Bank of the Serb Republic, spoke on 19 April in Banja Luka with an IMF delegation about payment operations and commodity exchange between the Serb Republic and the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

After the meeting, which was held behind closed doors, Markovic said the guests from the IMF had been introduced to an attitude that "no currency that does not bear the symbols of the Serb Republic can function in the Serb Republic and that the Serb Republic does not accept a uniform system of payment operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it does accept that payment operations and commodity exchange with the Croatian-Muslim federation can be carried out on the basis of clearing [kliring]."

(?Raymond Garard), head of the IMF delegation, pointed out that, after a lengthy visit to the Serb Republic and the Croatian-Muslim federation, he saw for himself that three systems of payment operations are functioning in the region and three currencies are being used as means of payment.

B-H: Serbs' Kasagic, World Bank Officials Discuss Issues

LD2204122696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1013 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 22 Apr (SRNA)—Rajko Kasagic, prime minister of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, had talks in Pale today with Christine Walitch, director of the World Bank office for the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, and her aides, on the future cooperation between the World Bank and the Serb Republic in the reconstruction program of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

According to Kasagic, the World Bank officials were interested in hearing why the Serb Republic delegation did not participate in the recent Brussels conference on the reconstruction of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. [passage omitted]

"They demand a certain channel for cooperation—through the Muslim authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I have warned them that the joint authorities have not yet been elected and that cooperation should go though the existing Serb Republic bodies," Kasagic explained. He added that some things might change in this regard after elections, when joint authorities are elected in which the Serb Republic would be represented. [passage omitted]

"The heating systems in various towns would be a pilot project for which smaller funds would be needed, and it would be financed through the current Muslim authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Should it succeed, we would launch larger projects," Kasagic said. [passage omitted]

He added that several million German marks are needed for repairs of these systems.

Kasagic pointed out that the World Bank's condition [for investing funds] was that the funds for reconstruction programs be channeled through the former Bosnia-Herzegovina bodies and that the Serb Republic cooperate with the Croat-Muslim federation [Bosnia-Herzegovina federation] and the Muslim government. [passage omitted]

B-H: Serb PM on Elections, Economic Issues

LD2104162596 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1424 GMT 21 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kragujevac, 21 Apr (TANJUG)—Rajko Kasagic, prime minister of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, told Radio Kragujevac today that elections in the Serb Republic are necessary because there is a need for new people and fresh ideas. He said he hopes that elections will be held when envisaged, by 14 September at the latest.

Taking part in the hallmark of the Times program, Kasagic recalled that the state of war has been suspended in the Serb Republic and that it has been six years since the Serb Republic bodies were elected.

Kasagic pointed out that there are many problems in the Serb Republic, from the demobilization of more than 185,000 soldiers, and their employment, to the economy which operated at only 5 percent of capacity during the war and lost markets in many countries.

"Things are very difficult at the moment because, now that the sanctions have been lifted, there is no more humanitarian aid as during the war, and the Serb Republic cannot obtain financial support from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund before elections are held," Kasagic said.

"We are trying to ease the unemployment problem by establishing bilateral relations with business people, primarily from Serbia and Montenegro, then Greece and Italy. The Greeks will give us a credit worth $100 million. In a few days we will have another meeting with

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

a delegation of businessmen from Italy to discuss joint investments, joint venture enterprises, and cooperation," the Serb Republic prime minister said.

B-H: Kasagic Asks Media To Work on 'Preservation' of RS

AU1904143496 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 19 Apr 96

[Report by Radovan Brankov from Banja Luka]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Brankov] Since 19 April 1992, Srpska Radio Televizija Studio Banja Luka has been broadcasting its program without fail for 10 to 12 hours a day. Speaking to the guests at today's ceremony marking its anniversary, Serb Republic [RS] Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic said:

[Begin Kasagic recording] I hope that the republic assembly will find the strength to provide the conditions for the uninterrupted work of television and radio, so that reporters will be completely independent and able to work on the creation of our state and on the preservation of what we have created in this war: the RS, with a high level of independence, while respecting the implementation of the Dayton agreement, as that is our foundation at the moment, upon which we can build our prosperity and open our borders to all the areas of the former Yugoslavia, to Europe, and to the world, linking up with the united European and world market. Only in this way can we make progress in the media. [sentence as heard] [end recording]

B-H: Banja Luka Mayor Comments on Economy

AU1804160396 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 16 Apr 96 p 13

[Interview with Banja Luka Mayor Predrag Radic by Jovan Birac; place and date not given: "Better Days for Banja Luka"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka is undoubtedly the educational, cultural, and commercial center of the Serb Republic. Many people believe that it should be declared the capital of the Serb Republic. Although Banja Luka has not experienced the spasms of war for a long time, its mayor, Predrag Radic, is still most eager to talk about attempts to wake the patient from its coma.

[Birac] Has Banja Luka begun to live a peacetime life, and how long will it take for it to heal its war wounds?

[Radic] At the moment, my city looks like a patient who is in a sort of post-surgery coma, from which it will hopefully awake soon. There is no longer war, but its consequences are still felt. In Banja Luka at present there are few natives of Banja Luka. There are more refugees and others who have decided to settle here than those who lived here before the war. The problem is what to do with them, how to provide decent housing and jobs for them.

[Birac] What are the chances for Banja Luka's economy to finally stand on its own feet?

[Radic] In order for us to get the economy in the region moving at all, three conditions must be met. Until recently, I held capital as the most important factor. I was wrong. The first thing we need is sufficient quantities of electricity. We have enough electricity for illumination, but not enough to start up machines as well. In Banja Luka this is a huge problem. Banja Luka is being fed by electricity from a 110 kilovolt duct, and in order to meet our industry's requirements we need a minimum of 400 kilovolts. I think this problem can be easily solved with an agreement between the three Bosnian sides that would benefit each of them. Hydroelectric and thermal power plants have been preserved, and we also have some coal in the Ugljevik and Kreka mines. However, long-distance power lines have been cut. I do not think that just one side should be repairing them without the other side's participation. Therefore an agreement and a coordination of efforts are necessary. For the reparation of the entire electric power system, money should be provided by the international community.

The second condition is capital. Factories are without any resources whatsoever. All they had has been used up. There are no reserves of raw materials, and, during the war, many factories worked only for the army, almost for free. Farming production was gradually decreasing, and now only 20 percent of its capacity is being used. This means we need to "breathe" fresh capital into the Banja Luka economy for the purchase of raw materials and spare parts. According to my estimate, just to get started, we need 150 to 200 million German marks.

The third problem is skilled personnel. There has not been much talk about this problem lately, and everything is enveloped in silence. This is because the cadre before the war was multinational, rather than purely Serb. Banja Luka used to invest a lot of money in the education of experts, their specialization in the country and abroad. A deficit in skilled personnel is particularly sensed in the electronic, machine construction, and chemical industries. Let me make it clear: There are a lot of Serbs, top experts, who, over the past three or four years, have started careers abroad and probably left Banja Luka forever. Even if somebody were to present us with the most contemporary technology right now, it is questionable whether the existing cadre would know what to do with it.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Birac] In conclusion, will Banja Luka, despite all the problems, become the capital city of the Serb Republic?

[Radic] Banja Luka is primarily a university city. With its institutions of higher education, Banja Luka meets the needs of the Serb Republic. To build new university centers would be ridiculous. The fact is that the brain of the Serb Republic is being raised here and is living here. A state cannot be led without the assistance of highly educated people, while the entire professorial cadre of the Serb Republic is found in Banja Luka. Students are also here, who are the future of this country. Furthermore, Banja Luka owns the complete infrastructure that any capital city needs. Why should we build buildings to house the central bank or the state administration elsewhere, if we have everything we need here? After all, if people had wanted to build a large city on Mt. Romanija or Mt. Jahorina, they would have done so 1,000 years ago, and they would not have kept cows and sheep there.

[Box, p. 13]

[Birac] Is Banja Luka going to get some financial help for reconstruction?

[Radic] Principally, it is, but certain conditions have been set for us that we will barely be able to fulfill. Representatives of foreign institutions that are supposed to allot money for the reconstruction of Banja Luka are insisting on the problem of repatriation, that is, the return of refugees to their homes. Those foreign representatives tell me: "You will only get aid when Muslims and Croats return to Banja Luka. Only then can we talk about the construction of apartments, the renovation of the infrastructure, and the resumption of industrial production." However, no one has told us what we are supposed to do with the Serb refugees who found refuge here after the Croat offensives in Krajina. The first thing we ought to do is to provide them with housing or make it possible for them to return. Only then can we talk about full repatriation.

[Box, p 13]

[Radic] We shall soon open the Loznica-Zvornik-Tuzla-Doboj-Banja Luka railroad line for traffic. It is very important for this region, because certain goods can be transported only by train, like, for instance, ore from Omarska mine that is conveyed to the Sartid plant in Smederevo or wooden beams for the building industry, which are much cheaper to transport by train than by truck. Of course, in the beginning, only freight trains will operate.

[Box, p 13]

[Radic] Our capacities promise a bright future for us. We have the Cajavec holding company that includes 38 factories that are now ready to work at full speed. We also have the Jelsingrad plant that can resume production immediately, as well as cooperation with its old partners in Belgium. There is a shoe factory that can produce 2.5 million pairs of shoes a year, and it is already concluding contracts for exports to Russia. The Incel plant will undergo reconstruction, but it is still capable of manufacturing cellulose, viscose, and cellophane. The food industry has been working all this time without interruption. This field will be one of the pillars of exports from the Banja Luka region. The Levita meat processing plant based in Bosanska Gradiska owns an export license of the European Union, and can immediately put its products on the market. However, at this stage, we cannot speak in terms of development, but rather in terms of recovery. The patient has to recover first to be able to stand on its own feet.

[Box, p 13]

[Radic] The shops are indeed full of varied goods, but people are generally broke. There are many demobilized soldiers without jobs, and they are rightfully expecting the state to solve their financial problems. I hope it will be better in the future, when our economy recovers. The resumption of production is the only way for us to prevent social disorder in Banja Luka. This city had 25,000 of its workers on the front. Now all of them want to realize their right to work, which they cannot because factories are either closed or are operating merely symbolically. However, if at least 60 percent of the overall capacities were to resume operation, there would be no unemployment.

[Box, p 13]

[Radic] At least 700 refugees are still living in the gymnasium of an elementary school. Others are accommodated privately. There are frequently cases where as many as three families share a 30-square-meter apartment. They are also losing patience, because such living conditions are inhuman, and we cannot offer them anything better for the time being.

[Box, p 13]

[Radic] After minor repairs, the airport in Banja Luka could be used for civilian traffic. Although Yugoslav Air Transport is on the move now, I believe that it will wait for an agreement with the Croats to open the Belgrade-Banja Luka connection, because planes are supposed to fly over Croat territory, that is, right above the highway.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

B-H: Belgrade Daily Interviews Serb Member of Presidency

AU1904092296 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Apr 96 p 11

[Report on interview with Mirko Pejanovic, member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and leader of the Serb Civil Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Dragan Banjac; place and date not given: "Conditions for Democratic Elections Have Not Yet Been Met"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "I would like to express my pride that this party, led by a wise, courageous, and distinguished person, has offered and realized a defense model for the free society, democracy, and survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a multiethnic community," said Mirko Pejanovic, member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and leader of the Serbian Civil Council [SGV] of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He said this as he greeted the delegates of the Union of Social Democrats of Bosnia-Herzegovina [UBSD] and its leader, Selim Beslagic.

Although he originally comes from this area, what is Pejanovic's purpose in Tuzla since it is known that he is one of the distinguished members of Durakovic's Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Tuzla Has Advantage

—I came at the request of Mr. Beslagic, first as a civil servant, and also as a member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency. For me, this was an event of great importance. It was also a great event for Tuzla as well as for Bosnia-Herzegovina, because it brought up an array of issues that are of great importance for future political life in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Beslagic and Tokic are persons whose human and political point of view give equality to the ordinary man, regardless of the fact whether he is a Serb, a Croat, or a Bosniak. This does not mean that such an attitude does not exist in Sarajevo, but in Tuzla it is a bit better noticed. Maybe this is because it has a more acceptable atmosphere.

[Banjac] You are one of those who had expressed such an atmosphere in Sarajevo during the war. Has the situation changed?

[Pejanovic] I am sure that it has not. At least not regarding Sarajevo's wish to retain that, without which there is no survival for any of the nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, circumstances have changed, disturbed by the departure of [word indistinct] and by the arrival of a large number of refugees. This is unavoidable, and it would be best if the majority would return to where they came from. In this regard, Tuzla has an advantage, because the UBSD has been striving for a civil concept. This is something that SGV Bosnia-Herzegovina, the party of which I am leader, has been striving for. However, they have been more resolute and more successful in having the Serb people remain in this area. This was not done in much of Sarajevo, because of the war surroundings and the great suffering of the Bosniaks. And we need not even mention the movement of people from Grbavica, because here we are dealing with the incorrect politics of the [word indistinct] authorities. With this, they showed that they are not concerned with the people, but with their personal political profit.

[Banjac] What is the policy of cooperation in Sarajevo like today?

[Pejanovic] Three processes are fundamental. First of all, the cooperation of the Federation (as of recently it too has its own government). The way in which life will be restored depends on this program. There were some brakes [Mostar], and they have been taken care of, just like the problem regarding the formation of cantons. That is why Secretary of Defense Perry further spoke to the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] and SDA [Party of Democratic Action], to those who can influence the HDZ in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the people in the Bosniak corps [korpus]. He later also spoke about this in Zagreb. Even Stephan [name indistinct] threatened that the aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina would be refused, this was [word indistinct]. The second process is the connection of the individual entities in some common aspects that are necessary for the restoration of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is what, in some way, is being coordinated by Carl Bildt. It is very important that the representatives of the three governments met in Banja Luka, and the issue of prisoners has already been taken care of. This is being completed. Moreover, the representative of the World Bank recently (Wolfensohn) stayed in Sarajevo, and signed the Bosnia-Herzegovina membership.

The Same Concern for All People

[Banjac] Were there suggestions that there should be no investments in the Serb Republic?

[Pejanovic] This issue was mentioned, but there was also some additional explanation that there should be no investments while those two (Karadzic and Mladic—editor's note) are there, holding their positions. I personally represented the point of view that the punishment of the regime should not be a punishment of the people. Moreover, as a member of the Presidency and the leader of the SGV, I have to support the view that our concern must be the same for all people. The investments must be directed to the return of the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

refugees, to remove from their functions all those that have been accused of war crimes, and so that the aid has to go through the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, that is, through the state. This will contribute to the democratic process in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The third process is the formation of democratic institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, of course, the elections.

[Banjac] What is with the "Serb [word indistinct]"?

[Pejanovic] Until the elections, the authorities are represented by the previously elected national representatives, which is how it is regulated by the Dayton agreement. However, it is worth mentioning that those who are signing this are signing it with Muratovic. As it is known, there are seats in the government that are set aside for Serbs. The Assembly would be divided into two chambers, and the Presidency will consist of three members....

[Banjac] What do you expect at the elections?

[Pejanovic] There are still no assumptions regarding the democratic elections. There is no freedom of movement, the media support only one party, and it is not even known what the election procedure will look like. As far as the SGV is concerned, we will put together a list from personnel of Serb people in exile, from the federation, and from the list of democratic parties in the Serb entity. It is difficult to expect victory, we do, with a reason, hope for great progress.

[Box, p 11]

The Return of Refugees

The Serb Civil Council is working a great deal on the return of refugees to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Regarding this matter, Pejanovic said, "We are open to the [words indistinct] in Sarajevo and other towns. A number of obstacles are awaiting the refugees. This is a test for human rights, and [word indistinct] pressure on the authorities to implement these rights. I would say that the problem is the [words indistinct] with the [words indistinct]. The SGV is on the side of those who want to return, and we will fight for this with all our capabilities. What is most important is that they may all return. A number of people have come to me already, but the issue of residential rights is still open. Because, even he who [words indistinct] has been driven away [word indistinct], and until the Sarajevo refugees return there, it will be a bit more difficult. However, we call on all people because he who comes to Sarajevo will sooner get a job than a refugee in Belgrade."

B-H: Teslic SP Holds Rally, Calls For 'Free State'

AU2104162396 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 21 Apr 96

[Report by Radovan Brankov from Teslic—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Brankov] The Teslic Socialist Party [SP] Municipal Organization is one of the largest and best organized municipal organizations in the Serb Republic [RS] today. The members of this party are primarily young, educated people, experienced businessmen, former troops and their officers, the war disabled, and distinguished [words indistinct].

The two-year work of the Teslic SP obliges us to once again tell the public about ourselves, the times we live in, and the future we are hoping for, Rade Pavlovic, president of the SP Municipal Council, said at the start of the rally.

We wish to have a free state of free people who will not be ashamed of their history. We wish to build a future worthy of human beings and not a state where we will play the gusle [traditional Serb musical instrument], invoke the past, and dance the kolo [traditional dance] with the dead, and at the same time send our children abroad to be educated and to work. We have had enough of courting the people with humanitarian aid packages. The people have had enough of stories, insinuations, deceptions, lies, and fear. The Serb people in the RS have found themselves in complete isolation because of an unreasonable policy. We have done and continue to do everything the world does not want to either hear or see. Our task is to bring the Serb people out of isolation and remove their badge of shame. It is not true that the entire world hates the Serbs and that everyone is their enemy. Those who claim this do not deserve to speak on behalf of the Serb people, let alone lead them. We hope that the time of wise, responsible, and courageous people has come, Rade Pavlovic, president of the Teslic SP Municipal Council, said. Europe and the world are ruled by Socialist parties, and our place is among the Serbian people's majority party, legendary Lieutenant Colonel Miladin Klecak told the rally.

Greeting the rally, RSSP President Dragutin Ilic said:

[Ilic] You see what the current regime and certain—I stress certain—Serbian Democratic Party members who are consumed with hatred have been doing to us these last couple of months. This saddens and worries us. We are sad that such people exist among our people and are worried because they comprise those who still unfortunately make decisions on behalf of the people and apply their largely distorted standards to judge what is good and bad for the people. They have decided to force all those who do not support them and who

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

disagree with them to accept their standards. We appeal to them to come to their senses and understand that the people's wishes cannot be stopped by anyone or any repressive measures. And the people wish to have the RSSP because they see salvation in its program and they trust its personnel. The people also want the SP because the Socialists' responsible attitude to power in our mother country has protected Serbia from the war, protected our people from defeat, brought peace, and because it is led by a politician like President Milosevic. [applause] That is why no repressive measures will prevent our party from responsibly representing the interests of our people, and that is why I am convinced that their actions are provoked by fear of losing power.

B-H: Teslic Socialists Call For Removal of SDS 'Extremists'

AU2204192296 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 22 Apr 96

[Report by Predrag Sarac from Teslic]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Sarac] The great hall in the Kardial Hotel in Teslic was not big enough to receive all those who wanted to attend the first rally of the Socialists of the Teslic municipality. Although there was justified fear that groups from the ranks of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] and the current authorities would use this occasion to stir trouble and to attack the members of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic, the rally went ahead without much unpleasantness under intensified security measures.

The municipal organization of the Socialist Party of Teslic, with over 2,000 members, is one of the largest and best organized among the Socialists of the Serb Republic.

We are facing hard times of preserving peace and beginning the reconstruction of the destroyed country. It will be a time of great sacrifice, and a lot of strength and wisdom will be needed for us to stand up again and catch up with the others, stressed Rade Pavlovic, chairman of the municipal committee of the Socialist Party of Teslic.

Greeted warmly, Dragutin Ilic, chairman of the Serb Republic's Socialists, addressed the rally. He criticized very severely the constant attempts by the current authorities to prevent the activities of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic in many municipalities, thus creating an atmosphere devoid of a democratic interparty tolerance.

[Ilic] We appeal to all reasonable, decent, and honest people in the SDS—and I am convinced that there are more of them than the others—to remove the extremists from their ranks since they are causing damage primarily to the SDS and unfortunately also to our people in general.

[Sarac] To judge by the atmosphere and the addresses at the first rally of the Socialist Party of Teslic, they are definitely and successfully marching on to the first congress of the Socialist Party scheduled for 1 June in Banja Luka, when they will set out their program for the elections in the Serb Republic.

B-H: Opposition Party Leader Calls for 'Unity'

AU2204122396 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 22 Apr 96 p 20

[Unattributed report: "Bosnia-Herzegovina Should Be Moving Toward Unity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The chairman of the Social Liberal Party from Banja Luka, Miodrag Zivanovic, said the organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina should be moving toward unity.

"The establishment of ethnically pure entities is inhuman and uncivilized, and is not our perspective. Take us in the Serb Republic, for instance: If we unite with Serbia, Banja Luka and the Bosnian Krajina region would become a military frontier again. Our children would be meant only to bear arms, and we would remain people without a chance," Zivanovic said. According to him, it will be difficult for Bosnia-Herzegovina to function as the peace accord anticipates unless people understand that all are humans first and only then Bosniaks, Croats, or Serbs....

"Their understanding of this is a way for us to bridge the middle space on our way to a rational Bosnia-Herzegovina. We have a frame, but what will be inside of it is up to us. We must choose people capable of leading a dialogue," Zivanovic said.

B-H: SDS Vice President on Unification With Serbia

LD2204151396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1411 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Samac, 22 Apr (SRNA)—Blagoje Simic, vice president of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) of the Serb Republic, said today that the struggle to preserve the Serb Republic as a state and its unification with Serbia are built into the party's program. There is also a social program, which guarantees higher living standards for all segments of the population. [passage omitted]

According to him, the SDS is a "center party that aims to regroup all Serbs whose ideology is Serbdom and the Serb state."

Simic stressed that the "Serb Republic has been bought in blood, and no political program that would return it to a union with Croats and Muslims should be allowed."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Croatia: Granic, Hungary's Kovacs Sign Agreements

LD2204135396 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Hungarian and Croatian foreign ministers have signed agreements on upholding the validity of a number of accords concluded between Hungary and the former Yugoslavia. A memorandum on the ratification of protecting minority rights has also been exchanged. Evelyn Forro reports from Zagreb:

[Forro] [Passage omitted] The Croatian foreign minister stated that the withdrawal of heavy weapons has begun in eastern Slavonia and Baranja and that it is hoped that the process will be completed by the end of June. It will then be possible for the ethnic Hungarians and Croatians who used to live there to return to their homes.

Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs has asked his Croatian colleague, Mate Granic, that the [returning ethnic] Hungarians should enjoy the same rights as the Croatians. [passage omitted]

During the talks it was also said that Hungary supported Croatia's endeavors to integrate into European organizations. Laszlo Kovacs assured his host that Hungary would vote for Croatia's admission to the Council of Europe. [passage omitted]

Foreign Minister Granic said that Zagreb was supporting the participation of the Hungarian oil company Mol Rt in the privatization of the Adria oil pipeline. [passage omitted]

Croatia: Hungarian FM Stresses Rights of Minorities

LD2204155296 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At his talks in Zagreb the Hungarian foreign minister asked that the Hungarian minority returning to Baranja and Eastern Slavonia enjoy the same rights as the Croats returning there. Evelyn Forro reports from Zagreb:

[Forro] Peace and stability in the Yugoslav region is of equal interest to Hungarians living in Croatia and Croats living in Hungary. This was said by Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs following his talks with Croatian Prime Minister Zlatko Matesa. Kovacs stressed that we, Hungarians, are particularly committed to the peaceful reintegration of Serb-occupied territories to Croatia. Budapest and Zagreb are tied by common interests.

At his talks with Croatian Deputy Prime Minister Ivica Kostovic, the Hungarian foreign minister asked that the Hungarian minority returning to Baranja and eastern Slavonia enjoy the same rights as the returning Croats.

Asked by Hungarian radio, Ivica Kostovic said that the ethnic Hungarians who stayed in the occupied territories had nothing to worry about, they would be treated as those who had fled. [sentence as heard]

Croatia: Deputy FM on Normalizing Relations With FRY

LD2104183396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1817 GMT 21 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, April 21 (TANJUG)—Croatian Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Simonovic has said that the normalisation of relations to date between Yugoslavia and Croatia can be positively assessed.

Speaking for the Zagreb weekly OBZOR, Simonovic said the process of the normalisation of relations was a rational solution from the economic and security point of view in the long run.

Simonovic said Croatia had nothing against Yugoslavia becoming a member of the Council of Europe, NATO's Partnership for Peace programme or the European Union.

What Zagreb insists on is that the criteria for membership in the organisations be respected and that each state be admitted individually, he said.

Moreover, Croatia has nothing against the recognition of Yugoslavia as a successor state of the former Yugoslavia, but said Zagreb's position was that Yugoslavia must have no advantage in this sense over other states emerging from the former Yugoslavia.

He said they, too, had the right to be successor states.

Commenting on the issue of Prevlaka, the promontory situated on the border between the Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro and Croatia, Simonovic said if Yugoslavia's position was that Prevlaka belonged to it under international law, then nothing was easier than to call for international arbitration in the dispute.

In case that Yugoslavia's position is that its security depends on the issue of Prevlaka, Croatia is willing to make a compromise and agree to a demilitarisation of the promontory and even a wider area on condition that Yugoslavia does the same, he said.

He said Zagreb found absolutely unacceptable any exchange of territories.

Simonovic said an agreement on the protection of minorities—the Serb minority in Croatia and the Croat minority in Yugoslavia—was being drafted within talks

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

on the normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Zagreb.

All these negotiations create a realistic basis for a long-term normalisation of relations not only between the two countries but also between the two peoples, he said.

Croatia: POW Committee Chairman Views Talks With FRY

AU2204094396 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 19 Apr 96 p 7

[Interview with Major Ivan Grujic, chairman of the Croatian Committee for Imprisoned and Missing Persons, by Mirjana Priscan; place and date not given: "Belgrade Cannot Give Evasive Answers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zag b—Representatives of the Croatian Committee for Imprisoned and Missing Persons negotiated with the Committee for Humanitarian Issues and Missing Persons of the "FRY" [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], led by Pavle Todorovic, on Tuesday and Wednesday [16,17 April]. At the beginning there was no guarantee of results in the difficult search for the 2,761 persons on the Croatian list of missing, but on the second day of the negotiation chairmen of the Croatian and the Yugoslav Committees announced that the agreement on cooperation was signed. We spoke to Major Ivan Grujic, chairman of the Croatian Committee for Imprisoned and Missing Persons.

[Priscan] Can we expect the Yugoslav side to respect the agreement this time?

[Grujic] The agreement puts the parties under the obligation to exchange all information on persons imprisoned, missing, taken away by force, and dead, and also to release all prisoners.... The Yugoslav negotiators have always maintained that they have no prisoners of war, but that does not discount the possibility that some of those that Croatia is looking for are in their prisons or elsewhere in the "FRY."

Statements by the Belgrade Pathologist

[Priscan] You requested that the Yugoslav negotiators hand over the medical files for 1,400 identified persons from the Vukovar region in 1991. You said that you have information—unfortunately, obituary notices—about 64 persons from that list.

[Grujic] The Yugoslav negotiators informed us last year that 64 persons we are looking for were killed in eastern Slavonia in 1991, and we have informed their families. We know that the 64 persons are from the same list of the 1,400 identified persons whose medical files are in Belgrade, and we insist on having those documents. During the last negotiations we received 64 obituary notices, but there were technical errors in some of them or details were missing. We insisted that those be completed, and this time the Yugoslav negotiators brought us the obituary notices with complete data.

[Priscan] Do the Yugoslav negotiators admit that they have the medical files of 1,400 identified persons from eastern Slavonia?

[Grujic] The question is not whether they have them, but when they will be ready to give us all the documents. The medical part of the documentation about 1,400 victims identified in eastern Slavonia in 1991, as well as information about the unidentified, are in the possession of the JNA [the Yugoslav People's Army] Col. Dr. Stankovic, the pathologist at the Academy of Military Medicine. The court martial in Belgrade also has documents on identified persons. Evidence of this can be seen in the obituary notices we have received that were drawn up by the Belgrade Academy of Military Medicine. The Belgrade television reported on Dr. Stankovic's statement about the identified and unidentified victims from eastern Slavonia, and there were a number of interviews with him in the Yugoslav media about identification examinations he had conducted in the regions of eastern Slavonia, even western Slavonia, Bosnia...

They Refuse To Recognize Videotapes

[Priscan] Has the Yugoslav side seen the British Independent Television News videotapes, which prove that wounded persons and patients taken by the JNA from the Vukovar hospital by force were alive on 19 November 1991?

[Grujic] Of course, we have shown them the tapes, just as we provided evidence about people who had been taken away by force during previous negotiations, as well as about the circumstances in which they were taken away... They did not disappear! We have also proved who is responsible for taking them away, but there has been no response so far. The Yugoslav negotiators were not surprised by the videotapes, they said they had seen those before....

[Priscan] Still the information was leaked that the Yugoslav negotiators refused to recognize those tapes even though they saw them!

[Grujic] That is true. They are sticking to their claims, although documents show something very different. They say, for instance, that the ITT tapes could have been recorded a week earlier and then fixed, they say it is a fabrication... Thus they avoid giving answers. However, our means of pressure consists of proof and

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

information, and if the other side is ready to cooperate, so are we.

[Priscan] Do the Yugoslav negotiators accept the fact that 261 persons, whose present state is still unknown, were still alive when taken from the Vukovar hospital in November 1991 and that the JNA is responsible for them?

[Grujic] They never accept that fact in the negotiations, despite material evidence. They claim that the wounded persons from the Vukovar hospital were released in an exchange. They refuse to accept that those 261 persons were in the Vukovar hospital—and that fact has been confirmed. All they will admit to are the seriously wounded, who were taken from Vukovar.

Kupres, Banovina...

[Priscan] What other subjects were brought up during the negotiations?

[Grujic] We talked about persons taken away by force from eastern Slavonia and Baranja, and we provided material evidence about actual individuals we are looking for. We also discussed the subject of missing Croatian citizens and soldiers from Bosanska Posavina and Kupres. According to the Dayton agreement, the FRY has to help solve the issue of missing persons in Bosnia-Herzegovina too.

Since the JNA is also responsible for taking away Croatians from Banovina, we also negotiated about the Croatian policemen taken prisoner in the region of Petrinja, Kukuruzari, and Hrvatska Kostajnica. We brought up every subject on which we had material evidence.

We never received an answer from them when we asked, they always put it off for some other time. However, they cannot give evasive answers!

[Priscan] You have reported that the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] has contacted families of 11 people who were reported alive by the Yugoslav Committee last year. Who are those people, where are they now, and will they come to Croatia?

[Grujic] We have terminated the process of searching for those 11 people. They are in the Republic of Croatia, they live in the occupied territory. They are on the list of 24 persons given last year by the Yugoslav Committee as alive, and in the territory of Yugoslavia. A number of them were in the territory of Yugoslavia, and whether they have changed their residence by force or of their own free will—we do not know. Now they are in the occupied territory of Croatia. The status of the other 13 persons in that group remains an open question.

What the FRY Is Looking For

[Priscan] What were the Yugoslav negotiators asking for?

[Grujic] They are looking for approximately 1,000 missing persons. However, they mostly went missing in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They are looking for a group of soldiers from Niksic, a group from Savnic, then a group of soldiers who went missing in Kolibe Donje in Bosnian Posavina, six pilots whose aircraft were shot down in action in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina... We will do our best to help solve those cases in conjunction with the committees in charge of those regions. The Belgrade negotiators are also looking for the bodies of their soldiers who were allegedly killed on the territory of the Republic of Croatia. If their bodies are found in Croatia, we will unquestionably hand them over. The negotiators also made inquiries about persons who went missing in operations Storm and Flash. We told them that all families from Serbia could start the official procedure of searching through the national branch of the ICRC, and obtain the answer from them.

[Box, p 7]

Are Glavasevic and Perisin Alive?

[Priscan] The Serbians did not bring all negotiated prisoners of war to the exchange in Davor, when six Croatians—among them pilot Vladimir Sumanovac—were released. Did you discuss that?

[Grujic] Yes, we did. The problem is the three prisoners who have been transferred to the Pale prison. Two of them are the Croatian Army soldiers captured during operations Maestral and Lyeto '95 [Mistral, Summer of '95], who were caught on the road called "Arizona" after the Dayton Agreement was signed. According to the Agreement, they have to be released since the Hague Tribunal found no grounds for the allegation that they have committed war crimes. We are sure that those persons will be released.

[Priscan] The Croatian press recently wrote that the Croatian journalist Sinisa Glavasevic was alive in August 1992 in the military prison of Crni Vrh, near Aleksinac.

[Grujic] The released document was presented by our Committee during the negotiations last year, and we have followed indications that Glavasevic was taken by force first to Dalj... We have given the other side all the evidence we gathered in our investigation, we insist on an answer, but there has been none.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Priscan] Do you have any news on the present situation of pilot Rudolf Perisin?

[Grujic] Our Committee has not received any official information about Perisin. During these negotiations we insisted that the ICRC be enabled to register Rudolf Perisin if he is alive. There are indications he is alive, we also have certain evidence, but we cannot have confirmation because Perisin has not been registered by the ICRC. However, we know that among the persons recently released there were unregistered persons and some who were registered just before the release, who had been hidden by the Serbians until that moment.

Croatia: Serb Leader on Future of Srem, Baranja Region

LD2004190596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1745 GMT 20 Apr 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Erdut, April 20 (TANJUG)—The future of Serbs in the Srem and Baranja region, which is under U.N. administration, lies in their remaining there, Goran Hadzic, newly-elected president of the region, said here Saturday.

It is estimated that about 160,000 people, mainly Serbs, live in the Srem and Baranja region situated between Croatia and Yugoslavia.

Hadzic told reporters that the major goal of his policy was to secure together with U.N. administrator Jacque Klein minimum conditions for Serbs to remain in the region. He did not specify, however, what these conditions were.

Hadzic, who is the first president of the region ever, said he had confidence in Klein.

Hadzic said the Srem and Baranja region assembly will be set up on Tuesday, april 23, and that it would be made up of the region's deputies to the assembly of the Republic of Serb Krajina and of members of municipal councils of Vukovar, Tenja, Beli Manastir, Mirkovci and Dalj.

Serbs in Croatia proclaimed their own state, the Republic of Serb Krajina, in 1991, after Croatia launched its war of secession from the former Yugoslav Federation. Hadzic is also former Serb Krajina president.

Croatia occupied all of the Republic of Serb Krajina except for the Srem and Baranja region in large-scale offensives launched in early May and August 1995. Only several thousands of the elderly people have remained in the occupied territories.

The August offensive triggered an exodus of about 250,000 Krajina Serbs, with about 170,000 of them finding shelter in Yugoslavia.

More than 500,000 Serbs, who have been living in these lands for nearly seven centuries, have left Croatia since the outbreak of the war of secession.

Hadzic said all parties that would be represented in the assembly had agreed to sign a declaration on unity concerning the Serb national interest.

He said the assembly would elect a new executive council, which he said would act as a regional government and would be responsible for organisation of all spheres of living.

The council's current president is Borislav Drzajic, but sources close to Hadzic say he will be removed from the office.

Commenting on relations with Serbian authorities, Hadzic said, "Belgrade has always had a constructive attitude towards the Srem and Baranja region," and said he backed the Serbian leaders' policy of peace.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FYROM: Assembly Commission Backs Agreement With FRY

AU2204175996 Skopje MIC in English 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Commission for political system of the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] gave support to the Agreement on normalization of relations between RM [FYROM] and FRY on Friday [19 April], recommending to the Parliament to adopt an adequate law.

Except for the chairman of the Commission Mersel Bilali, all the other members of parliament expressed unreserved support to the signing of this Agreement and to the normalization of relations between FRY and RM. It was underlined that the most favorable items for Macedonia from the Agreement are the decrees for mutual recognition and the settlement of the questions about mutual claims on the basis of succession to former Yugoslavia.

Mersel Bilali from the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] feels the Macedonian side should have waited a bit more before signing the Agreement, because, as he said, "according to the European Union, we were not obliged to recognize FRY which is responsible for the tragic events that have taken place, it has still not fulfilled its obligations from the Dayton Accord and it has shown no good will for a serious succession, which is liable to cost Macedonia tens of billions of dollars." He feels that the recognition of the continuity of RM from ASNOM [Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Macedonia] and onwards has no other meaning beside political satisfaction, and he does not agree with the stance in the document about "settlement of the question of succession by agreement," saying that by this, the Republic of Macedonia is backing down from multilateral negotiations over this problem among all the newly-developed states in the regions of former Yugoslavia.

FYROM: Gligorov's Role, Political Polarization Viewed

AU2204185196 Skopje PULS in Macedonian 19 Apr 96 p 6

[Commentary by Vasil Mickovski: "Bridges"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Not much time has passed since the rumpus in the legislature and the government that caused a dispute between the Social Democrats and the Liberals, but there is already a new drama on the political scene. The participants in the government were the main actors in the first act. The extraparliamentary opposition was the actor in the second. President Gligorov presented his opinion on both of these acts, which did not leave much room for guesses about his personal views on them.

Although Gligorov's latest statement, unlike his previous two speeches, about the election coalition breaking up was not reported in any detail in the media, it hit the target. His interview with VECERNJI LIST, just before his official visit to Zagreb, is said to have had a "shocking" effect on the extraparliamentary parties, which, although they were aware that he would not back their initiative for early elections, had hoped that he would at least remain neutral, that is, keep quiet and let the parties do their job.

The president surprised them because, from his position as magister politicae [Latin for political master], he clearly recommended that there was no need nor was it in the spirit of democracy to have a referendum on early elections.

Since the head of the state is not the one to decide and does not have the constitutional prerogative to influence the initiative of the extraparliamentary opposition, the question is what effect can this "lesson" in democracy have as a method and in practice. There are no dilemmas for the opposition; this is a "defensive view," which gives the authorities wings, while the wings of the others are clipped. This is why there were some claims that Gligorov's view on the initiative was further "proof" that he was not the president of all the citizens of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] after all.

What did Gligorov actually "defend" and what did he "deny"?

First, the president noted that the initiative of the extraparliamentary opposition had not waited for the law. At the same time, he discreetly indicated that the signatures should be verified and, in this case, this was done additionally. Although saying that the initiative came about with honest intentions, Gligorov's strongest argument was taken from the experiences of countries with traditions in democracy. "From all the knowledge and information that I have gathered on referenda and regulations in traditionally democratic countries in Europe and outside, I could not find a single country that has the possibility of calling early elections on a civic initiative. All kinds of other civic initiatives are possible according to their constitutions, but nowhere are elections called on one." According to Gligorov, this lies at the root of democracy, because it allows the political forces that have won the elections to implement their election platform over a period of four years. Otherwise, what would the meaning of election programs be if there were no reasonable period set aside

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

for their implementation? Finally, the president pointed out that "in the last 100 years nowhere have there been early elections based on such an initiative."

It seems that a lot of paper and ink was wasted on explaining the pros and cons of early elections. The focus of the battle is now being transferred to the field of reasonable interpreting of the Constitution, in which everybody believes that he has found the formula and collected the reward. However, what is being neglected is that, in defending the "divinity" of the Constitution, we are witnessing a trampling on the spirit of democracy. It is unfortunate that, regardless of the outcome, in which we will have winners and losers, the defeat will be a common one. This sad fact is due to a lethal one: May God help a state in which democracy "is used" to expand divisions and break up the national spirit. The situation is even more complicated because this political antagonism is not a newborn baby, but a constant companion of the Macedonian state over the last five or six years.

This view will be intentionally placed where it does not belong, that is, in association with the theory that democracy in Macedonia is slowing down, a theory that has been circulating with a definite political interest.

So, something else is in question. Democracy implies a struggle. Some will win, others will lose. However, in democracy the victim is a political phenomenon, which either loses power or is deprived of it. Democracy is supported and nourished by differences and changes. Ultimately, it is a learning process without a final examination. Nevertheless, it is a constant sadness that characterizes the nation's tradition and culture. This is why we say that one small step is better than two great and fast ones.

What is the shortcoming in our case? All those values that were just imagination and an unattainable goal five or six years ago have more or less become today's reality. Independence, security, peace, and a national awareness are attributes that decorate the new state in the Balkans, and it is an achievement of just a couple of generations this century. It is logical that values that have not been easily attained represent a fruitful base for the overall development of democracy. It seems that the only reason for the struggle is the competition to choose the best out of all those who decide to face the verdict of the electors. On the other hand, there is a polarization among us that is unusual for democratic societies. We are divided between Macedonians and non-Macedonians, between regime and nonregime personalities, between democrats and pseudodemocrats. Macedonia is too small a land to endure these two polarities, let alone be a combination of two worlds that not only do not recognize each other, but actually exclude each other.

The opposition, which presents itself as an alternative to the "present regime," sees a chance to enter the system through new elections. It considers everything else to do with the present authority as a mere farce. The government reacts by saying that the majority has given it a four-year mandate and that all this simply reflects on the attitude of the opposition, particularly after they boycotted the second round of the last elections. Under the workload of duties and projects, I do not believe that the government will be generous toward the opposition's "ultimatum." So, there is little chance that early elections will set up a new democratic cycle and at the same time symbolize a historic reconciliation of the two political blocs in Macedonia.

If Macedonia remains without a bridge to link the two political riverbanks, it does not mean that the lesson of how bridges should be constructed must be rejected. We are making our first steps and, therefore, it is not a waste of time to read the primer of democracy once again. Joseph Schumpeter, whom we used to study as a "middle-class Marx," is very inspiring. In his view, democracy or, as he says, democratic method, implies at least 10 essential principles. If we put it in a more sophisticated way, democracy should not be taken to be the technology of ruling, but principally as a method for reviving a number of generally accepted values: tolerance, responsibility, efficiency, and culture.

One more thing: Democracy does not produce miracles. However, a "miracle" is always possible if the democratic method ceases to function.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Poland: Cimoszewicz Wants Full Disclosure on Oleksy Case

LD2204163096 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1600 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At the Council of Ministers Office, Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz has made a statement concerning the decision by the prosecution service in respect to Jozef Oleksy.

[Correspondent Stanislaw Prygon] The prime minister said he is deeply convinced that this decision accords with the law and the truth. The government has done everything to ensure that the prosecutor's office can act completely independently. Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz said that he thinks the principles of law observance and care for the standing of the administration of justice should be reflected in refraining from any manner of making use of this case for short-term political purposes.

Considering the scale of the unconfirmed allegations and the interest of the Polish and foreign public, said Prime Minister Cimoszewicz, I intend to ask the prosecutor general to bring about a disclosure to the public of all of the evidence gathered in the case. The prosecutor's decision puts an end to the issue of allegations against the former prime minister, but it does not put an end to the whole of this episode, said the prime minister.

At the end of his brief statement, he said: We will have to clarify in a competent and unbiased manner all of the circumstances under which a groundless accusation was made against the head of the Polish Government and serious damage caused to Poland's image.

Stanislaw Prygon, outside the Council of Ministers Office, for the First Program.

Poland: URM, MSW Disagree on Central Ministerial Reform

WS2304085396 Warsaw GAZETA SWIATECZNA in Polish 20-21 Apr 96 p 3

[Article by "KRZEM": "A Dispute Between the URM Head and the Internal Affairs Minister; Will URM Merge With the MSW?"

[FBIS Translated Text] *Leszek Miller, head of the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM], is defending the idea of establishing one ministry out of the Internal Affairs Ministry [MSW] and URM. He denies that he would like to introduce it to the reform of the central economic bodies through the back door.*

As we reported yesterday, on 17 April Miller appeared at the session of the Sejm extraordinary commission that is dealing with this reform and presented the deputies with an amendment that envisions the establishment of one ministry out of the present URM and MSW and subordination of the Office of State Protection to the prime minister. The deputies protested because they did not receive the entire text of the amendment (30 pages); they also demanded a Sejm debate on the amendment.

Yesterday [19 April] Minister Miller explained that he went to the commission because he did not know that the Sejm Presidium had not yet decided what should be done with this amendment. Miller considers it a "good and rational" idea to include the amendment in the entire reform package, whose first reading in the Sejm has already taken place. "It seemed to us that the sense of this amendment was clear and easy to accept, but we met with a lack of understanding," Miller conceded.

This month he engaged in polemics with "his colleague minister," MSW head Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, who gave an interview to RZECZPOSPOLITA in which he discredited the idea of merging the MSW and part of URM into one ministry. "The criticism formulated by Siemiatkowski is profoundly wrong and archaic; its purpose is to preserve the MSW in its current shape," Miller retorted yesterday, adding: "I regret saying this." According to him, Siemiatkowski "fell into the same trap into which all of his predecessors in office had fallen": They went to the MSW with the conviction that reforms are necessary, but after a few months they stated that it was not necessary to change anything.

Replying to Siemiatkowski's allegations, Miller repeated earlier presented arguments in favor of establishing a ministry of internal affairs and administration. "Such solutions are known in Western countries; in addition, they were also known before the [Second World] war in Poland." According to Miller, "it would not be a problem to manage such a giant because it would not come into being as a result of mechanical merging, but out of a deep reform of all of the services."

The goal to achieve is that the police, the Border Troops, and the fire brigades and the regional administration offices all have the same boss. Then it will be possible to pass some of the powers to coordinate the activity of these "special administrations" to voivodes and self-governments.

"This concept is part of a broader program that will be presented to the public for evaluation as early as May," Miller announced. The program is called "An Efficient State, a Friendly State, a Safe State."

At the end, Miller denied rumors that decisions as to who will head the future ministry of internal affairs and administration had already been made. "These issues

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

will be up to the prime minister because this lies within his power.'

Poland: Minister of Internal Affairs Interviewed

WS2304073196 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 19 Apr 96 p 3

[Interview with Polish Interior Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski by Anna Marszalek; place and date not given: "I Will Take No Part in Weakening the Secret Services"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Marszalek] Do you carry a gun?

[Siemiatkowski] I never had a gun, but I received one as a gift on my nameday, 17 March, from officers from the Office of State Protection [UOP]. It is a Brazilian Cub Astra, caliber 6.35 mm. I had to get a license. But the gun is simply a souvenir. I used a gun back in the army, 16 years ago.

[Marszalek] It is said that you are fascinated with the secret services. There was a time, however, when you did not speak of them highly. What do you think of them now, after three months at the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW]?

[Siemiatkowski] It is much better than I thought. I saw the ministry and UOP in good condition. As for my fascination, you cannot be the director of a zoo if you do not like animals. You cannot be interior minister if you do not like the police, UOP, the Border Guards, the Fire Department. I hope I can forget my political and party activist past as soon as possible. I am a high state official, constitutionally and legally responsible for the MSW I head.

[Marszalek] And for its dissolution?

[Siemiatkowski] For its restructuring. I am the 16th interior minister in history and I do not want to be remembered by future generations as the one who buried the Polish secret services or contributed in any way to destabilizing and weakening the MSW. I was surprised by the huge responsibilities of the interior minister.

Reform of the MSW

[Marszalek] The Council of Ministers has recently amended its draft of the central administration reform project, providing for the establishment of a Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration. Did they consult with you on this amendment?

[Siemiatkowski] Of course, I am a cabinet member.

[Marszalek] Then why was this amendment made before the teams of experts which you formed within the MSW came forth with their suggestions?

[Siemiatkowski] I am certain that all procedures related to extracting UOP from within the MSW comply with the recommendations of the team supervised by Minister Nozka. (He elaborated the draft of a new law providing for the subordination of UOP to the prime minister).

[Marszalek] During the hearings in the Sejm commission, you said that the MSW must be divided because it is an overgrown structure. Now it turns out that although UOP and the Vistula Military Units will be beyond its structures, an administration will be added on, which will in fact cause further overgrowth. It will be even more difficult to run than it is now. Where is the consistency?

[Siemiatkowski] Such a danger exists. I have drawn the attention of the Council of Ministers to this problem, giving the advantages and disadvantages of such a solution. My doubts were not taken into consideration.

[Marszalek] Does that mean you lost in a confrontation with [head of the Office of the Council of Ministers] Minister Miller, the author of the amendment?

[Siemiatkowski] I have a different view of this problem, one I formulated over the last two months I spent getting acquainted with the mechanisms on the basis of which the MSW functions.

[Marszalek] What do you think the MSW should be like after the reform?

[Siemiatkowski] More efficient, more effective, removed from typically administrative departments.

[Marszalek] Does that mean you support forming two separate ministries, a Ministry of Administration and a Ministry of Internal Affairs?

[Siemiatkowski] Yes. I do admit, however, that I am the author of that part of the amendment which pertains to the extraction of UOP from the MSW structure and subordinating it to the prime minister.

UOP Beyond the MSW

[Marszalek] Are you sure the operation is necessary?

[Siemiatkowski] Absolutely. Regardless of recent developments, I do not see any need for the secret services to operate within the same structure as the Fire Department, the civic department, or the department dealing with foreigners.

[Marszalek] But should they not be within the same structure as the Police and the Border Guards with which they closely cooperate?

[Siemiatkowski] I imagine that their operations could be coordinated by the Secret Services Board at the Council of Ministers.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Marszalek] Who would issue permission for the secret services to carry out tapping operations once the reform is carried out?

[Siemiatkowski] The prime minister.

[Marszalek] Do you not think that in actuality the head of the secret services should be held responsible for their operations and that in fact it does not make much difference whether he is controlled by a civilian interior minister or another officer appointed by the prime minister? What if malfeasance occurs within the secret services? Will the prime minister take political responsibility?

[Siemiatkowski] According to the provisions of the draft project, the prime minister will appoint a secretary of the board to exert ongoing control of the secret services. The board (the members of which are to include the interior and defense ministers) would be controlled by UOP and the Military Information Services.

[Marszalek] Taking UOP out of the MSW is not merely changing about a dozen laws. This will cost an estimated 3 trillion old zlotys.

[Siemiatkowski] Unfortunately, this will be expensive.

[Marszalek] Will UOP have to leave the building in Rakowiecka Street? If so, where will it go?

[Siemiatkowski] A change of address is also necessary.

[Marszalek] Will the intelligence move to the Gwardia building? Where would the Warsaw division be?

[Siemiatkowski] We will see. The buildings on Rakowiecka Street are huge.

[Marszalek] What will you do once the MSW is reformed?

[Siemiatkowski] I will be a cabinet member.

[Marszalek] If the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration is formed, Leszek Miller wants to head it. He has allegedly already been promised the job. There will be practically no office for you unless you become head of UOP, subordinated to the prime minister.

[Siemiatkowski] The prospect is so distant that I do not bother to think about it. I have to work here until the end of the year and I will try to do my best.

The Press Will Not Learn First

[Marszalek] Is UOP currently divided into Milczanowski and Siemiatkowski camps?

[Siemiatkowski] If such a division exists, I know nothing of it. There is a huge group of very skilled officers who want to work in peace and stability. They wish to be protected by their superiors—the minister, their chiefs—from politics. I tell them: "I am here to keep you away from politics."

[Marszalek] What effect does the fact that the chiefs come and go, the feeling of endangerment on the part of the heads of the directorates, the prospect of reorganizing and the projected vetting process have on that "peace and stability"?

[Siemiatkowski] I do not see any danger for the directors. Everyone is working. We have appointed a new chief of the counterintelligence directorate.

[Marszalek] Who is currently head of counterintelligence?

[Siemiatkowski] An operational officer. It is not a good custom to reveal these people's names and ranks. He worked "on the front line" for more than 30 years. In one of its publications, RZECZPOSPOLITA uncovered an officer who was considered to be an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs even among his closest circles. As a result, he will never be sent on a mission abroad.

[Marszalek] We received the information from a politician with whom you shared your plans and it was confirmed by a deputy from the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. At the same time, you did not find the time to speak to RZECZPOSPOLITA. This is by no means the first piece of information that made its way out of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to SLD politicians.

[Siemiatkowski] That has nothing to do with me.

[Marszalek] Who will be chief of UOP?

[Siemiatkowski] The new chief will be appointed by 28 May.

[Marszalek] An officer or a politician?

[Siemiatkowski] An officer. Considering that the minister is a politician, the Police, the Border Guards and UOP must be run by professionals.

[Marszalek] It is being rumored that your candidate for the UOP chief is the head of the intelligence school in the Mazurian lake district.

[Siemiatkowski] He is a very good officer, one of the first graduates of that school, just like Czempinski and Libera.

[Marszalek] Is that your answer?

[Siemiatkowski] The press will not be the first to know.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Disciplinary Action Against the Authors of the "Oleksy Case"?

[Marszalek] Do you often visit UOP?

[Siemiatkowski] I go there several times a day. I want to get to know those people. I do not like to sit in my office; I prefer to go directly to the people with whom I want to discuss a matter. I visit Minister Kapkowski, Minister Nozka, heads of directorates. However, I also visit the Main Headquarters of the Police [KGP], the Warsaw Police Headquarters [KSP], the Border Troops. This is how I have decided to work; I want to be where things are done.

[Marszalek] Do you visit General Fonfara and Gen. Libera equally often? It was noted that, for example, you went to visit the intelligence schools in the Mazury region alone, without the intelligence chief, which went against accepted custom.

[Siemiatkowski] Whenever necessary, I go to see Gen. Fonfara and Gen. Libera. I also speak with Gen. Zacharski. I was not familiar with the custom you have mentioned.

[Marszalek] Do you plan to take disciplinary action against the UOP officers who handled the so-called Oleksy affair?

[Siemiatkowski] If it turns out, after the prosecutor's decision is announced, that the ministry will have to draw some conclusions from it, certain procedures will be applied.

[Marszalek] I believe that in one of your interviews you stated that there is no reason for punishing officers who followed orders. Now you say that this will depend on the decision made by the prosecutor's office.

[Siemiatkowski] That was a statement about the officers who dealt with the so-called Moscow money case. However, let me give you the example of the case of Major Lysenko, whom UOP accused of spying for Ukraine. When a court rejected these arguments, internal proceedings within UOP were instituted later. This is the usual procedure.

[Marszalek] This sounds like a threat. Now, there was a case of a dishonest company which misused the right that emigres have to import cars as part of their property. There was an attempt to use the case of purchasing automobiles from this company against Marian Zacharski. Explanatory proceedings were instituted which vindicated Zacharski.

[Siemiatkowski] This is an old case which goes back to 1994. As far as I know, the Inspectorate really did conduct such proceedings, but Marian Zacharski was excluded from them. The prosecutor's office decided that there were no grounds for bringing charges against him; then charges were leveled at representatives of the company which smuggled automobiles into Poland by means of false registration documents. It seems that he was a plenipotentiary of the board.

[Marszalek] Why has information on this issue leaking from the MSW now?

[Siemiatkowski] It is the first time that I have heard information that something on this subject is to come out. There were reports on this in 1994 in Gorzow Wielkopolski. [passage omitted]

[Marszalek] The police also speak about another problem: lack of a database which would contain banking information, information from customs and tax offices, as well as information from the police and UOP. This would make it possible to control business activity [obrot gospodarczy], coordinate the fight against economic and organized crime, make quick inspections, and finally, to avoid situations where various services take exactly the same actions. Perhaps the MSW might launch an initiative to create such a database?

[Siemiatkowski] Work on an integrated data system on people sought by the police is almost finished; it is a police system linked to the Public Computerized Census System and UOP. Practically this system can already be used in regional police offices; now we are introducing it in lower levels—in police stations. This system makes it possible to find out almost everything about a given person. I certainly agree that the MSW ought to coordinate the activities of the various services, and I must admit that there is a great disorder in this area. It sometimes happens that one issue is handled by three services and they do not know about it. I have appointed a plenipotentiary of the internal affairs minister to combat drugs. This cell, headed by Colonel Waldemar Markiewicz, will coordinate all the actions which the services under the MSW will take as far as drugs are concerned.

We are trying to gain access to the FBI database and we also want to reach the Europol computer base.

[Marszalek] However, we must offer them our own database in return.

[Siemiatkowski] Yes, we must, and our system is being created right now. We must have a database on people who operate in the economy. I would like to appoint another ministerial plenipotentiary for combating organized crime. I have already found a perfect candidate for this post: Col. Slawomir Petelicki, former commander of the GROM [an elite commando unit]. He will be in charge of all the antiterrorist groups; there are several of them in the ministry. Aside

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

from the GROM, he will coordinate the activities of the antiterrorist units in the Vistula Military Units, the KSP, and in UOP. At the same time, he would have all information about organized groups, and this information is not concentrated in any one organ now. This would help increase efficiency. I would also like to offer assurances that the leadership of the ministry will not be lenient, that it will not block information, and that it will not try to cover up cases regarding the existence of links between criminal organizations and the world of politics, regardless of the party which a given politician comes from or the post he holds.

[Marszalek] Are you not drawing up another "Pelican report" (information on links between criminals and politicians)?

[Siemiatkowski] On the orders of the prime minister, we are currently analyzing the arms trade problem. It will be a report on both groups of people and companies involved in the arms trade. The draft law on arms and ammunition will be discussed by the Council of Ministers next week.

The Monday Sessions With Kwasniewski

[Marszalek] What are the greatest threats that UOP ought to counteract?

[Siemiatkowski] Penetration activities of foreign intelligence services, the activeness of their stations, the scope of their interest, and the security of our economic structures. We are an attractive market for investors. Collection of intelligence information affects financial decisions which are made later on. For this reason, we want to set up a fourth directorate in UOP which would deal with the protection of business activity. I believe that this is the most important thing right now. The intelligence and counterintelligence fight is being waged in the economy, not in the sphere of politics or ideology, as in the past.

[Marszalek] When will this directorate be established?

[Siemiatkowski] I have ordered one of the deputy directors of the counterintelligence directorate to start implementing the project. The new directorate will be established on the basis of the existing sections in the intelligence and counterintelligence which have so far dealt with economic issues. However, it will not handle these issues only. We also want to set up a Warsaw regional office of UOP. It has not been established yet and over a dozen central voivodships are under UOP headquarters. This is comparable to a situation in which issues regarding the security of Warsaw residents would be handled by the KGP.

[Marszalek] Rumors are circulating about regular Monday meetings of the internal affairs minister, the foreign minister, the national defense minister, and President Kwasniewski, during which the ministers receive tasks, not from the prime minister, but from the president.

[Siemiatkowski] These meetings always take place on Monday at 0900 in the morning. In the presence of the prime minister, we report to the president on what is going on in the areas which the three ministries deal with. The president offers us his suggestions, directives, requests, instructions. As for the prime minister, we are in permanent contact with him. He is very specific; he assigns us various tasks and he always remembers what he has assigned.

Poland: Control of Intelligence Services, Armed Forces

WS2304085496 Szczecin GLOS SZCZECINSKI in Polish 2 Apr 96 p 10

[Article by Andrzej Holdys: "Hiccup After Dinner"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Like all special services, the Military Information Services [WSI] subscribe to the principle that, in contacts with the media, "no news is good news." From time to time, however, these services are of interest to journalists, particularly if a spectacular event takes place, such as the unexpected dismissal of their head. Such an event took place on 26 March, when the WSI chief, General Konstanty Malejczyk, was suddenly recalled. The decision was made by Minister of National Defense Stanislaw Dobrzanski.*

Gen. Malejczyk has commanded military intelligence and counterintelligence since February 1994. His promotion coincided with the reorganization at the Ministry of National Defense [MON] managed by the then chief of the sector, Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk. He decided that the WSI would be controlled by Chief of General Staff General Tadeusz Wilecki.

At that time, cooperation between the minister and the chief of staff was not bad, although subordinating the special services to Gen. Wilecki meant that his position was getting stronger and stronger.

From the outset, Gen. Malejczyk was regarded as Wilecki's favorite. Control over secret services' activities, however, is a strategic matter, and Minister Kolodziejczyk had his own man there.

It was the chief of counterintelligence, Commodore Kazimierz Glowacki, who, similarly to the minister, comes from the Navy. It was he who put the report on the chief of staff's selling several armored vehicles abroad, without the minister's knowledge, on

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Koldziejczyk's desk. The information about the transaction was obtained owing to the fact that military counterintelligence eavesdropped on Gen. Wilecki's conversation with the UOP chief, General Gromoslaw Czempinski.

Thus, it became clear that military counterintelligence, being part of the WSI, has the telephone of its dirct supervisor, the chief of staff, bugged, and then submits reports to the minister of national defense, who is in conflict with the chief of staff. Moreover, it came to light that one secret service—that is, the WSI—is eavesdropping on another service, UOP.

The military explained to the civilians that they had eavesdropped to discover the person who notified the media of the behind-the-scenes activities of the generals' dinner in Drawsko. It was then that they accidently encountered the conversation. Yet doubts still remain. Because there was a cassette with a recording, that means the telephones in Drawsko were connected to a tape recorder operated by a counterintelligence agent.

The report on the sale of the armored vehicles was one of the last ones filed by Kazimierz Glowacki. A few weeks after the Drawsko dinner, in the fall of 1994, Premier Waldemar Pawlak, at the request of Lech Walesa, recalled Minister Kolodziejczyk; a period of interregnum began at MON. Gen. Wilecki remained alone on the battlefield. His power over the Armed Forces was unlimited at that time.

In February 1995, the president's hopeful Zbigniew Okonski became the new minister of national defense in Jozef Oleksy's government. Okonski said that, although he was a civilian, he would not have any problems in reaching an agreement with the generals. Quite quickly he was on the same wavelength with the chief of the WSI, as one of the first personnel decisions that he made was to recall counterintelligence head Cmdre. Glowacki.

However, time passed, and with it the work continued on a new bill on the office of minister of national defense, which was supposed to subordinate the chief of General Staff to the defense chief. Work on the bill was accelerated after the Drawsko dinner.

The new law took effect in March of this year. In the meantime, by the end of last year, Zbigniew Okonski ceased to be minister of national defense. He left together with Lech Walesa. A week later, Stanislaw Dobrzanski, who was strongly supported by the Polish Peasant Party, became the new boss of MON. From the very beginning, Dobrzanski announced that he was a proponent of civilian control over the Armed Forces. He soon proved the point by taking over supervision of the Armed Forces' finances from the chief of the General Staff. Recalling Gen. Malejczyk is yet another step zeroing in on curtailing the chief of General Staff's influence. Malejczyk's seat was taken by K. Glowacki, former chief of counterintelligence, who was removed from his position a year ago.

Politics keeps nagging the special services. Deputies accuse Minister Dobrzanski of violating the law. They say that, before appointing the new chief of the WSI, he "forgot" to ask the opinion of the Sejm Committee for Control Over Special Services, something, according to Sejm rules, he should have done. In this way, despite the fact that the new law on MON is in force, the problem of civilian control over the Armed Forces still exists. Now the dispute has focused on other issues. The Armed Forces are controlled by the civilian minister of national defense. The problem now is who should control the minister and how.

Poland: President Accepts KRRIT's Annual Activity Report

LD2204194896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1933 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Warsaw, April 22—President Aleksander Kwasniewski voiced no reservations concerning the work of the national radio and television council [KRRIT] and approved its annual activity report, Chairman of the council Boleslaw Sulik announced Monday following a one-hour discussion with the president.

Sulik told journalists that he agreed with the opinion of the president that "it is sound to preserve a distance with respect to the developments in public television."

He announced that the council will monitor public television's activities although it sees that it does not have "sufficient instruments" to perform a regulating role" in tv. He added that after May 3 national day the KRRIT will deal with a vacancy in the TV supervisory board.

Presidential Spokesman Antoni Styrczula said the president believes that "mass media in Poland should be objective, independent and professional" and that this should be the task of the council.

Earlier in the day, representatives of the council were received by Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz to talk about amendments to the law on the KRRIT. The prime minister intends to undertake legislative initiatives in this respect, Sulik said.

Council's representatives handed over to the president and the prime minister a list of ideas that could be included in the amendment to the law on the KRRIT.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Poland: PSL Deputy on Coalition, 'Squabbles'

WS2204135896 Warsaw Radio RMF FM Network in Polish 0605 GMT 22 Apr 96

[Interview with Sejm Deputy Janusz Piechocinski, one of the leaders of the Polish Peasant Party, by Konrad Piasecki at the Radio RMF FM Network studio in Warsaw on the "Guest of the RMF FM Morning Program"—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Piasecki] Jerzy Szmajdzinski maintains that the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] is paying a high price for forming the ruling coalition with the PSL. Are you not ashamed of doing harm to your coalition partner?

[Piechocinski] Szmajdzinski's interview was quite surprising. It is part of a certain sequence. On the one hand, there was a significant article by POLITYKA's chief editor, who accused Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz of being the prime minister of a government of stagnation. Shortly afterwards, there was a response on the part of the government, which I would call violent. Important SLD politicians have joined the ranks of those who claim that reforms are going too quickly. At the same time, they do not specify which reforms they mean. In my opinion, this is how they are launching their campaign for the 1997 legislative election. For instance, some two weeks ago, Jozef Oleksy began his great Polish tour. He does not conceal that this is part of the preparations of the SdRP [Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland] for the election. On the other hand, the SLD leadership very nervously responded to suggestions that a certain discussion should be held within the party. This suggestion was made by Marek Borowski, who proposed that the SLD's future status be discussed—whether the SLD should be a party or whether it should continue to be an election movement. We have arrived at a situation when the leader of the SLD parliamentary club, a very influential SdRP politician, depicts the situation as follows: The SdRP is an orphan party; at least recently it has become one. The president is not a party member and neither is the prime minister. The SdRP has paid a high price for the coalition with the OPZZ [All-Polish Trade Union Agreement]. It is paying an even higher price for the coalition with the PSL—the price of slowing down reform.

We are not reacting nervously. We are observing the situation very calmly. We, too, have important issues on our agenda, related to the preparations for the fall PSL congress. The campaign continues. The situation inside the PSL has calmed down; the party has taken care of its own organizational form and clarified the tenets of its program. Undoubtedly, all of this has yielded results, which has been reflected in opinion polls. The PSL is the only party that has increased its rating by 3 percent over the past month.

[Piasecki] Let us dwell on the crisis within the coalition for now. Is it indeed a crisis or simply a temporary problem? You are talking about the SdRP's election game. Can this game eventually lead to reform of the Cabinet or the coalition? Or will it leave no trace?

[Piechocinski] We have a coalition agreement. I believe that all PSL and SLD deputies were aware of the common elements of the two parties and what issues there was no consensus on; these issues are not part of the agreement. There are such issues, related, for instance, to relations between the state and the church or the attitude to religion. They are not regulated by the coalition agreement, but one should not claim that they will be resolved with a different coalition partner. In fact, this would dash the essence of the coalition. Or take, for instance, the issue of powiats. Aleksander Kwasniewski recently pointed out that the SLD can count on the fact that the issue of powiats will be resolved with a different coalition partner. In that event, we will simply remind the SLD and the SdRP leadership why the issue of powiats was not included in the coalition agreement. It happened because the PSL did not agree with it.

[Piasecki] Your party colleague Bogdan Pek says that the lobbying of the issue of powiats may lead to a breakup of the ruling coalition. Do you agree with him?

[Piechocinski] I think that the issue of powiats is one of the key elements of our program. Coalitions are formed and disbanded not for the sake of one's personal career or for the division of portfolios. They are formed to achieve specific goals envisioned by programs. The PSL, which more than a year ago submitted to the parliament a draft resolution on self-governments at the voivodship level, is simply waiting until the parliament begins to discuss the resolution.

[Piasecki] What if the SLD does not change its stance on this issue?

[Piechocinski] In a situation where an impasse exists in the discussion of the self-governments at the powiat level, the most logical thing would be to seek advice from the electorate, for instance through a referendum. We have a great opportunity because the drafting of the constitution is nearing completion and perhaps this would be a good time to find out what the electorate's preferences are. I would like to add that in all the opinion polls the issue of powiats is addressed in a very specific manner. There have been polls in which people opposed the forming of powiats when the question was: Are you for or against powiats? The opponents did have

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

a slight majority then. On the other hand, more than 70 percent of people supported the idea of powiats when they were asked: Do you support the forming of powiats which will facilitate the rational use of public property?

[Piasecki] Let me ask you directly: Can the issue of powiats lead to a breakup of the coalition?

[Piechocinski] Thus far, there have been [those kinds of] statements by President Kwasniewski, by people from the Office of Presidential Affairs, and by certain SLD leaders. However, the statement by Prime Minister Cimoszewicz, who is coalition leader, is still valid. Cimoszewicz has said that this disputable issue will not be discussed until the parliamentary election.

[Piasecki] This is not the only issue the discussion of which has been suspended. The same kind of situation exists in the issue of social insurance reform.

[Piechocinski] These are only rumors. We currently have certain draft documents ready for parliamentary discussion. Great progress has been achieved in the issue of reform of the central economic bodies; I am head of the commission. I must say that we have covered a lot of ground. The problem is not of a political nature. We only argue on specific tenets, regardless of our party affiliation. At the same time, last week we overcame the internal conflict in the extraordinary commission for reform of the health insurance system. The drafting of 18 sections of this important resolution has been completed. The principal thing is that the Sejm has approved the program of the principles of reform of the social insurance system. The government now has to transform those principles into a package of concrete resolutions.

[Piasecki] Discussions have been held both within the SLD and within the government—between the head of the Office of the Council of Ministers and the interior minister—around the merging of the two institutions. Why do these two gentlemen argue, because of their personal ambitions or for more important reasons?

[Piechocinski] I think that two ministries have remained in the same form which they acquired at the beginning of 1980's—the Interior Ministry and the Ministry of Finance. All candidates for heads of the two ministries have promised radical reform, transformations, and a limitation of powers. After they became ministers, they lost their zeal for reform and for limiting their own powers. The Interior Ministry in its current form is very sensitive in political terms, and, in addition, it is omnipotent. There have been suggestions—and not only in light of the Oleksy case—that the Office of State Protection be separated from the Interior Ministry and subordinated directly to the prime minister so as to change the status of the police, the fire-fighting administration, and a number of other institutions. The government, as suggested by Minister Miller, is currently trying to curtail the omnipotence of the Interior Ministry. It meets with natural resistance on the part of both Interior Minister Siemiatkowski and the entire lobby interested in retaining the old structure. This lobby is comprised by the people who work at the ministry itself and a large group of people—thousands of them—who work in Interior Ministry bodies.

[Piasecki] Or perhaps the problem lies somewhere else? All squabbles in the government originate with Miller. First, he argued with Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko, then with Barbara Blida, then again with Kolodko. Now he argues with Siemiatkowski.

[Piechocinski] This shows that those debates—I would not call them squabbles—on essential issues do not reflect the simple division of the coalition into the PSL and the SLD. They reflect differences in opinions of various ministers on reform of the state, including ministers representing the SLD. One may say that this is bad for the image of the government, because the government should express unanimous opinions to the public. However, this also shows that we are currently at such a stage here in Poland when those kinds of discussions are useful.

[Piasecki] Today, tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow the prosecutor will decide whether to close Jozef Oleksy's case. What is your prediction? [Piechocinski] I will not make any. I am simply waiting patiently for the decision. In my opinion, whatever the decision, it will be criticized from all sides anyway. In political terms, Oleksy's case has three perspectives. One is the perspective of the SLD, one is that of the extreme opposition, and the third is that of centrist forces which do not possess enough information to make final verdicts. Nevertheless, I believe that depending on the prosecutor office's decision, the political meaning of the case will be immense.

[Piasecki] Thank you very much.

Poland: Rift Over Powiats Endangers Coalition Unity

WS2304085696 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 22 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by "PK, MSZ": "Conflict Over Powiats in the Coalition; Pek: The PSL Will Never Agree"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Aleksander Kwasniewski claims that the administrative reform can be passed through parliament without the consent of the Polish Peasant

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Party [PSL]. Bogdan Pek of the PSL is threatening that the coalition agreement might be broken.

The provision on the powiats [smallest administrative units] was included in the draft of the new constitution thanks to supportive votes from the Freedom Union and the Democratic Left Alliance, despite protests from the PSL. The president admitted the possibility of implementing the reform against the PSL's will in Pultusk last Saturday [20 April]: "We cannot reach an agreement with the PSL here. But it is not impossible to round up support for the reform from a Sejm majority."

On the very same day, PSL Deputy Pek threatened in Gorzow Wielkopolski that an attempt to form huge voivodships further subdivided into powiats might lead to breaking off the coalition agreement: "If the PSL leaders bought it, the coalition agreement would be broken off because the majority of PSL deputies would never agree to it." Pek also announced that the PSL will obstruct work on the new constitution unless the provision on the powiats is crossed out.

The draft project of the new administrative reform divides self-governments as well. Also on Saturday, representatives of local assemblies from eight voivodships that would disappear if 17 regions were formed entered a coalition to fight for the 25-voivodship plan. These endangered voivodships are Torun, Czestochowa, Gorzow, Kalisz, Legnica, Plock, Radom, and Siedlce.

Poland: Daily on 'Tension' Within Governing Coalition

WS2304115296 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 22 Apr 96 p 1

[Commentary by Piotr Zaremba: "Tension"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to experts on running the state—for example, Professor Michal Kulesza—Poland cannot be reformed unless powiats are introduced. There are many tasks that neither the gminas nor the minuscule voivodships are capable of handling. Considering that the state will not decentralize unless powiats are formed, it is worthwhile to support anyone who advocates powiat reform.

The controversy over the powiats has a political dimension. Politicians from the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] can prove they are reformers. Many see them as etatists and advocates of a party state. They need to regain their credibility after the Oleksy case. Moreover, on the eve of a lengthy election campaign (assuming we will elect the Sejm next spring), they will want to demonstrate that the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] is not their only potential partner. Even if the Freedom Union is currently aloof and apprehensive, discreet wooing of this party can be started to forward the very important reform. President Kwasniewski is a good wooer; after all, administrative reform is an old concept of his.

The peasants have reason to staunchly resist the powiats. The gminas are their main spheres of influence, and condensing the voivodships will primarily hit the profuse PSL voivodes. Moreover, on the eve of the election campaign, it will be useful to have some distinguishing features setting the SLD apart from its coalition partner. Several points might be gained, if only by instilling fear in the inhabitants of the voivodships that may disappear that they might lose out on the reforms.

The approaching elections are causing tension within the coalition. The prime minister is trying to alleviate the situation by stalling for time—because governing against a backdrop of two warring camps is not easy.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Romania: Iliescu Responds to Roman's Accusations

AU2204125596 Bucharest VOCEA ROMANIEI in Romanian 18 Apr 96 pp 1-2

[Communique of Presidency released in Bucharest on 17 April: "President Ion Iliescu's Answer to the Accusations of Former Prime Minister Petre Roman"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to a communique of the Presidency released on 17 April 1996, Romanian President Ion Iliescu sent the following reply to the editorial board of JURNALUL NATIONAL daily:

In an interview published by JURNALUL NATIONAL of 12 April 1996, Mr. Petre Roman [president of the Democratic Party-PD and presidential candidate of the Social Democratic Union-USD]—referring to the resignation of his government in September 1991 and to the split within the National Salvation Front [FSN] in the spring of 1992]—is deliberately misinterpreting and grossly distorting well known facts, something that makes me require your newspaper to publish the following clarification:

In connection with his government's resignation, Mr. P. Roman obstinately repeats certain formula that vary from the truth. He is again referring to his government's "removal," which was allegedly sanctioned in the "document" signed with the miners' leader Miron Cozma after my meeting with the delegation of the miners at Cotroceni [Palace] on 20 September 1991.

Mr. Petre Roman also refers to the "Decision of the National Defense Council," which allegedly mentioned the start of negotiations for the creation of a new government. First, I would like to point out that there was no decision by the Country's National Defense Council [CSAT] to this extent, because it was not within that body's prerogatives to pronounce itself on the government.

What was published at the time was part of a CSAT communique on the serious situation created in the wake of the acts of violence committed by the groups of miners who arrived in the capital. On the other hand, the communique was supplemented with a text proposed by Mr. Petre Roman himself, which did not refer to the CSAT meeting, but to the fact that, according to constitutional provisions—included in Decree-Law No. 93/1990—Prime Minister Roman "laid down his mandate" to allow President Iliescu to start the political negotiations for putting together a new government. Moreover, according to the provisions of the respective Decree-Law, it was within the president's prerogatives to "receive the resignation" of the prime minister—this was the exact stipulation of the law; any interpretation of "laying down the mandate" not being quite the same with "handing in one's resignation" are meaningless.

This is what actually happened:

1. On the following day, before the arrival of the group of miners at Cotroceni, I had a meeting with all the leaders of the parliamentary parties, which was also attended by Ion Aurel Stoica, the FSN executive president, when I briefed those present of the prime minister's decision to "lay down his mandate," and I asked them for proposals of candidates for the position of prime minister, in order to form a new cabinet.

Mr. Petre Roman claims that the resignation should have been approved by Parliament. This is not true. This would have required a totally different procedure, which would have implied the government's dismissal by Parliament. However, Mr. Roman's intention, which I accepted at the time, was to act on his own initiative, in keeping with the provisions of the law at that time, which, it is true, have not been taken over and included in the new Constitution. According to the then-valid provisions, the president was empowered to receive the prime minister's resignation, without having to pass it through Parliament. As a matter of fact, the representatives of all parliamentary parties endorsed this initiative without objection and supported the endeavors that led, as is known, to the formation of Theodor Stolojan's cabinet. The proposal to appoint Mr. Stolojan as prime minister actually came from the FSN leadership.

2. That initiative had nothing to do with the meeting I had with the delegation of miners, who arrived at Cotroceni, and with the communique issued at the end of that meeting. As a matter of fact, at the aforementioned meeting with the party leaders, I told those present about the need to receive the miners' delegation in order to diffuse the tense situation, something that was actually endorsed by all participants. Moreover, I invited those who wanted to stay to attend the forthcoming meeting. But nobody wanted to.

Mr. P. Roman keeps repeating certain insinuations about the causes of the miners' arrival in Bucharest and claims that President Iliescu owes an explanation in this respect. But, as Mr. Roman himself says, the one who talked to the representatives of the miners, both in Bucharest and Tebea, was not President Iliescu but Prime Minister Roman. Therefore, Mr. Roman's rhetoric on this subject is nothing but a misleading act, without any real foundation. Actually, there was no difference on this subject between the two of us at the time. Mr. P. Roman actually kept me informed of the progress of these negotiations. The difference between us emerged when Mr. Roman panicked over the violent

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

attacks against the government palace and asked me to declare a "state of emergency," which would have amounted to a true provocation, with consequences that are difficult to calculate. I rejected his request.

3. Equally distorted is his presentation of the facts leading up to the split within the FSN in the spring of 1992. As is known, at the end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992, I tried to influence the internal discussions within the FSN with a view to avoiding a rift, which I considered damaging not only to the country's main political grouping, but also to the overall development of our political life. However, I could not become directly involved, because of my status as president. However, Mr. Petre Roman and his supporters took the road of scission and opted for a political line at variance with the FSN's initial platform. They supplemented this change of course with hostile statements, including against me.

In a personal discussion with him—when I tried to find out the meaning of this new orientation and language, whose violence sometimes exceeded the slogans ventilated by certain aggressive opposition forces in the spring of 1990—Mr. Roman told me that this is the "winning banner," which he wants to take away from the hands of the opposition.

I did not participate in the FSN Convention, where the rupture occurred. Those who participated in it can better judge the respective moment, in full awareness of the details. The attempt to blame the breakup of the FSN on me is completely unwarranted.

Romania: PD's Roman Challenges Iliescu to Debate

AU2204142996 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 18 Apr 96 p 12

["Note" by Marcela Feraru: "Petre Roman Calls on Ion Iliescu To Hold a Face-to-Face Public Debate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a statement published yesterday, Petre Roman [president of the Democratic Party, PD], Ion Iliescu's opponent in the upcoming presidential elections, calls on the president to hold a face-to-face public debate, where Iliescu should clarify the way in which the Roman government was deposed in the wake of the miners' incursion of September 1991.

In the opinion of the PD leader, these clarifications are necessary because President Iliescu continues to use half-truths and misrepresent events. "Why does Mr. Ion Iliescu launch this polemic about past events, which are no longer a topical issue in this year's elections?" asks the PD leader, who proceeds to blame President Ion Iliescu for the prevailing poverty in the country, by claiming that the latter bears direct responsibility for it. "Mr. Ion Iliescu has no solutions for either the present or the past, let alone for the future," Petre Roman says, adding that bringing up the issue of the September 1991 miners' incursion is not a subject of his choice, but rather it is President Iliescu's preference.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Slovenia: Thaler Briefs Spain on Negotiations With EU

BR2204135796 Madrid ABC in Spanish 20 Apr 96 p 36

[Interview with Slovenian Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler by Simon Tecco in Ljubljana; date not given: "Slovenia Hopes To Clear Path to EU Membership After Italian Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana—*The Foreign Minister of Slovenia Zoran Thaler arrived in Madrid for an official visit yesterday to inform his Spanish counterpart Carlos Westendorp of the progress made in diplomatic negotiations intended to unblock Slovenia's association agreement with the EU. Thaler will thank Spain for proposing a compromise which, according to all indications, will enable Ljubljana's to jump around the Italian veto, at Ljubljana's request.*

[Tecco] Minister, with the Slovenian Parliament's approval of the Spanish proposal, talks with Italy that had been suspended for six months have begun again...

[Thaler] In actual fact we have recently been negotiating very strongly with the EU and, therefore, with Italy too, since it is a member of the community. Given that on a number of occasions Italy has expressed its agreement with the Spanish compromise proposal, there should not be any obstacles.

[Tecco] The Spanish proposal requires Slovenian law to grant EU citizens the right to acquire property under certain conditions, but at the same time it suggests preferential treatment for the Italian exiles when the association agreement is signed. Do you think that Italy will only lift the veto on the agreement when the Slovenian Parliament has approved the measures that will make this possible?

[Thaler] As you know, the Lower House explicitly authorized the Slovenian Government to sign the European agreement on the basis of the criteria approved at the Madrid summit which in turn were based on the Spanish proposal. It should also be pointed out that the Spanish compromise does not go nearly as far as we have gone. With regard to the rights of those people who have taken up fixed residency in Slovenia, all Spain is proposing is for the government to amend the current bill. That should be sufficient for the agreement to be signed. We are actually proposing that this be included in the association agreement so that there is greater clarity at the judicial level.

[Tecco] Spain made its proposal in August last year. Why the delay?

[Thaler] We have been very busy in the past six months at the diplomatic level too. We needed to clear up more than one issue in relation to the questions raised. At the same time there was an intense political debate in Slovenia on this subject. Parliament's decision concerning Slovenia's European future was significant with 49 votes in favor and 14 against.

[Tecco] What would be the political consequences for Slovenia if its attempt to join the EU failed?

[Thaler] If this occurred for whatever reason, then in my opinion the current positive climate would deteriorate dramatically and it would be a severe blow to the forces of democracy. That would stir up the extremists on both sides (Slovenians and Italians).

[Tecco] Do you think the results of the Italian elections could affect negotiations?

[Thaler] I do not think so. However the very fact of the electoral campaign coming to an end will help relax the political climate and will have a positive effect on the final decision.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Federal

FRY: Milutinovic Arrives in Belgrade From Bucharest

LD2204200796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1950 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 22 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic returned to Belgrade late on Monday from a one-day official visit to Romania.

In Bucharest, Milutinovic had met with President Ion Iliescu, Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu, House of Representatives Speaker Adrian Nastase and Senate Speaker Oliviu Gherman.

They discussed the promotion of the peace process in former Yugoslavia, prospects for bilateral relations and the development of regional cooperation.

Milutinovic and Melescanu initialled a 20-year treaty of friendship, good-neighbourliness and cooperation between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (federation of Serbia and Montenegro) and Romania.

Milutinovic said that the treaty was a comprehensive, substantive and long-term agreement which laid the foundations for wide-range bilateral cooperation in all fields—from security, via the economy, to the environment and culture.

FRY: FM Comments on Friendship Treaty With Romania

LD2204163396 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1459 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bucharest, 22 Apr (TANJUG)—At the end of his one-day visit to Romania, Milan Milutinovic, Yugoslav minister of foreign affairs, said his talks in Bucharest today were open, very meaningful, and constructive.

They covered the ways of advancing the peace process, the state of and prospects for bilateral relations and for developing regional cooperation, Milutinovic said in a press statement.

Our views on all the issues we discussed are either identical or very close, Milutinovic said.

"Understandably, we devoted special attention to the ways of furthering bilateral relations and cooperation. We agreed that traditional friendship and good-neighborliness provide a stable foundation for further successes in developing Yugoslav-Romanian relations and cooperation. We stressed the great need for continuing political dialogue at all levels and agreed to step it up," Milutinovic said.

"In our common desire to develop and advance relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Romania on lasting foundations and in the spirit of traditional friendship and common interests, we harmonized and signed a treaty on friendship, good-neighborliness and cooperation. It is a comprehensive, very substantial, and long-term (20-year) agreement which lays foundations for diverse cooperation between the two countries in all spheres including security, economy, environment, and culture. This agreement is a major contribution by our two countries to the efforts to enhance peace, stability, and trust in the region," the federal minister said.

"We noted with satisfaction that the recent signing of bilateral economic and cultural agreements has promoted the existing institutional framework for the development of long-term cooperation on modern foundations. These activities on the promotion and strengthening of existing forms of cooperation will continue."

"In this respect," Milutinovic said, "We voiced our support for the existing numerous initiatives in our countries for cooperation in the areas of industry, agriculture, transport, environmental protection, culture, education, science, and technology and agreed on the need for increasing the number of border crossing points.

"We reiterated the mutual conclusion that our bilateral relations are being constructively enriched by members of the Serbian national minority in Romania and the Romanian national minority in Yugoslavia, who have always been loyal citizens of the countries they are living in and as such represent a link between our countries and a positive factor for our ties and better mutual understanding.

"We devoted close attention to the consistent and full implementation of all aspects of the peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina—something to which both countries attach priority importance. We agreed on the necessity for full respect for all the provisions of the agreement, especially a balanced and unbiased approach to all sides by the key factors and the entire international community. We assumed an equally principled position on the consistent and full implementation of the Basic Agreement on Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Srem.

"We upheld the efforts by the international community to secure as soon as possible the allocated funds for the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina and stressed the need for their even distribution and use by the entire region. We agreed that the timely holding of democratic and fair elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina is of great importance for the stability and final success of the peace process.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

"Our side repeated its appreciation for Romania's objective and constructive efforts for a peaceful, lasting, and just political solution for the area of former Yugoslavia.

"We highly appraised Romania's readiness to work in favor of the speedy reestablishment of Yugoslavia's equitable role in the work of the United Nations, the OSCE, and international financial institutions, as well as regional integrations."

"It is the joint assessment reached by us, neighbors and active participants in the multilateral regional cooperation, that such a cooperation is in the interest of all countries of the region and the whole of Europe. We have agreed that such a cooperation can be successful only if all the countries of the region participate in it on an equal footing."

"I single out the special importance of the very meaningful and friendly conversation I had when received by President of Romania Ion Iliescu. I conveyed to him cordial greetings from of the President of Yugoslavia Zoran Lilic and President of the Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic. We have talked about the outlook for peace on security and cooperation in this area of Europe and in a wider context. We have stressed the need to activate all regional potentials with the aim of a rapid integration of the region into the modern European integrational streams.

"I am especially glad that President Iliescu expressed his readiness to visit Yugoslavia soon. We are expecting this visit with great pleasure, as another confirmation of a steadfast determination on the part of Yugoslavia and Romania to continue the good-neighborly cooperation, in the interest of the people of our countries and the creation of a favorable climate in the region.

"In talks held with the Senate President Oliviu Gherman and the President of the Assembly of Deputies Adrian Nastase, we have stressed the need for further advancement of the parliamentary cooperation.

"As you can see, we have had a very intensive and meaningful program. I am sure we have used it in the best possible way, so we could use this visit to boost the enrichmenet of mutual contacts and cooperation in this new phase of our bilateral relations. The overall atmosphere during the visit has reflected in full the close ties, understanding, and traditional friendliness which Yugoslavia and Romania have been nurturing for years," Federal Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic concluded.

FRY: Deputy FM Receives Russian Counterpart

LD2204201796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1952 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 22 (TANJUG)—Deputy Yugoslav Foreign Minister Radoslav Bulajic on Monday received his Russian counterpart Nikolay Afanasyevskiy who arrived on a several-day working visit to the former Yugoslavia.

The two ministers exchanged views on the present and future activities on promoting bilateral relations and cooperation, the Yugoslav foreign ministry said.

It was noted that the cooperation between the two countries proceeds in a satisfactory manner, thanks largely to the accelerated process of providing legal bases for agreements in key areas, especially in economic relations.

Afanasyevskiy was informed about the latest developments in the former Yugoslavia and activities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the peace process and overall stabilization of the situation in the Balkans.

FRY: Macedonian Tourists To Get Domestic Visitor Status

LD2204120896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1107 GMT 22 Apr 96

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, April 22 (TANJUG)—Macedonian tourists will not need entry visas for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia this year but only tourist permits, officials of Yugoslav tourist organizations said after the sixth Balkan tourist exchange meeting in Skopje.

Macedonian tourists will enter Yugoslavia with a document which will be needed for leaving Macedonia. They will enjoy the status of domestic tourists in Yugoslavia.

Serbian Minister of Trade and Tourism Srdjan Nikolic told journalists in Skopje that the recent normalization of relations between Yugoslavia and Macedonia would pave the way for the conclusion of a series of bilateral agreements.

Nikolic said that the two countries would define official principles for a far more liberal exchange of goods and capital in about one month's time.

Montenegrin Deputy Minister of Tourism Slobodan Lekovic voiced optimism ahead of the 1996 season regarding the number of Macedonian tourists expected on the Montenegrin sea-board.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Serbia

Serbia: SPO's Draskovic Criticizes Milosevic at Rally

AU2204152496 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 21 Apr 96 p 6

[Unattributed report: "Beating at a Counterrally!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] More than 10,000 people demanded yesterday in Novi Sad from the joint democratic opposition of Serbia to initiate political changes in the country and for President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic to step down.

At the largest city square, in front of the Vojvodina sports center, the rally was addressed by Vuk Draskovic, leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO], Zoran Djindjic, leader of the Democratic Party [DS], and Vesna Pesic, leader of the Civic Alliance of Serbia.

The rally passed in a very tense atmosphere and with a number of incidents because a group of activists of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS], backed up by a strong police presence, tried to disrupt the opposition's rally.

On this occasion the police several times severely beat Miroslav Negrojevic, an SPO deputy in the Serbian Assembly, using batons.

The entire area where the rally was taking place was encircled by cordons of special police.

Draskovic placed the blame for the incidents on President Milosevic, who, according to the SPO leader, had ordered his Vojvodina underlings to create disorder and clashes in Novi Sad.

He also accused the Serbian president of provoking a war with Montenegro and preparing Serb rabble to loot Podgorica.

Milosevic is the one, Draskovic said, who undermined the governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia Dragoslav Avramovic at the talks with the IMF and the World Bank in Paris. The aim of this was to conceal the fact that people had been robbed of their money, which ended up in private bank accounts in Cyprus, he said.

"Milosevic fosters no other ideology save that of thieves," Draskovic said. He assessed attacks on Governor Avramovic as an attempt by the regime to remove the man who had uncovered this robbery of people.

Draskovic stressed that in Serbia the situation had never been as difficult as it was now and changes must come about soon. "The current regime will collapse and Serbia will be reborn in December," the leader of SPO said.

DS Chairman Djindjic called the president of Serbia "an arrogant coward who, as soon as the world powers raise their voices, even gives them what they did not ask for" and he also said of the SPS and the Yugoslav United Left that they were a double misfortune for Serbia.

Serbia: Vojvodina Official Hails Good Minority Relations

LD2104123096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1221 GMT 21 Apr 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Novi Sad, April 21 (TANJUG)—Vojvodina Assembly Speaker Dr. Milutin Stojkovic said Sunday that relations are good between 26 nationalities and ethnic minorities in that north Serbian province.

This nonfirms, Stojkovic said at a 'guest of TANJUG' panel, that 'the Serbian state is a state of citizens in which all nationalities and ethnic minorities, regardless of their religious or national affiliation, are enjoying completely equal rights.'

In Vojvodina over 75 percent of the population are of Serbian nationalitiy, followed by Hungarians (17 percent), then come Ruthanians, Czechs, Slovaks, Ukrainians, and others.

'In Vojvodina there are so many mixed marriages, so many economic and social interests, that it would be nonsense to think about divisions on the basis of nationality,' Stojkovic added.

'In the Assembly of Vojvodina, five languages are in use—Serbian, Hungarian, Slovakian, Romanian and Ruthanian. Every assembly session has on its agenda an issue related to the rights of ethnic minorities in education, culture, the work of civil service,' Vojvodina Assembly speaker said.

He added that all gazettes issued in Vojvodina are printed in five languages, as well as all assembly session minutes and decisions.

He pointed out that in Vojvodina most of the children are attending independent schools in their mother tongue. They study their culture, and lectures on faculties are also organized in the languages of the ethnic minorities.

The Vojvodina Assembly, Stojkovic said, is the founder of many dailies in the languages of ethnic minorities. Besides the daily DNEVNIK published in Serbian, it finances the daily MAGYAR SZO, HLAS LJUDU, RUSKE SLOVO and LIBERTATE. There are also regular radio and t.v. programs in the languages of ethnic minorities.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

However, Stojkovic pointed out there are people who don't like something, who say that some people are imperiled, unable to realize their rights and demand the setting up of local rule.

'I think there is no truth in such information and no need for local rule because if somebody has all the rights in an autonomy, within one state, it is not logical to create another autonomy. It seems to me there are underlying intentions which do not augur well, first of all for the people who wants to achieve it.' Stojkovic said.

'Those who says that mutlinational relations in Vojvodina are not good, are not telling the truth and that their intentions are not good for their people, or the state of Serbia', Stojkovic said in conclusion.

Serbia: Psychologist on Impact of Crisis on Serb Mentality

96BA0165A Belgrade DUGA in Serbo-Croatian 28 Oct-10 Nov 95 pp 23-25

[Interview With Dr. Bora Kuzmanovic by Vesna Malisic; place and date not given: "Dr. Bora Kuzmanovic on the Serbian Man Freed of Ideology, Cosmopolitanism, and Attachment to Europe: Without Ideals and Idols"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The long-lasting crisis, isolation, and conflicts occurring on all sides are returning us to a traditional, hard mentality, since problems are also returning that are current when such a mentality and disposition have developed. We live in a era of revitalization of archaic Serbian models of opinion and behavior.*

The book *Social Character and Social Changes in a World of National Conflicts* was recently published. One of the authors, Dr. Bora Kuzmanovic, a professor of social psychology and administrator of the Institute for Psychology on the Philosophy Faculty in Belgrade, tells us about what has happened with our man in recent years, when he has found himself in an interregnum between a breakdown in old values, established during socialism, and a breakdown in new ones, which have been shaped under the pressure of war and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. He has remained uncertain and disappointed, mistrustful and frightened, without ideals, but also without idols. Nevertheless, a precise research hand has placed a hand on the pulse to see which values powerfully affect the hearts of Serbs.

[Malisic] In your research you mention the term "national character of Serbs." To what conclusions have you come? Does a national character of Serbs exist and what it is like?

[Kuzmanovic] That's a problematical idea. When reference is made to the national character of a people, this means that some relatively lasting characteristics are assumed and then, in some interpretations, it is assumed that they are conditioned by genes, that they have an archetype, that means, a collective unconsciousness that begins to speak from this people in certain situations. Therefore, that idea is problematical if you accept it as lasting and unchangeable. In general, that idea is narrower than the idea of "social character," which designates a collection of the most frequent characteristics of some group. According to this, when one speaks about the Serbs' national character, one must be very cautious in its designation.

[Malisic] With all the scientific caution, tell me nevertheless what are the most frequent characteristics of Serbs that have entered into the so-called national character?

[Kuzmanovic] Civijic, Dvornikovic, Cajkanovic have written and spoken about this throughout history. We have devoted ourselves through research to this question. Therefore, we have not reached conclusions on the basis of reflections, but we have done empirical research. We have first of all researched authoritarianism in Serbs, which is fairly prominent, with an uncritical attitude toward authority, and a certain intolerance and rigidity in opinion, and overrating of the importance of a hierarchy, leaders, and the principle of leadership according to law. Secondly, traditional orientation understood as a system of values and attitudes. Third was a statist orientation—some kind of glorification of the state. It traces the origin, with one part from tradition and the other from the communist period when the state was viewed as some paternalistic state that worries about the citizens and people. We especially investigated nationalist orientation and national identity.

Savings in Opinion

[Malisic] In your research you speak about the Manichean consciousness of Serbs, therefore, about the tendency to view the world as a black-and-white picture. By what is that conditioned?

[Kuzmanovic] It has to do with the Serbs' tendency to unshaded, rigid opinion. Thinking is in a small number of categories. All are either patriots or traitors. People push themselves into one category or the other. Naturally, I don't think that only the Serbs are prone to a black-white view of the world. But there is something in the Balkans that conditions such an opinion. I must say that the rigidity in thinking is characteristic mainly of less educated people. It's easier for them to think in a smaller number of categories. That's a savings in thinking. You make the world clearer when you have fewer categories. Naturally, that's an

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

incorrect picture of the world but, no matter, it satisfies people's needs. However, here there are also other sources of that division. They are social-historical roots tied to conflicts in those areas that have sharpened the people's perception of others as either friend or enemy. Conditions in the Balkans have been like this, people have clashed with each other, the principle of domination has been expressed, everything has been resolved by victory or defeat. Traditionally a rigid system of values has been formed, along with a heroic codex. In order for one society to be able to survive, it has had to have a firm system of standards for subjecting the individual to the collective. In this way, collectivism has created rigidity in thinking.

[Malisic] What has remained of this today?

[Kuzmanovic] It is interesting that the clashes that are happening today are returning us to a traditional, firm mentality because problems are also returning that existed then when such a character developed. Thus we are witnesses to the revitalization of old modes of thinking and behaving.

[Malisic] In which parts of Serbia are these old modes of thinking and behaving most evident?

[Kuzmanovic] It is most evident in Vojvodina, then in Belgrade, and next some other parts of Serbia. Nationalistic views have emerged in western and central parts of Serbia, but I think that this is a consequence of the fact that they are nearer the battlefield, they are bearing the brunt of things more, they are in contact more directly with refugees than people in the south or east of Serbia.

[Malisic] Could it be said that Serbs are stuck in the past?

[Kuzmanovic] Well, it couldn't be said that they have recently been fixed on the past the whole time. However, it could be said that this is a characteristic in the traditional culture of Serbs. But since the new Yugoslavia has been formed, Serbs have pretty much left the past. Serbs are the creators of Yugoslavia, they have connected themselves to it, and they did it to establish their national identity. Research shows that the Serbs nevertheless accepted the project of socialism, although many try to deny this today.

[Malisic] Can it be said that the Serbs and Orthodox church members in general are especially likely to accept socialism?

[Kuzmanovic] Probably part of the values that socialist doctrine supports correspond to some degree to the traditional values of Serbs. I speak, naturally, about what was promised and not realized under this project. But in the project itself, i.e., when legitimacy was sought for this project to be founded, it was tied to recognizable old values—solidarity, collectivism, justice.

To Be a Worshipped Serbian Leader Is Most Dangerous

[Malisic] It was probably also tied to what you described at the beginning of the conversation as the elements of national character—authoritarianism, connection with a leader...

[Kuzmanovic] Precisely so, the old conscience and old forms of reflecting contributed to accepting new communist leaders more easily. The authoritarian conscience is such that it seeks authority, accepts it uncritically, and believes too much in it.

[Malisic] But it is also uncritical when challenging the leader begins?

[Kuzmanovic] Naturally, when they are disappointed, the Serbs often kill their leaders. Then they again seek new leaders. And they think that the problem is only due to the fact that they voted wrong. Therefore, the search, being a slave to the leader, and disappointment begin anew. These circles constantly repeat themselves in our people. That form of relating to authority, that system of values with Serbs, favored the constant establishment of a leader. Only a substitution of authority took place, instead of disappointment with authoritarianism. New content is placed into the old forms. Thus our peasants said of Tito that he was our ruler. He had a similar function for them as a king. To be sure, he also behaved that way, so he "fit" well into that Serbian framework of mentality and those Serbian symbols of mentality.

[Malisic] What has your research shown? Where are the roots of Serbian nationalism today?

[Kuzmanovic] Nationalism here was not expressed in the previous period. A return to traditionalism and a return to national roots occurred because of disappointment in beliefs. Among those observed, we noticed a tendency that the greater nationalists are those that have spoken out as Yugoslavs rather than those that have spoken out as Serbs. It's evident that disappointment is in question. The breakdown in that system has created a feeling of hopelessness, a vacuum of values, a lack of perspective. That is a situation that cannot be maintained psychologically for long, because it means that you are practically living without hope, without belief. It was logical for people to seek alternative values after the collapse of the socialist project. They were offered by ideologues, distinguished intellectuals who supported a return to tradition and national roots. They ordered: "We have lost our way, and we are returning where we came

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

from." Naturally, it could have been different. If we had had different ideologues, we could have moved toward modernization instead of tradition.

[Malisic] Why do Serbs constantly return to the same modes of behavior? Does this indicate conservativeness or perhaps immaturity?

[Kuzmanovic] Maturity, naturally, should be taken as a metaphor, that other values are not understood, that mistakes are being repeated, and in that sense a certain immaturity in Serbs can be spoken about. We must correctly interpret why leaders appear. If we have chaos in society, if we have people who want something but cannot articulate this, then the first step is to accomplish this through some kind of hierarchical groups with leaders who personify these tendencies. Today there are more leaders because there are more groups with various interests. That is some pluralism. Leaders, it could be said, are various candidates to lead the people. With other peoples you also have a need for leaders.

Why Serbs Most Like Gypsies

[Malisic] Nevertheless, doesn't it seem to you that we are not seeking a usual but a charismatic leader?

[Kuzmanovic] In this we differ from other people. Because we seek a leader whom we can believe blindly, to whom we attribute the most human traits. Slobodan Milosevic has attained the aureole of charismatic leader. At that moment when he spoke a few important sentences in Kosovo, he attained the charisma of a national leader who is almost sacrificing himself for the people. He has lived for years on this. And only now is that charisma being destroyed. He also has some other traits suitable for a leader.

[Malisic] What are those traits?

[Kuzmanovic] It seems that he has characteristics that appeal to Serbs. He doesn't speak too much, he doesn't appear much, he's not an everyday man whom you can see and hear whenever you want. Thus you can't easily "consume" him. Our people think that a leader must be unusual in everything, from where he lives and what he likes to how he behaves. Our people, in this respect, like secrecy, so that they can built a cult. A modern leader is something else, he is necessary as a man who expresses well what is said among the people. Nevertheless, I must say that authoritarianism is not characteristic just of Serbs. The most bitter authoritarianism in this century occurred in Germany. Therefore, we must have in mind the fact that declines in civilization are possible with every people under certain conditions.

[Malicic] You have also researched the closed nature of the Serbian population. How great is it and can xenophobia among Serbs be spoken of?

[Kuzmanovic] Xenophobia is practically evident. On the basis of Serbs' negative attitude toward Albanians or Croats, you mustn't assume xenophobia because that is a question of real conflicts. But if mistrust of other nations exists with which we are not in conflict, then a sharper phenomenon of closing oneself off occurs. I have engaged in parallel research on ethnic distancing and have observed a tendency for Serbs to close themselves off from other peoples which was never evident before. And it didn't develop right up until the war.

[Malisic] How do you explain it then?

[Kuzmanovic] The crisis has contributed to mistrust, but the research of 20 years does not show dramatic negative attitudes of Serbs toward other peoples. There were more such attitudes among Slovenes, Albanians, and even Macedonians. Among Serbs and Montenegrins there were then the least negative views of other peoples. The war changed things all at once. People began to think that it was risky to be in close contact with members of other peoples. Refugees, for example, want to flee to the center of Serbia, or wherever Serbs are, in order to feel secure, in order to be among their countrymen. A repeat of a negative experience makes them unsure of others.

[Malisic] And what is the situation like today with Slovenes?

[Kuzmanovic] I haven't researched it, but I heard figures at a meeting last year that Slovenes now keep their distance from Serbs. One part of their research shows that Slovenes prefer to live in a neighborhood with people sick of AIDS than with Serbs. But xenophobia has also occurred with Serbs. However, it should be said that xenophobia is a state of fear of others. Fear of others must not necessarily be construed as hatred of others. Fear is relatively preventable and with it are hidden optimism and hope that people can live together.

[Malisic] But in the last several years we have been able to hear how we cannot live either with Croats or with Muslims.

[Kuzmanovic] Individual Serbian leaders, who have said that one cannot live with other people, have certainly contributed to such xenophobia. Other peoples have then replied that they cannot live with Serbs. And that is an atmosphere that generates fear and mistrust in people, which lead to a new and ever increasing tendency to close oneself off.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Malisic] It is interesting that with all the indicators of closing oneself off, mistrust, and fear of others, research also indicates the paradoxical fact that Serbs have nothing against mixed marriages. How is that possible?

[Kuzmanovic] It is certain that there are contradictions in the accounts, but they are the consequence of a situation where old and new consciences catch up with each other. In this way, when you pose a question about mixed marriages, the majority of those surveyed will say that they have nothing against them. But if you concretize the question and ask someone whether he would marry a person of another nationality, the answer is predominantly negative. Therefore, mistrust exists, but at the same time there is something that is older, and that is the idea that people choose each other based on other traits and not nationality. There are also other changed views.

About the Eternal Search for Friends

[Malisic] But let's return to the national character of Serbs, no matter how much we spoke about it conditionally. Have you noticed a certain inadequacy in the sense of the constant need of Serbs to seek friends who will love them and support them in a brotherly way. What does this indicate?

[Kuzmanovic] This also belongs to that immaturity about which we spoke. Serbs are constantly on a search for friends, they are constantly obsessed with a model of friendly relations. That is an idealization of relationships. Thus, Serbs constantly talk about brotherhood and expect that others will be disposed to them in a fraternal manner. For this reason the slogan "brotherhood and unity" has "lain" so well on Serbs. Serbs believe in something like that. They believe that relationships are built on a sentimental basis, so they seek closeness wherever relationships with a partner are observed. Thus, we are on a constant search for friends. Here we find them in Russians, and we love the French, then Romanians were enjoyed that way at one time, then Greeks. We have seen what the disappointment in Greeks was like because we thought of them not as partners but as brothers.

[Malisic] Have we been disappointed that way in Slovenes?

[Kuzmanovic] Yes, we have. I think our western brothers have not understood us on the question of Kosovo. Serbs did not expect much of them. They expected only understanding. If, for example, Slovenes had said to Serbs, "It's really not easy for you in that area," it would have been sufficient. They could have even exploited Serbs. I speak conditionally, only for someone to tap them on the shoulder and say, "Really, brother, it's not easy for you in Kosovo." But they did not want to say this. They had their views and, from their perspective, that thing does not look the same way that I am describing it. But I am speaking from an internal perspective that I have noticed in my research. Therefore, Serbs are on a constant search for friends and are constantly disappointed. And then nothing is worth anything and then they continue to search ideally, not learning a lesson, and especially not comprehending that perhaps their views are not in order, or that their expectations are not realistic. Moreover, relationships between peoples are not based on sentimental relationships but on interests.

[Malisic] In this sense, will this war at least be instructive?

[Kuzmanovic] I don't know if we'll learn a lesson but it would be good if, from this unfortunate war that has brought Serbs the greatest defeats, because Serbs have been humiliated and defeated, we draw some conclusions and, instead of looking for the ideal brothers, we become more realistic.

[Malisic] If only it doesn't happen to us that, in a compensatory interpretation of events, we again fall into the traps of mythical conscience.

[Kuzmanovic] Even Cvijic changed our idealism and tendency to attach importance to values, ideas, and ideals. That is a heavenly kingdom. When the myths in which Serbs believe are swept away, then it is seen that much illusion is added on there. That is a compensatory idealization. It has not exactly been that way. Today it is a rare Serb who can calmly accept the fact, which appears to be true, that they lost the Maricka battle because they got drunk, and the sentries got drunk and didn't notice in time that the Turks were coming. In a parallel picture of Serbs, we know that this exists, but, in certain interpretations, that other picture is forgotten and tends toward the idealization from which disappointment stems.

[Malisic] Serbs are showing distrust of other peoples, but also of their own. Within the Serbian ethos there are always divisions, conflicts, and doubts, of dynastic, political and all others.

[Kuzmanovic] As a rule their own people accept and idealize each other the most because these self-stereotypes are mostly positive, but some research, after the imposition of the embargo on the Drina, shows that this picture is being stirred up a little. There is great closeness between Serbs and Montenegrins, but negative stereotypes are also appearing, in addition to that general one that Montenegrins are lazy. For example, on the question of marriage, a somewhat greater

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

distancing from the Montenegrins is being shown due to the belief that they are unsuitable as husbands. According to this, conflicts among Serbs do not stem from their negative attitude toward their people, but from this violence, lack of restraint, poor self-control. [Malisic] Nevertheless, the degree of antagonism of Serbs is greater, it seems to me, than is the case with other peoples; why do you think so?

[Kuzmanovic] Serbs are nevertheless a political people. I think about this myself, why Serbs are often quarrelsome among themselves, is it only a psychological trait that even stems from that heroic codex of norms. Serbs value heroism very highly, a high place in the hierarchy. Another kind of success is thought less of. And this has as a consequence that all are competing with each other, so there is a certain competition for gaining position, a place in the hierarchy, or for attaining a reputation. That leads to a situation where everyone wants to be the leader, because this is thought of highly in the culture. It is more important for someone to be a leader than a writer. This leads to a never-ending race. Our conflicts, to a great extent, have stemmed from conflicts of leaders. Hatred is sometimes induced in a groups that leaders lead. And so, while Milosevic and Karadzic cooperate, everything is all right; when they quarrel, the danger of division in the people threatens. It has always been this way through Serbian history. Therefore, placing hierarchical values on a pedestal is, in my opinion, the cause of increased rivalry among Serbs. This has, as a consequence, conflicts within the people. Moreover, Serbs have a saying that, I think, no other people has: "A dram of power is worth more than an oke of intelligence."

[Malisic] Where are Serbs now in relation to the modern world, with regard to the values that prevail or the predominance of violence in character?

[Kuzmanovic] Serbia and the Serbia people are now in a terrible state. I am afraid we are entering a stage of a vacuum and of hopelessness. The communist system has been rejected, we have attempted to return to a traditionally nationalist system, it has yielded disappointing results. There will be attempts to bring about differentiation there now; we already hear certain nationalists who speak about militant and nonmilitant Serbs, in an attempt to preserve something of this, but that will go with difficulty, because this whole defeat is part and parcel of this conscience and system of values.

[Malisic] And what then? How to go on?

[Kuzmanovic] The tendencies of modernization, of a modern Serbia, of a normal life, of democracy must appear.

[Malisic] Are there chances for this?

[Kuzmanovic] The chance is not so great because we have a disappointed and frustrated people who are obsessed with their defeats and the humiliations that they have experienced. And, on the other hand, a people that is tired of war. Our research shows that people have wished for peace and have had a positive view of peace. When an attempt is made to understand these various data that we have obtained, then it would be: "We want peace, but we hope that we will resolve these nationalist questions." Peace will arrive, however, but with a feeling of defeat and humiliation.

[Malisic] Isn't this state of apathy and disappointment an obstacle to a tendency of modernization that carries enthusiasm and optimism?

[Kuzmanovic] It is certain that this is not a spiritual state that favors a return to some modern currents and a normal life. This people still needs interpreters, leaders, intellectuals, who will confront it with the truth. We must confront the truth, that we have perhaps erroneously achieved our goals, that we have not taken all circumstances into account, that we have perhaps been tied to the wrong people, that we have perhaps judged the international situation badly, that we have perhaps employed the wrong methods. When you establish a right of domination then whoever is stronger will resolve a situation, and the one in Croatia has been resolved to the detriment of Serbs, and I fear that the one in Bosnia will be resolved to the detriment of Serbs. And Serbs in Serbia are just for this, but that feeling of defeat is also present here. Therefore, we must confront the truth. We cannot achieve anything with a policy of distancing ourselves from everything or with later reconstruction. Facing the truth will not be easy, but we must return to a normal life. That's not such a big goal. In the eyes of this traditional way of thinking, it does not look so overpowering as when you say: "I will give my life in order for the national question to be resolved." You must now convert fighters to workers and that won't be easy. We will have a period of great difficulties. Therefore, when you ask me where Serbs are in relation to other peoples, I see that we have fallen off the track. We are not in Europe, which is the worst; we have reason to experience the world as unjust, because it has indeed been that. It remains for us to reject our need for love and simply to cooperate with the world.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Kosovo

Kosovo: LDK Says Albanians Oppose Inclusion in FRY

AU2004171596 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 19 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Albanians and Kosova, with the 1991 national referendum and their political movement to this very day, have made it clear they do not consider rump-Yugoslavia their own country, Dr. Fehmi Agani, vice chairman of the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK), said in Prishtina today (Friday).

Speaking to reporters, Dr. Agani emphasized that this state, calling itself "Yugoslavia" ("FRY"), has been created without Albanians and against their will. He said normalization of relations of several European countries with "FRY" was premature, occurring at a time the political, human, and civil rights of two million Albanians in Kosova are been blatantly violated by the Serbian regime. He said recognition of "Yugoslavia" by some European countries can in no way presuppose the framework for the settlement of the status of Kosova status.

Dr. Agani noted that alongside with the systematic repression, the Serbian regime has launched a vast campaign of propaganda against Kosova, spreading slanders that Albanians "have been coming to their senses to realize the best solution for them is Serbia" (sic!). Such a propaganda makes people understand better what sort of "settlement" Serbia would like for Kosova, Agani said. He added that the people of Kosova have come to know very well the nature of the Serbian propaganda by now. The public opinion in Kosova sees Serbian propaganda as lies in a network of attempts on behalf of the Serbian regime to deceive the domestic and foreign public opinion, the LDK vice chairman said. He recalled that the current state of affairs in Kosova proves that Serbia has introduced a system of discrimination and apartheid, without parallel in Europe and the world, which was proven by the latest reports of the Vienna-based International Helsinki Committee, and the UN special rapporteur on human rights in territories of former Yugoslavia, Mrs. Elizabeth Rehn.

Dr. Fehmi Agani told reporters that the president of the Republic of Kosova, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, has been continuing his trip to some European countries. He assessed as fruitful the meetings President Rugova had with Austrian Foreign Minister Wolfgang Schuessel, Alois Mock, EDU [European Democratic Union] chair and former foreign minister of Austria. President Rugova also addressed the southeast Europe delegation at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, where he stressed the need for concerted efforts of international institutions to deal with the Kosova issue and facilitate the dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade, Dr. Agani said.

Speaking about this week's trip of Kosova Prime Minister Bujar Bukoshi to the United States, the LDK vice chairman said Bukoshi met with several U.S. officials, including Mr. Rudolf Perina, deputy assistant secretary of state. The Kosova prime minister was assured that the U.S. will further support the peaceful policy of the Kosova leadership and it will make recognition of the self-styled Yugoslavia conditional on Kosova and other outstanding issues, Agani said.

Fehmi Agani spoke at length about the current developments in Kosova, noting that the Serbian regime violence against the Albanians has been mounting. He called for an immediate release of Kosova Albanians convicted by the Serbian regime on political grounds.

Kosovo: Five People Killed in Shootings in 24 Hours

AU2304143396 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 23 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Five people have been killed and four wounded in incidents in Kosovo in the last 24 hours. Unidentified people armed with automatic weapons stormed a cafe in Decani last night. Three Serbs were killed and one was injured in the shooting. In Pec, unidentified people shot at two policemen and wounded one. In Stimje, a policeman has been killed, and, in the vicinity of Mitrovica, unidentified people killed a woman and wounded a policeman.

Kosovo: 'Armed Terrorists' Kill, Injure 10 in Province

AU2304143696 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 23 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Information Service of the Serbian Interior Ministry has reported that several organized attacks by armed terrorists were carried out last night in Pec, (?Stilj), Decani, and on the Rozaje-Pristina route in the vicinity of Kosovska Mitrovica. Citizens and Serbian Interior Ministry members were attacked; five were killed, and five sustained injuries.

The relevant authorities have carried out an investigation, and the Serbian Interior Ministry is undertaking urgent measures to locate the perpetrators.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 368
MERRIFIELD, VA.

This is a U.S. Government publication produced by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

FBIS collects, translates, disseminates, and analyzes foreign open-source information on behalf of the U.S. Government. Its publications may contain copyrighted material. ***Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.***

— Bracketed indicators before the first sentence of each item describe the way in which the material was processed by FBIS.

— Headlines and all bracketed explanatory notes are supplied by FBIS.

— Personal and place names are rendered in accordance with the decisions of the U.S. Board on Geographic Names as adapted by FBIS. Unverified names in radio and television material appear in parentheses and are spelled phonetically; words and phrases in parentheses preceded by a question mark are unclear in the original and deduced from context.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

U.S. Government Customers

For a list of FBIS products, to subscribe to an FBIS publication, or to indicate a change of address contact:

FBIS
P.O. Box 2604
Washington, DC 20013-2604
Telephone: (202) 338-6735
FAX: (703) 733-6042

Non-Government Customers

Subscriptions are available from the National Technical Information Service:

NTIS
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161
Telephone: (703) 487-4630
FAX: (703) 321-8547

New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.